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This thesis is a qualitative and interpretive exploration of continuity and change in the role of 
executive agencies in UK central government.  Its three objectives are: (i) to test the longevity of 
the semi-autonomous agency model first introduced by Conservative governments after 1988; 
(ii) to explore the department-agency task division in the policymaking processes supposedly 
fragmented by this Ǯǯ; and (iii) to evaluate the paradigmatic testament of 
contemporary agency policy and practice in Whitehall.  The thesis builds from an extended case 
study conducted during the 2010 Coalition Government in the Ministry of Justice and three of its 
agencies Ȃ the National Offender Management Service, HM Courts and Tribunals Service, and the 
Office of the Public Guardian.  Social constructivist meta-theory and the application of narrative 
and discourse analysis together make for an account of interpretive transformation that is 
theorised by discursive institutionalism. 
Substantively, the thesis first describes an asymmetric departure   Ǯǯphilosophy which the 1988 Next Steps agency programme originally epitomised.  
Agency meaning is multivocal, but contemporarily converges towards accountability and 
transparent corporate governance, rather than managerial empowerment, de-politicisation and 
decentralisation.  Secondly, institutional preservation of the policy-delivery work dichotomy is 
registered, yet found to be a poor descriptor of both historic and contemporary policy 
processes.  Agency staff act as policy initiators and collaborators, contrary to ǯ quasi-
contractual, principal-agent logic, and further evidencing the departmentalisation of the once ǯ-length agency model.  Thirdly, and paradigmatically, while no unidirectional trend is 
found, the thesis adds to the growing literature positing some departure from the former 
ideological and practical predominance of Ǯnew public managementǯ.  In so doing, it also 
demonstrates the challenges faced by large-N population ecology and administrative systems 
analysis Ȃ the favoured methodology in much international agencification scholarship Ȃ in 
accounting for continuity and change in policy, practice and paradigm. 






















"As politicians know only too well but social scientists too often forget, public policy is 
made of language.  Whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages 
of the policy process." 
(Giandomenico Majone,1989) 
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Chapter 1 Ȃ Introduction 
 
State agencies are ubiquitous.  Such is their expenditure, public policy reach, and constitutional, 
political and cultural significance that it is difficult to conceive of government functioning at all 
effectively without some manner of administrative decentralisation.  Although partly testifying 
to the fragmentation and new interdependencies engendered by the contemporary dispersal of 
the executive into composite governance (Rhodes, 2000), in fact, public agencies long predate 
the modern, professionalised and democratised state (Flinders, 2008; Wettenhall, 2011).  Still, 
alongside wider trends towards outsourcing and contract-based public service delivery (Aucoin, 
1990; Barzelay, 2001; Hood, 1991), delegated governance underwent international expansion 
and reform during the 1980s and 1990s (Pollitt et al., 2001), bringing new consequences and 
challenges for public administration which are only now beginning to be understood.  Over the 
last decade, particular progress has been in macro-level analysis of governing systems in 
Europe and beyond (see contributions in Verhoest et al., 2011).  Here, shifting dynamics of 
structural disaggregation are assessed and compared quantitatively through methods first Ǯǯ(Hannan & Freeman, 1989; 
Singh & Lumsden, 1990).  However, the character and ordinary practices of individual and 
networked agencies, their street-level deployment of new politico-bureaucratic bargains of   ǡ     Ǯǯ    icy processes 
remain largely unaccounted for by these aggregative and abstracting methods.  In short, despite 
their ubiquity, little is known of what it means to be a government agency on a day-to-day basis, 
let alone whether this is changing over time.   
ǯǡǡǯǲ   ǳ  (Talbot & Johnson, 2007, p.54).  In the 
space of a decade, 138 executive agencies were created, directly employing some 60 per cent of 




the British civil service (James, 2003, pp.58, 158).  Designed to operate entrepreneurially and 
with considerable delegated authority, while at the same time exposed to new principal-agent-
style monitoring (Efficiency Unit, 1988)ǡ      Ǯǯex-ante delegation and ex-post control that underpinned much late-
twentieth-century civil service reform (Drewry & Giddings, 1995; Gray & Jenkins, 1986, 1993).  
Indeed, for making inroads where previous initiatives had failed, agencification was soon hailed ǯǲmost ambitious attempt at civil service ǳ (Treasury 
and Civil Service Committee, 1990, p.v), analogised as the modern-day ǲǳ  
Northcote-Trevelyan reforms that first established modern, meritocratic bureaucracy after the 
1850s (Jordan & O'Toole, 1995, p.3).  Retrospectively, this level of acclaim renders all the more 
remarkable the latter-      ǯ   -term impact.  
While few dispute its managerialist origins, little if any research has explored the contemporary 
character of agencification in Whitehall, nor whether agencies continue to instil the principal-
agent bargain of      ǯ     
century ago. 
Public administration has continued a rapid evolution since the Next Steps years, in the UK as 
internationally, and debate now rages over whether the managerialist paradigm continues in its 
ideological and practical predominance (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007b; Dunleavy et al., 2006; 
O'Flynn, 2007; Olsen, 2008).  Despite the intimate association with administrative 
decentralisation, however, studies of agencification have thus far contributed only marginally to 
analyses of paradigmatic continuity and change, and, again, principally through the large-N 
methodology.  Population tracing and surveys of autonomy and control have noted some 
measure of structural re-ǡ    Ǯ-ǯ s towards 
strengthened central control and larger organisational forms (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007a).  ǡ    Ǯ-ǯ measure of evolution, essential for comparative 
administrative science, this manner of system analysis should represent the beginning, not the  ǡ   ǯ   Ǥ  




but the means to effect broader cultural and institutional change under new public management 
doctrine Ȃ it was not an end in itself.  Again, therefore, there remains a pressing need to 
penetrate high-level administrative systems and register the ordinary ideas and practices by 
which delegated governance is transacted on a day-to-day basis.  This thesis offers but a small 
step in that direction. 
Departing from meta-theory which posits the social construction of governance (Bevir & 
Rhodes, 2005; Wagenaar, 2011; White, 1999; Yanow, 2000), and employing methods associated 
with the narra   Ǯǯ   ǡ      Ǥ        Ǯ ǯ  
Whitehall, and the second looks to the post-agencification policymaking process.  Both are Ǯǯǡǡǡ
the aim is to essay an inductive return to agencification, without presupposing the function of 
this now aged institution.  Latterly, the research also attends to a third, more conceptual 
question concerning the paradigmatic testament of modern agency policy and practice.  Overall, 
the first contention is that the day-to-Ǯǯ
existing literature recognises, if broadly tending to elaborate the control and accountability 
aspects of the original accountable management bargain.  In terms of public policymaking, 
moreover, the division of labour between core departments and agencies has been variously 
constructed since Next Steps, and, despite some recent recentralisations under the Coalition 
Government, description of a policy-delivery split reflects neither aspiration nor practice in the 
cases studied.  Finally, on paradigmatic stability, the situation is differentiated.  As noted, the 
thesis finds limited evidence for the deregulation and de-politicisation of executive bureaucracy 
as a public service solution, but rather strengthened accountability and control.  In thus 
attending to the meanings by which delegated governance proceeds on a day-to-day basis, 
support is found for previous claims of emergent paradigmatic hybridity (Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2011), albeit in markedly differing terms to much existing, population-focused 
literature.  




1.1 Thesis outline 
Following this introduction, the thesis unfolds in three parts.  The first deals with preliminary 
matters of context, theory and methodology.  The second contains the empirical presentation, 
which draws on document analysis and an extensive interview programme in the Ministry of 
Justice.  The third part then addresses the research questions of agency longevity, policymaking 
and paradigm, before offering wider substantive and methodological implications for the study 
of administrative decentralisation. 
Instigation 
Chapter 2 introduces the original Next Steps agency programme and its high-level evolution 
under the 1997-2010 Labour Government.  The main research agenda is formulated, before the 
internationalisation of agencification as a public management solution, and the managerialist 
doctrines underpinning this, are both recounted.  Latterly, the chapter reviews methodologies 
adopted in existing international studies of agency longevity and policymaking, noting three 
limiting tendencies.  These are: de-contextualisation, whereby agencies are dislocated from 
their local policy systems and studied aggregately as administrative systems; deductive 
empiricism, which makes for the presupposition rather than probing of governance meanings;  Ǯǯ research, which focuses on static concept measurement rather than dynamic 
(inter)organisational processes. 
Chapter 3 draws on post-empiricist social philosophy (Berger & Luckmann, 1971; Miller, 2012; 
Wittgenstein, 1986), discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008, 2010), narratology (Bal, 1985; 
Feldman et al., 2004; Patterson & Monroe, 1998) and discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2003), to 
establish a conceptual and theoretical framework.  It first translates the constructivist ontology     ǡ  Ǯǯ  Ǯǯ Ǥ  
synchronic dimension pertains to coexistent public management meanings in macro (cross-
governmental), meso (sector-specific), and micro (organisational) discourse, while diachronic 
multivocality compares temporally sequenced reconstructions at these three levels.  The 




chapter then proceeds to theorise the diachronic parameter with insights from discursive 
institutionalism.  Offering a dynamic, agent-centred understanding of social institutions, this 
frames continuity and change as the product of the ongoing discursive accomplishment of 
events and ideas.  Accordingly, the latter part of the chapter develops a general analytic 
framework by which such meaning structures can be interpreted and compared, built from 
concepts of argumentation, narrative voice and discursive differentiation.  An empirical strategy 
for generating the necessary macro, meso and micro-level discourse is also formulated.  
Analysis 
Individually and in tandem, the five empirical chapters undertake the synchronic and diachronic 
comparisons.  Initiating the analysis at the macro-discursive level, Chapter 4 traces diachronic 
continuity and change in Ǯǯ-administrative idea, comparing historic 
discourse from the Next Steps project with recent parliamentary and interview materials about 
the Public Bodies Reforms initiated in 2010.  Combining the general analytical framework with ǯ (2011) model of incremental ideational change, the chapter registers a 
considerable departure from the precepts of managerialism, civil service empowerment and 
decentralisation by which agency reform was first constructed.  Indeed, in modern Public 
Bodies discourse, agencies are reinterpreted as a mode of administrative centralisation and 
politically-ǡǯǡ
explicitly in contrast to peripheral, ǯ-length bodies. 
This contemporary departmentalisation of the agency idea  ?ǯ
meso-level (sector-specific) agency discourse.  Prefacing the main case study, this begins by 
outlining key policy and structural developments in the justice sector since the 1980s, including 
the creation of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) in 2007.  Then, drawing on historical and 
contemporary discourse, the general analytic framework traces diachronic evolution across 
justice agencification narratives from the Next Steps era and recent reforms initiated by the 
Coalition Government.  This analysis suggests an accurate initial translation of the core Next 




Steps idea, with agency status being framed in terms of de-politicisation, empowerment and 
contractual politico-administrative relations.  However, contemporarily, these managerialist        ǯ -prompted restructure, where 
fundamental difference is once again   ǯ-length bodies and agencies, the 
latter being simply a corporate governance and transparency solution. 
Chapter 6 further descends the synchronic parameter to reach micro-level, organisational 
discourse.  Drawing on the concept of relational organisational identity (Albert & Whetten, 
1985; Ashforth & Mael, 1996)ǡ       Ǯǯ  
generated in the National Offender Management Service, HM Courts and Tribunals Service, and 
the Office of the Public Guardian Ȃ the three MoJ agencies.  This follows the part-whole dialectic 
codified by the hermeneutic circle, and makes for three prominent and contextualised 
renderings of agency as: unfulfilled de-politicisation; constitutional correctness; and sound 
corporate governance.  In this manner, greater interpretive polyphony is registered at the micro 
level than either meso or micro strata. 
Chapter 7 advances the analysis from agency meaning to post-agencification policymaking.  It 
explores narrative evaluations of historic and contemporary policy process restructuring in the 
areas of offender management, courts and tribunals, and public guardianship, noting both 
synchronic inter-      Ǯǯ    nd 
opportunities of its development, yet intra-MoJ consistency in the common decrial of traditional 
policy failure by its isolatedǡǮǯ design.  This communal, historic and deeply symbolic 
tale of justice  Ǯ  ǯghast operational managers is explored 
through the concept of organisational folklore (Gabriel, 1991, 2000). 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the empirical presentation  Ǯǯ
contemporary justice policymaking.  Co-authored by researcher and researched, these chart the 
development of five justice policies during the eight-month interview programme, confirming 
the identities and evaluations narrated in the previous case study chapters, and offering a first 




look into the largely closed world of policymaking in a large and (supposedly) agencified 
Whitehall department. 
Conclusions 
Drawing on the five empirical presentations and theorised by the discursive institutionalist 
framework, Chapter 9 systematically appraises the research questions.  Regarding agency 
longevity, it describes an asymmetric evolution from the original Ǯ ǯ
philosophy of Next Steps.  Contemporary agency meaning is multivocal, but converges towards 
political accountability and transparent corporate governance, rather than managerial 
empowerment, de-politicisation and decentralisation.  As for policymaking, institutional 
preservation of the policy-delivery work dichotomy is registered, yet found to be a poor 
descriptor of both historic and contemporary policy processes.  Agency staff exercise a 
considerable role as policy initiators and collaborators, contrary to ǯ principal-agent          ǯ-length model.  
Paradigmatically, therefore, although no unidirectional trend is found, the data adds to the 
growing literature positing some departure from   ǯ former 
predominance.  Latterly, Chapter 9 addresses methodological implications for the study of 
agencies and post-agencification policymaking, returning to the three limiting tendencies noted 
previously.  It also anticipates a new research agenda prompted by the major reinterpretations Ǯǯclaimed by the thesis.  




Chapter 2 Ȃ Agencies in Government 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The governing implications of new or reconditioned administrative decentralisation, both in 
terms of the changed character of the central state, and its new capacity for policy delivery, have 
proven to be as extensive and diverse as the research literature seeking their explication.  
Theoretical approaches ranging between classical organisational science (Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2012), rational choice theory (James, 2003), cultural theory (Smullen, 2010) and new 
institutionalism (Gains, 1999; Pollitt et al., 2004) have provided fruitful explorations of 
agencification, often in multi-theoretic combination (Verhoest et al., 2010).  Nevertheless, while 
the once expansive output on UK executive agencies has dwindled in the new century, 
burgeoning interest in the transnational convergence upon the agency solution has prompted 
greater coordination of research agendas and methodologies, as illustrated by recent edited 
collections (Bach et al., 2012; Lægreid & Verhoest, 2010; MacCarthaigh & Roness, 2012; 
Verhoest, et al., 2011).  In navigating what is thus an internationalised yet increasingly codified 
scholarly terrain, this chapter aims not at systematic appraisal of the overall field, but rather at 
elucidating and contextualising the key questions of post-agencification longevity and 
policymaking that inspire the present inductive return to the British case.  Considering both 
substantive claims and established methodologies, it is here that the present ǯ
continuities and departures are framed. 
The chapter begins by outlining the lineage, design and high-level evolution of the Next Steps 
endeavour, and the empirical tensions which the thesis is to explore.1  Thereafter, it situates 
these within the wider international trend towards agencies and managerialism in government.  
                                                             
1 Much of this material has been published as Elston (2013). 




Finally, attention turns to the expanding academic literature on post-agencification longevity 
and policymaking, and the preponderance of large-N methodology. 
2.2 Agencies in the UK 
2.2.1 Overview 
The institutions of UK central government are complex and constantly evolving, extending out 
concentrically from ministerial and non-ministerial departments to a multitude of organisations 
including executive agencies, special health authorities, non-departmental public bodies, and 
public corporations (Flinders, 2008).  While many have a statutory basis, executive agencies are 
a purely administrative arrangement (Hogwood et al., 2001), crafted, reformed and terminated 
through powers of Crown prerogative (see White & Dunleavy, 2010).  Legally synonymous with ǡ ǡ Ǯǯǡǯ-length status (Pliatzky, 1992).  Still, in the UK as internationally, 
legal status is but a partial indicator of day-to-day organisational autonomy (Flinders, 2008; 
Lægreid et al., 2006; Verhoest et al., 2004).   
Figure 2.1: Executive agency population, 1988-2010 
 
(Source: see Table 2.1, below) 
Principal agencification proceeded across 1988- ? ? ? ?ǮǯǤǡ

















































































































































p.57), encompassed some 285,000 civil servants Ȃ 60 per cent of the total, excluding Northern 
Ireland.  Although the organisation count has since declined, reaching 84 by 2010, employment 
figures rose in both absolute and proportionate terms to 303,000 (62 per cent).2  This complex 
trajectory of expansion and partial decline forms the backdrop against which the following 
subsections gradually introduce a contemporary research agenda. 
2.2.2 Ǯǯ 
Intimately associated with the post-1979 Thatcherite agenda, Next Steps nonetheless enjoys 
longer lineage in the late-twentieth-   Ǯ ǯǤ   ǲthe delegation to managers of the responsibility for specific resources and the 
accountability for their use in the p   ǳ (Gray & Jenkins, 1986, 
p.181), and was     	 ǯ  ? ? ? ?    Ǥ  ǡ  ǲǳ 
departments, and review the potential of Swedish-style agencification (Fulton Committee, 1968, 
pp.51-52, 61).  Though little progress was made at the time, the so-called super-ministries of the  ? ? ? ?     ǲ    ǳ (Prime 
Minister and Minister for the Civil Service, 1970, p.6), and three agencies were also established 
(Massey & Pyper, 2005, p.85).   
Thereafter, while lacking a coherent Whitehall reform plan, the Thatcher Government sought 
major changes to the process of government, as well as civil service reductions of 100,000 (Lord 
President of the Council, 1981)Ǥ     ǲǳ  ǲǳ 
(Richards & Smith, 2002, p.101), but included a further push towards accountable management.   ǡ   ? ? ? ? 	     ǲ   ǳ
had defined objectives and could measure performance against them (Prime Minister and 
Minister for the Civil Service, 1982, p.5).  In practice, though, few delegations emerged alongside 
                                                             
2 This calculation uses the same exclusion criteria as James (2003), but its data are not wholly compatible.  
Due to central reporting inconsistencies, average FTE employment figures for 2009-2010 have been 
collected individually from agency annual reports.  Their sum is then compared with the Home Civil 
Service headcount (again, FTE), which is but a snapshot at 31st March 2010. 




the proliferation of performance indicators and increased cost-consciousness (Goldsworthy, 
1991; Greer & Carter, 1995). 
In this manner, the Next Steps development was    ǲ   ? ? ? ?-7, 
despite several years of reform, the civil serviǳ
(Greer & Carter, 1995, p.87).  As Richards and Smith (2002, p.109) ǡǲ
not a radical departure from earlier attempts at reform; rather, it was a reaction to, and 
consolidation of, previo     ǳǤ   ǡ Improving 
Management in Government: The Next Stepsǡǡǯǡǲǳǡ
making for its prioritisation over service management (Efficiency Unit, 1988, p.3).  Destined to 
enjoy significant managerial and financial autonomy from departments, task-specific delivery 
agencies were prescribed as a solution to this policy-delivery imbalance.  They would operate at ǯ-length fr      ǲ   ǳǡ 
which performance would be judged on quasi-contractual terms (Efficiency Unit, 1988, p.9).  
Thus combining delegation and responsibility, aǮǯ
the accountable management movement (Gray & Jenkins, 1993; TSCS, 1988b, p.ix).   
2.2.3 Implementing Next Steps  
According to Hennessy (1990), the draft Next Steps Report was so critical of earlier progress in ǯ             ? ? ? ? 
election.  Twelve agency candidates were initially named at its release in February 1988, but 
soon the aspiration was to cover three quarters of the civil service (TCSC, 1988a, p.9).  In the 
new decade, progress was rapid, with 50 agencies operating by 1991 (TCSC, 1991, p.vii).  A 
follow-ǲǡǡǳ
resulting from agencification, despite continuing over-regulation by departments (Efficiency 
Unit, 1991, p.12).  Latterly, increased delegations were forthcoming under Prime Minister Major 
(Gains, 2003b, p.9), although a subsequent report reaffirmed earlier concerns with over-




intervention (Trosa, 1994).  Finally, in 1997, it was announced that Next Steps was to end in 
1998, having achieved a major reconfiguration of Whitehall (Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster, 1997). 
2.2.4 Agencies under Labour Ǯ-ǯǡd 
broad cross-party support (Campbell & Wilson, 1995, p.280).  Indeed, soon after assuming 
office, the Labour Government declared: 
ǲll the evidence suggests that in the majority of cases agency status has had a 
transforming effect on the way in which executive parts of the civil service have carried 
out the tasks for which they are responsible....ǳ(Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 
1998, p.iv) 
After closing the agency programme, Labour turned to performance improvement and 
interorganisational collaboration (Minister for the Cabinet Office, 1999).  In particular, as James 
(2001b, p.25) ǡǮ-ǯǮ
ǯ           
agencies (see Cabinet Office, 1999a).  Thus, by 1999, the new government was arguing: 
ǲ  for all agencies to consider is whether there is scope for improving 
performance by cooperation with bodies beyond the agency boundary. ... [Agencies] 
have a vital role to play in fostering ... growth in cooperative solutions to ... meet needs 
that are not themselves constrained by bureaucratic boundariesǤǳ (Minister for the 
Cabinet Office, 1999, pp.v-vi) 
In 2002, the last wide-ranging review into agencification extended this argument into a fuller 
critique of fragmentation, suggesting that, although agencies had been culturally transformative, ǲ-defined aims 
of tǳ(Office of Public Services Reform, 2002, pp.3, 11).  Accordingly, it was now ǲng distinctions between policy and service delivery in ǡǳǤ 




Overall, then, as Schick (2002, p.51) explains, Labour refocused attention onto the operation of  ǡ     ǲdepartmental subdivisions, not independent 
entitiesǳǤ      ǣ     ǡ -
governmental Next Steps agency reviews; the ending of quinquennial performance appraisal; 
the decline in framework document maintenance (see Section 2.2.6, below); the adoption of 
some departmental rather than agency-specific frameworks (Department for Transport, 2009; 
Department for Work and Pensions, 2008); the advent of departmental Public Service 
Agreements; and the gradual return to interorganisational shared corporate services (Elston & 
MacCarthaigh, 2013; Gershon, 2004).  Therefore, while retaining a central position in the ǡǲǳ(Gains, 2003b, p.17). 
2.2.5 Population dynamics 
As noted above, by 2010, the UK-wide agency population declined to 84, yet employment rose 
slightly compared with 1997.  This apparent contradiction can be probed further by adopting an Ǯǯǡn a defined 
population Ȃ a method examined more closely in Section 2.4, below.  Using archival data, Table 
2.1 ǯ
literature and existing research (Cabinet Office, 2006; Massey & Pyper, 2005, p.90).  These are: 
privatisation (by sale or outsourcing); agency merger; departmental reintegration; and 
miscellaneous (including agency reclassification).  All closures are listed according to the 
dominant direction of transfer (for example, the majority of HM Stationery Office was sold in 
1996, so this is classed as a privatisation).3   
                                                             
3 Without an official agency register across 1988-2010, full coverage cannot be guaranteed, but the 
entries and exits in Table 2.1 are internally consistent. 













b Reintegrated Misc.c Total 
1988 3 - - - - 0 +3 3 
1989 6 - - - - 0 +6 9 
1990 25 - - - - 0 +25 34 
1991 23 - - - - 0 +23 57 
1992 19 - - - - 0 +19 76 
1993 16 1 - - - 1 +15 91 
1994 12 - - - 1 1 +11 102 
1995 14 3 4 - - 7 +7 109 
1996 31 8 1 - 2 11 +20 129 
1997 12 3 - - - 3 +9 138 
1998 4 - 2 1 1 4 0 138 
1999 6 - 6 1 2 9 -3 135 
2000 5 - 3 6 - 9 -4 131 
2001 6 - 4 3 2 9 -3 128 
2002 3 - 2 2 1 5 -2 126 
2003 10 - 6 1 2 9 +1 127 
2004 3 - 2 4 - 6 -3 124 
2005 6 - 1 6 3 10 -4 120 
2006 5 - 4 5 1 10 -5 115 
2007 6 - 8 8 2 18 -12 103 
2008 6 - 8 6 3 17 -11 92 
2009 3 - 3 4 1 8 -5 87 
2010 2 - - 2 3 5 -3 84 
Totals 226 15 54 49 24 142   
 
a Includes merged agencies; exǮǯǤ 
b For merged agencies, all original bodies are listed as closed and a new agency is counted. 
c Includes agencies closed for further disaggregation, those whose functions were dropped from government 
altogether (without being privatised), and those reclassified. 
Sources: the Next Steps annual reviews before 1999 (for example, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1997); 
departmental and agency annual reports after 1999; and, occasionally, statements in Hansard. 
 
Agency launches, 1988-2010 
Between 1988 and 1997, Next Steps produced 161 agencies.  Nominally, the majority involved 
new organisational disaggregations, but some functions actually pre-existed in recognisably 
separate forms (see Talbot, 2004).  Latterly, several agencies were also made by small-scale 
rationalisations of already devolved functions.  Afte  ǯ    ? ? ? ?ǡ  ? ? 
agencies were created.  Some involved newly decoupled functions, but, in contrast with the Next 
Steps programme, over half were from rationalisations Ȃ principally, mergers Ȃ of the existing 
population. 




Agency closures, 1988-2010 
Initially, privatisation was the main dissolution method.  Of the 15 such closures during Next 
Steps, 12 constitute full privatisations and three involved major contracting-out.  Since 1997, 
there have been no direct privatisations, although, as Burnham and Pyper (2008, pp.146-147) 
demonstrate, some functions formerly undertaken by agencies have, since dissolution, been 
sold.  In addition, 54 closures have been classified as due to agency mergers, 49 as departmental 
reintegrations, and 24 as miscellaneous.  Mostly occurring after 1997, these developments 
suggest a mixed evolution overall, and this is complicated by the post-1999 devolution 
settlements to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  Existing work has already demonstrated 
post-   ǯ-length governance (Flinders, 2008).  On this basis, Table 
2.2 further disaggregates the UK-wide data by sub-polity.  (Appendix I includes separate year-
by-year chronologies for each country, and brief commentaries). 




Agency Dissolutions Agencies 
in 2010 Privatised Merged Reintegrated Misc. 
Scotland 20 - - 6 1 13 
Wales 4 - - 3 - 1 
Northern Ireland 28 - 6 7 2 13 
Central UK 174 15 48 33 21 57 
Whole UK (Total) 226 15 54 49 24 84 
 
As Table 2.2 demonstrates, rationalisation in both Scotland and Wales was predominantly 
through full de-agencification.  In Northern Ireland, a mixture of de-agencification and agency-
to-agency mergers occurred.  Thus, with these figures removed, UK central government is 
shown to have pursued mergers (48) over de-agencification (33).  Of the mergers, 43 came after 
1997, often being rationalised as improving inter Ǯ-ǯ  ǡǯ-fragmentation agenda.  The formation of the Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency, for example, explǲǳCoastguard Agency 
and Marine Safety Agency (Minister for the Cabinet Office, 1999, p.141), while, more recently, 




amalgamation of the Pensions Service and Disability and Carers Service ǲmore holistic ǳ (Disability and Carers Service, 2008, p.4).  In this manner, the original task 
specialisation pursued by Next Steps agencies has been eroded. 
Of the 33 departmental reintegrations in UK central government, 24 were in the Ministry of 
Defence.  During the 1990s, this department thoroughly embraced the agency model (Hogwood, 
1995), but its population steadily declined thereafter, initially through mergers, but increasingly 
through reintegrations.  From a highpoint of 44 agencies, there were just nine by the end of 
2010.  An official offered a transaction-cost rationale for this pronounced de-agencification,    ǲthe overheads that go with a very  ǳ, and a   ǲthe decentralising tendency in the Department went ...      ? ? ? ?ǳ 
(see House of Commons Defence Committee, 2006, p.19).  There has been no similarly coherent 
rollback elsewhere, with most reintegrations occurring before 2001 in similarly low-profile 
sectors.  Therefore, in contrast to Scotland and Wales, de-agencification in Whitehall has, prior 
to the 2010 Coalition Government, been restricted to one particularly agencified department 
and some small-ǯrapid initial implementation. 
2.2.6 Task division 
Next Steps 
While organisational ecology offers a high-level, longitudinal analysis of structural change, it 
says little of delegated responsibilities.  Agencification is particularly associated with a division 
of policymaking and implementation tasks (Drewry & Giddings, 1995; Hyndman & Eden, 2001; 
Pyper, 1995).  Hogwood (1995, p.518) ǲǳǡǡ
James et al. (2011, p.62)ǡ  ǲǳǤ ǡ
the time, not only were commentators sceptical about the benefits of such rigid decoupling, but 
many found scant evidence of its enforcement.  Pyper (1995, p.24), for instance, notes a ǲǮǯǳǡ
would contribute ideas when requested, or ǲ-active roleǳǤ




Greer (1994, p.61) divides agencies between those funded with a specific parliamentary vote 
and those subsumed into departmental financing, noting that the former often have policy 
responsibilities defined in their framework documents.  Similarly, a government review found ǲ ǤǤǤ  ǳ (Trosa, 1994, p.3), andǡ       ǯ  ǡ
Hogwood et al. (2001, p.44) observed: 
"While many agencies have no direct input into policy issues (and there are few directly 
concerning them), in a limited number of cases the agency is the main source of policy 
advice because it is the repository of expertise, and in others the agency has the right to 
be consulted about any policy proposals affecting them, and to make policy proposals."  
These analyses all pertain to the initial post-agencification period and draw evidence solely 
from framewoǤ ǡǯ-delivery 
task division.  As Page and Elder conclude: 
ǲIt is problematic (as well as inaccurate) to accept without at least some qualifications 
the distinction between policy and operational delivery as underpinning the whole of 
the reforms in Britain, since many ministries have operational responsibilities and many 
agencies are involved in policy makingǤǳ(1998, p.29) 
Post-Next Steps 
Against this benchmark, Table 2.3 compares framework documents for 47 of the 58 agencies 
operating in Whitehall in 2010.  Most were authored under Labour but, reflecting the decline in 
framework maintenance, some predate the 1997 election.  Documents are classed by a 
taxonomy of three hierarchically-ordered groups.  This was formed inductively and iteratively 
through successive readings of the sample, but it remains an academic construct.  The first 
group contains frameworks reporting a significant, regularised policymaking role for agencies.  
These further subdivide between those leading in policy development and those sharing 
responsibilities with the sponsor.  The Identity and Passport Service represents the former.  Its ǲǳ, so that its 
chief executive is ǲǳ (Home 




Office, 2009, p.6).  The second subset of the first group is illustrated by the National Offender 
Management Service, which is ǲfully participative and influential in the process for setting ǳ (Ministry of Justice, 2008, 
p.15).  The second major category includes agencies whose policy participation is periodic, 
occurring more explicitly at the discretion of departments.  Agencies may be consulted on policy 
matters, or assist departments in advising ministers.  HM Courts Service (2008, p.21), for 
example, was to be consulted by the Ministry of Justice ǲ ǳǤ  Finally, the third major category lists frameworks with no details of a 
devolved policy role.  This is not to say that, in practice, these agencies do not contribute to 
policymaking.  However, there is no framework delegation. 





Table 2.3: Devolved policy responsibilities in UK central government framework documents 
Agency undertakes significant levels of policy formulation and 
development work 
Agency undertakes periodic policy development 
work, either assisting the department with the 
formulation of ministerial policy advice, or being 
consulted on operational aspects of policy 
Agency has no formal policy responsibilities 
Agency leads on policy 
and/or legislative matters 
Agency and department share 
policy duties (agency may 
lead in certain areas and/or 
is a key Ministerial advisor) 
FERA (2009) 
Identity and Passport Service 
(2009) 
National Fraud Strategic 
Authority (2008) 
National Measurement Office 
(2010) 
Office of the Public Guardian 
(2009) 
UK Intellectual Property Office 
(2008) 
Defence Storage and 
Distribution Agency (2003) 
Defence Support Group (2008) 
Defence Vetting Agency (2006) 
Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratory (2006) 
Forest Research (2003) 
MHRA (2004) 
NOMS (2008) 
Ordnance Survey (2004) ǯ
(1996) 
Skills Funding Agency (2010) 
The National Archives (2009) 
UK Border Agency (2009) 
UK Debt Management Office 
(2005) 
UK Hydrographic Office (2007) 
Valuation Office (2009) 
Veterinary Medicines 
Directorate (1995) 
Asset Protection Agency (2009) 
Department for Work and Pensions (2008) 
(encompassing Jobcentre Plus and Pension, Disability 
and Carers Service)  
Highways Agency (2009) 
HM Courts Service (2008) 
Planning Inspectorate (1998) 
Rural Payments Agency (2005) 
Service Personnel and Veterans Agency (2007) ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ 
 
Central Office of Information (1998) 
CEFAS (2008) 
Companies House (2009) 
Criminal Records Bureau (2003) 
FCO Services (2008) 
Forest Enterprise England (2003) 
Land Registry (2008) 
Met Office (2007) 
Ministry of Defence Police and Guarding Agency (2006) 
National Savings and Investments (2009) 
People, Pay and Pensions Agency (2008) 
Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre (2003) 
The Royal Parks (1993) 
Tribunals Service (2006) 
Veterinary Laboratories Agency (1995) 
Wilton Park (2009) 
 
Six framework documents could not be sourced.  Moreover, the five agencies in the Motoring and Freight Services Group (Driving Standards Agency; Driver and Vehicle Licensing 
Agency; Government Car and Despatch Agency; Vehicle Certification Agency; Vehicle and Operator Services Agency) are excluded because this grouped format was incompatible with 
the analysis. 




Table 2.3 includes major departures from Next Stepsǯ prescription.  In particular, documents 
listed in the first two subcategories bear little resemblance to the official model of disaggregated 
policy and implementation.  However, given doubts over the extent to which Next Steps 
achieved a full separation during the 1990s, the question of an evolving task division is 
problematic. ǡǯ Ǯ-ǯ
of agency fragmentation in the 1990s, and this pertained not simply to horizontal, inter-agency 
collaboration, but also to vertical detachment of policymaking and operational delivery.  As one 
report from this Ǯ
ǯǣ 
ǲonal and management changes over the past decade have emphasised ǡǮǯ
demands that they be re-   ǡ ǡ  Ǥǳ (Cabinet 
Office, 1999b, p.9) ǯ 2002 agencification review ǲ
is considered bǳ(Office of Public Services Reform, 2002, p.5).  As such, 
whether or not widely achieved during Next Steps, decoupled policy and delivery was identified 
and critiqued by Labour.   
Illustrations of remedial action to reintegrate policy and implementation are found in 
restructuring like that in the Department of Transport, which brought together five agencies as 
the Motoring and Freight Services Group.  This operated a single framework, and was intended ǲǡǳ(Department for Transport, n.d.).  To similar effect, the Department 
for Constitutional Affairs removed policy work to its agencies in the middle of the decade in 
order to ensure operationally-informed policymaking (Civil Service Capability Reviews, 2006).  
More recently, in the trade and industry sector, the National Measurement Office (2010, p.2) 
was devolved formerly-centralised policy responsibilities, and the Skills Funding Agency was   ǲǳ ǯ-leng     ǲ ǳ  
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2010, p.9).   




This trenǲǳ(Elston, 2013) under Labour is further evidenced 
by early Coalition Government developments.  Both coalition parties oppose policy activities 
being undertaken outside of departments (Gash et al., 2010, p.29), and, prior to the 2010 
election, Conservative leader David Cameron (2009) argued that quangos Ȃ including executive 
agencies Ȃ   ǲ ǳǤ   e inherited state of devolution, 
therefore, policy functions have been recentralised since 2010 (Jenkins & Gold, 2011). 
2.2.7 Discussion: towards a research agenda 
This review of executive agencies began by detailing their accountable management lineage, the 
design and implementation of Next Stepsǡ  ǯ , qualified critique.  An 
organisational ecology then traced structural developments across 1988-2010, and a 
framework document review probed the contemporary department-agency task division.  
These materials raise at least two questions   ǯ  ǡ  
continuity and change and post-agencification policymaking.  These are elaborated below. 
Continuity and change in agencification 
Given the decline in UK agencification scholarship over the last decade, the question of 
continuity and change has received scant attention, and opinions divide as to the nature of post-
Next Steps developments.  On one side, Talbot and Johnson (2007, p.55) ǡǲ
large-scale disaggregation of the early 1990s policy seems to have almost completely reversed ǡǳǤǲǳy.  Although 
largely evidenced by anecdote,   ǯ    ǡ
prompting Pollitt (2007, p.532) ǲ
from the semi-ǳǡ (2007, p.227) ǲe reversal of    ǡ     ǳǤ  The idea of cyclical 
(de)centralisation is a familiar one in administrative science generally (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 
2004, p.81; Wettenhall, 2011), but, in the UK, the maintenance of agency employment figures 




and tendency towards mergers rather than de-agencification are somewhat qualifying (see 
Elston, 2013).  Thus, on the other side of the debate, James et al. (2011, pp.62, 67) maintain that    ǲ Ǯde-ǯ ǳǡ    ǲǳǤǡǡ being largely 
supported by reference to the original agency proposition and its early development, rather 
than empirical detail on contemporary implementation.  For instance, the authors describe the 
salience of framework documents, sponsorship, ministerial advisory boards on performance, 
and separated policy and delivery.  Although recognisably the intent of the 1980s-1990s design, 
it is unclear that agency practice necessarily continues along these lines today, particularly ǡǯ
entity, and the significant reunification of policy and delivery functions, all noted above.   
In this light, the population ecology in Section 2.2.5, above, represents but a limited assessment 
of continuity and change.  Next Steps was about more than shuffling organisational boundaries; 
it aimed at cultural change, redefined politico-bureaucratic relations, and a new bargain of 
autonomy and control.  As such, longitudinal analysis of structures can be a rounded gauge of 
administrative evolution only if it is assumed, firstly, that Next Steps did originally achieve its 
cultural and operational aims, and, secondly, that these dynamics were felt equally across a 
quarter of a century of governance thereafter.  Implicitly, these assumptions are adopted in 
much contemporary literature, which, in broader studies of quangos and public management 
reform, still describe agencification through the Next Steps imagery of quasi-contractual 
decentralisation, decoupled policy and operations, and ex-ante autonomisation (for example, 
Drewry, 2011; Flinders & Skelcher, 2012; James, et al., 2011; Pina et al., 2012; Pyper & 
Burnham, 2011)ǤǡǯǮ-ǯǡ
as well as the non-statutory definition of agencies and the only partial link between formal and 
operable autonomy, such assumptions are untenable.  Rather, as the international research 
agenda has recognised, agency autonomy and control are matters for ongoing empirical 




investigation (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006b; Verhoest, et al., 2004; Verhoest, et al., 2010).  It is 
on this basis that the first empirical research question is formed: 
 ?ǣǮǯ
the UK, and has this changed over time? 
As Chapter 3 explains, this focus on meaning is of epistemological as well as practical import 
within an explicitly interpretive and narrative investigation.  For now, however, this research 
question is rationalised on the grounds that, contemporarily, agencies operate in a markedly 
differing context to that surrounding Next Steps, and, in the intervening period, have been 
exposed to various critiques and second-generation reforms.  In failing to attend fully to the 
dynamics of contemporary agency practice, existing research is able to form only a very limited 
opinion on longevity. 
Post-agencification policymaking 
Little if any work has probed beneath framework documents to analyse emerging dynamics of 
post-agencification policymaking.  Still, although focused on other aspects of the agency 
endeavour, the two main theoretical accounts of Next Steps offer contrasting perspectives on its 
likely nature (Gains, 1999; James, 2003)Ǥǯ(1991) bureau-shaping model, 
which offers a rational-ǯdetaching of under-valued service 
management tasks, James (2003) explains Next Steps as the product of such utility-maximising 
strategies.  His contention is that, faced with a heightened political concern for service ǡ    Ǯau-ǯ      ǡ
undervalued tasks would transfer to agencies, and interesting, high-status policy and ministerial 
work remain within departments.  Empirical support for this account is claimed in a variety of 
quartersǡǡǲȏȐǳ(James, 
2003, p.116).  Nonetheless, there remain significant problems with the idea that departmental 
officials designed the agency reforms largely independently of politicians and the core executive 




(Marsh et al., 2000).  For one, this neglects the fact that Next Steps was a centrally-driven 
initiative which, following the managerialist concern for political primacy, already advocated 
separate policy and operations prior to individual departmental implementations (Elston, 
2010).  Moreover, bureau-shaping fails to explain cases where policy responsibilities were 
explicitly and formally devolved to agencies; for example, in the case of the Prison Service (HM 
Prison Service, 1993; Whitmore, 1994).   
      
ǯ (1999, 2003a) examination of department-agency 
relationships, which adopts policy network theory to examine new actor dependencies forged 
by agencification.  A policy network i    ǲ    
between governmental and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated   ǳ (Rhodes, 2006b, p.426).  Actors are interdependent Ȃ there is power 
dependency between them Ȃ and thus goal achievement depends on exchanging financial, legal, 
political and informational resources (Rhodes, 2006b, p.431).  On this basis, Gains posits that 
Next Steps redistributed resources between departments and new agencies, and, therein, 
altered their interdependencies.  Departments retained political legitimacy, authority and 
financial resources, and agencies gained ǲǡ     ǤǤǤ  ǳ (Gains, 1999, pp.53, 251).  By extensionǡ ǲ 
more powerful participants in the policy process because of the knowledge and operational ǳ. 
James (2003) and Gains (1999) offer clear, if contradictory, perspectives on the post-Next Steps 
policymaking process, with bureau-shaping predicting an enforced task division between 
principals and agents, and policy networks positing their base interdependence.  However, 
neither study is addressed to policymaking directly, and, moreover, both accounts are now 
dated.  Accordingly, the second research question for this project is: 
Research Question 2: What position do agencies occupy within the policymaking process, and 
has this changed over time? 




In turning to post-agencification policymaking, the question of longevity remains significant.  As  ǡ ǯ Ǯ- ǯ agenda was in part designed to reunify 
policymaking and delivery, and there is evidence of some functional reaggregation after 1997, 
even if 1990s framework documents hardly point to full initial decoupling (see Section 2.2.6, 
above).  Moreover, Elder and Page (2000, p.224) suggest that it is actually with maturity that 
agencies may become more powerful policy actors, since departmental expertise will diminish 
over time.  For this reason, sensitivity to historical transformation is required across both 
components of the research agenda. 
2.3 Agencies internationally 
Having established an empirical research agenda based on post-agencification longevity and 
policymaking, this section considers the international trend towards agencification.  Not only 
does this confirm the salience of these areas in the study of delegated governance generally, but 
it also situates Next Steps within its paradigmatic context and, in so doing, adds a third element 
to the investigation in terms of the doctrinal stability of managerialism in government. 
2.3.1 Ǯǯ 
Next Steps was not without parallel internationally.  Indeed, Pollitt et al. (2001) identify an ǲ ǳ world since the 1980s, and the 
burgeoning international and comparative research in this field points to similar contagion 
within the academy (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006b; Pollitt & Talbot, 2004; Pollitt, et al., 2004; 
Smullen, 2010; Verhoest, et al., 2010; Verhoest, et al., 2011).  This is not to deny the pre-
existence of administrative decentralisation in many states (Wettenhall, 2005), nor the diversity 
of the organisational forms attained since the 1990s (Van Thiel, 2011).  On this latter point 
specifically, Christensen and Lægreid (2006a, p.12) ǲ
does varies considerably across national and organizational cultures, legal systems and political ǳǤǡǡǲȋ
semi-autonomous agency) and a management process (target setting, performance indicators, 




feedback) has be   Ǯ ǯǳ (Pollitt, 2006, p.301), adopted to varying 
degrees in situations as diverse as Ireland (MacCarthaigh, 2012), the Netherlands (Smullen, 
2004), the EU (Barbieri & Edoardo, 2008), Canada (Aucoin, 2006), New Zealand (Boston, 1995), 
Japan (Nakano, 2004), and Tanzania (Sulle, 2010). 
While shared concerns of finance and efficiency partly account for this convergence (Pollitt, et 
al., 2001, pp.276-277)ǡ    ǲ ǳ    
(Verhoest, et al., 2010, p.106)Ǥ   ǲ ǳ
governance is the OECD (Pal, 2012, p.xvii), which is often credited with advancing homogenising 
reforms (Goldfinch, 2009; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004).  On agencies specifically, its 1995 report, 
Governance in Transition, suggested that: 
ǲDevolving managerial authority is a corner-stone of reforms to improve the 
performance of the public sector.  In essence, reforms under this heading involve giving 
managers greater flexibility and incentives to achieve results, relaxing traditional 
central controls on the use of resources.  New managerial freedoms are balanced by 
greater accountability involving specification of targets, performance measurement and 
reporting of results achieved.ǳ (OECD, 1995, p.29) 
This reǮǯfication in the UK.  
However, though often overlooked, the OECD view on administrative reform was more nuanced 
than outright valorising of a single best-practice solution, as Pal (2012) recently demonstrated.  ǡ   ǯ er-day disillusionment with agencification (see 
below), it actually warned in 1995 that agencies risked fragmentation and poor coherence, 
accountability and operationally-informed policymaking (OECD, 1995, pp.29-32).  Nonetheless, 
sufficiently pervasive was the agency reform logic that academics have codified its doctrinal 
basis into various pan- Ǯ-ǯ Ǥ       Ǥǯǲ ǳǡ   the three elements of ǲǳǡ ǲǳǡ ǲǳǤǣ 
ǲȏȐ-type model for modern agencies is: where an organization has been clearly 
and probably formally separated from any other public organization; where it has some 
degree of discretion over internal rule setting (e.g. over personnel, finance and other 




arrangements); and where it is subjected to some sort of contractual or quasi-  Ǥǳ (Pollitt, et al., 2004, 
p.42) 
This model has been widely cited, although some research adds the separation of policymaking 
and implementation as a fourth dimension (Verhoest, et al., 2010; Verschuere, 2009; Verschuere 
& Barbieri, 2009)Ǥ  ǡ       ǯ ǡ 
empowerment and contract-based control.  Importantly, though, these models are taken as   ǲǳǡ     ǲ Ȃ and unrealities Ȃ  ȏȐǳ
(Pollitt, et al., 2004, p.46).  A considerable research industry has thus developed to test the 
empirical prevalence of ex-ante de-regulation and ex-post control across diverse politico-
administrative contexts (see Christensen & Lægreid, 2006b; Verhoest, et al., 2004; Verhoest, et 
al., 2010). 
2.3.2 Paradigmatic basis 
Agencification as envisaged by the international tripod model is widely read as a key expression 
of the broader, paradigmatic shift away from hierarchical, command-and-control styles of 
government towards leaner, more entrepreneurial and explicitly business-orientated 
approaches (Barzelay, 2001; Hood, 1991).  Though often critical of its assumptions and 
consǡ        Ǯ  ǯ ȋȌ 
more than two decades.  Famously lacking in theoretical and practical coherence, NPM defies 
close definition.  Nonetheless, its doctrines broadly proceed from analogising public service 
delivery to industrial production, whereupon improvement is sought by market forces, 
entrepreneurship and de-regulation (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Gregory, 2007).  To this end, NPM 
is particularly felt in the private-sector inspiration for the parent-subsidiary model of 
department-agency contracting (James, 2001a), the pursuit of task-specific organisations 
(Roness, 2007), the potential decoupling of policymaking and implementation as purchaser and 
provider (Dollery, 2009; Stewart, 1996), and the (alleged) shift from ex-post to ex-ante controls 
(Hoggett, 1996; Pollitt, 2006; Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002).  Indeed, so intimate is the paradigmatic 




association that agencification has been cǲmost frequently adopted and far-reachingǳ
policies of NPM (Moynihan, 2006, p.1029).  Moreover, often (dis)credited ǲǳǡin 
the UK, its Next Steps programme is understood to epitomise managerial reforms in executive 
government (Barzelay, 2001; Wegrich, 2009). 
2.3.3 Agencification and managerialism: a turning tide? 
While NPM continues to provide fertile ground for politico-administrative research, scholars are 
increasingly questioning the security of its doctrines within the new century (Alford & Hughes, 
2008; Christensen & Lægreid, 2007b; Dunleavy, et al., 2006; Olsen, 2008; Skelcher, 2000).  A 
split has emerged between research purporting further paradigmatic shift or essential 
continuity and entrenchment.  On the one hand, Dunleavy et al. (2006) identify ǲǳ
NPM and its substitution  ǲ- ǳǡ evidenced in part by the second-
generation, anti-fragmentation reforms initiated by many governments.   Also on the decline 
side is Pal (2012, p.6), who contends that, with the 2008 financial crisis and increase in state ǡǯǲǳǤ ǡ§(2007a, 
p.11) register a layering of new reforms over enduring managerialist precepts, identifying not a ǡǲǡ
single-ǳǤ 	ǡ
(2011) find very limited evidence 
of  ǲ-ǳ ǡ ǡ    ǡ Wegrichǯ (2009, p.152) claim is ǲǳǤ 
Though by no means exhaustive, this sampling of opinion demonstrates the salience of, and 
contestability within, the current paradigm debate.  Despite offering different interpretations, 
both Dunleavy et al. (2006) and Christensen and Lægreid (2007a) evidence their claims for ǯtion with developments in agencification.  Dunleavy et al. (2006) point to 
diminishing enthusiasm for agencies both in the UK and internationally.  The former can be seen  ǯ -Next Steps anti-fragmentation reforms, while the latter is illustrated by the ǯǡto wit, following its initial (if qualified) enthusiasm, 




the subsequent Modernising Government report identified ǲmounting evidence that OECD 
countries that have delegated a lot of responsibility to arm's-length bodies are rethinking the ǳ (OECD, 2005, p.118).  In this manner, as Smullen (2010, p.19) observes, 
latter-day OECD discourse essays a marked reinterpretation of agencies ǲǡǳǤ 
In their more cautious diagnosis of paradigmatic evolution and layering, Christensen and 
Lægreid (2007a) similarly claim a lessened emphasis on structural disaggregation.  As they ǡǯǲǤǤǤ
political systems are now trying tǮǯǳ (Christensen et al., 2007, p.25).  Longitudinal work on agency populations has 
supported this assessment; for example, in noting a trend towards agency mergers similar to 
that observed in the Next Steps organisational ecology, above (Verhoest, et al., 2011). 
2.3.4 Discussion: supplementing the research agenda 
In highlighting the international prevalence of agency reform and its paradigmatic association 
with NPM, this section both confirms the significance of post-agencification longevity and 
policymaking to the global study of administrative decentralisation, and prompts a third, more 
conceptual research question to complement these two empirical concerns.  Specifically, on the 
understanding that, as Drewry (2011, p.199) ǡ     ǯ ǲflagship ǳǡhe proposed exploration of continuity and change can offer a wider 
commentary on the long-term stability of managerialist doctrines.  Accordingly, the final, 
supplementary research question is: 
Research Question 3: What does an understanding of the evolving meaning and policymaking 
role of executive agencies suggest about the stability of managerialism in Whitehall? 
2.4 Methodological trends in agency research 
Having established a research agenda built around post-agencification longevity, policymaking 
and paradigmatic stability, this final section reviews methodologies favoured in international 




research.  The first subsection considers large-N studies of longevity, and the second looks to 
the small but growing literature on agency policymaking. 
2.4.1 Agency longevity: the preponderance of system analysis 
Within the burgeoning international canon on agencification, the most prolific longitudinal 
work takes the form of system analysis Ȃ that is, analysis of evolution within administrative 
systems as a whole.  Implicitly  ǡ        ǲǳ  ǲ ǳ (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1989), for which the unit of 
analysis is not individual organisations, but collectivities (Peters & Hogwood, 1991).  
Originating in private sector analyses of firm density and survival in competitive industries (see 
Carroll et al., 2009)ǡ ǲ         ǳ (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, p.936).  
Organisational ecology thus examines rates of member entry, exit and change within the 
population, and, potentially, the influence of internal group dynamics and external social and 
environmental forces on these developments (Singh & Lumsden, 1990).  Transferred to 
governmental analysis, the claim is that thi     ǲ  ǳ(Peters & Hogwood, 1991, p.83). 
The Next Steps chronology presented in Section 2.2.5, above, represents a simple example of 
organisational ecology, and many published analyses of agency trends adopt a similar 
population focus without necessarily    Ǯǯ (see examples in 
Verhoest, et al., 2011).  More directly, population ecology has prompted discussion of agency ǲǳǡ ǲǳǡǲǳǲǳ (MacCarthaigh & Roness, 2012, p.776), 
and new exploration of the dynamics of agency termination (Adam et al., 2007; Rolland & 
Roness, 2011).  A growing literature is also examining the effect of a variety of organisational 
and environmental variables on rates of agency formation, modification and termination, 
including legal classification, performance, national accession to the European Union, and 




isomorphism by international NPM reform doctrine (Hajnal, 2012; James et al., 2011; æ
& Budraitis, 2012; Rolland & Roness, 2012). 
Administrative systems analysis has advanced the study of agencification considerably, enabling 
longitudinal and cross-country comparative analysis, and hypothesis-led explanatory research.  
Able particularly to trace the changing dynamics of bureaucratic fragmentation against the ǯǡthe approach is well suited to the cross-
the-board targeting of agencification as a pan-government system redesign.  Still, population 
ecology is not without its problems.  In particular, even setting aside the issue of ontological 
reification (discussed in the next chapter), there are challenges of defining both the population 
of interest and the nature of life cycle events (Carroll, et al., 2009; MacCarthaigh & Roness, 2012; 
Peters & Hogwood, 1991).  Moreover, by its very nature, the approach is based on a certain 
amount of abstraction and de-contextualisation.  This is critiqued further below.  
2.4.2 Post-agencification policymaking: from systems to cases 
There is growing interest in the impact of agencification upon public policy processes (Bach, 
2010; Bach, et al., 2012; Niklasson & Pierre, 2012; Painter et al., 2010; Verschuere, 2009), 
although, as Verschuere and Bach (2012, pp.184-185) note, relatively speaking, this aspect of 
the research agenda is underdeveloped.  The largest body of work follows in the manner of 
administrative system analysis, often being conducted within broader research programmes 
that seek to probe the empirical prevalence of the autonomy and control dimensions envisaged 
by ideal-type agency models (Verhoest, et al., 2010; Verhoest, et al., 2011)Ǥǲ    ǳ       absence of its sponsor 
(Verhoest, et al., 2004, p.104), multiple dimensions of agency autonomy have been probed, ǲǳǡ an agenǯ-making ability regarding: 
ǲhe (sub)processes and procedures it has to conduct to produce the externally 
prescribed good or services; the policy instruments to use to implement the externally 
set policy and the quantity and quality of the goods or services to be produced; and the 
target groups and societal objectives and outcomes to be reached by the policy.ǳ
(Verhoest, et al., 2004, p.105) 




Operationalised through standardised, (cross-)national surveys of agency chief executives, this 
coordinated methodological endeavour has sought to investigate de facto (rather than de jure) 
policy autonomy, offering hypothesis-led explanations according to a range of independent 
variables, including structural-legal status and organisational task (Bach, 2010; Lægreid, et al., 
2006; Painter, et al., 2010), and agency age (Niklasson & Pierre, 2012).  In so doing, the policy-
delivery dichotomy often associated with NPM agencies has been found a poor descriptor of 
post-agencification policymaking. 
Latterly, concerns have been expressed over the ability of large-N surveys of chief executives to 
capture the complexity and frequent irrationality of the public policy process (Bach & Verhoest, 
2012; Elston, 2012), and a small but promising case study literature is emerging.  Here, the unit 
of analysis is neither agency populations nor individual organisations, but rather individual 
public policies.  Through both quantitative (Verschuere, 2009) and qualitative methods 
(Verschuere & Vancoppenolle, 2012), these studies again seek to test whether the NPM ǲǳ-ǲǳ
events rather than abstract and generic concepts.  Once more, the veracity of the policy-
operations split is frequently challenged in this processual work. 
2.4.3 Discussion: three methodological tendencies 
Fuller methodological discussion is delayed until the next chapter, on the understanding that 
such questions relate as much to meta-theory as they do to research agenda.  For now, however, 
it is useful to note three tendencies in the burgeoning international work on agency longevity 
and post-agencification policymaking.   
A product of administrative systems analysis, the first tendency is towards de-contextualisation, 
whereby agencies are studied in dislocation from the day-to-day policy systems and networks in 
which they operate and are embedded.  While important for exploring and comparing the 
prevalence of NPM-style reforms both within and between countries, this focus on cross-
governmental populations necessarily foregrounds the (pseudo-)legal classifications apparently 




shared between organisations, while underplaying their day-to-day situation amongst and 
interaction with local circumstances and contingencies.  As such, de-contextualisation makes for 
a structuralist mode of inquiry where, simply by virtue of their common Ǯǯ, a 
large national security agency is readily compared with a small environmental research body.  
Though certainly revealing on the nature of NPM reform, such approaches say little about public 
governance processes Ȃ the agencified delivery of national security and environmental research. 
The second tendency is towards deductive empiricism.  This involves testing the incidence and 
interrelation of predefined variables (Ǯeticǯ knowledgeǡ    ǯ ), 
whereby complex governance phenomena are to a large degree universalised across particular 
national systems and even between nation states.  This is particularly the case for research into Ǯǯǡits frequent measurement through the standardised surveys exported 
to multiple jurisdictions in the recent COBRA project.4  Again this is de-contextualising, but, 
more importantly, it also removes much of the complexity and dynamism inherent to politico-
administrative phenomena by assuming that summative indices can distil governing processes 
to numeric evaluations.   
Related to this, the final methodological tendency is towards the investigation of concepts 
rather than processes.  Again within the quantitative literature on agency autonomy, 
researchers ask chief executives of ǡǲ     ǫǳ (Bach & Verhoest, 2012, p.145).  The answer is a 
snapshot evaluation of a much-ȋǲǳȌain underplays 
the dynamism and processual nature of governance and policymaking, and dislocates the 
investigation of a particular public management reform strategy from day-to- Ǯǯ in heterogeneous governing situations, across which Ǯ ǯ   
differing, contingent meanings and connotations. 
                                                             
4 COBRA: Comparative Public Organisation Data Base for Research and Analysis (see Verhoest et al., 
2011). 





In providing a historical and conceptual grounding for the remainder of the thesis, this chapter 
has covered much ground.  It began by charting the origins, design and implementation of the 
Next Steps programme Ȃ a seminal event in twentieth-century civil service reform.  To illustrate  ǯ   -generation reforms, an organisational ecology and 
framework document review then offered a preliminary account of continuity and change in the 
post-Next Steps period.  It was on this basis that the empirical research agenda was established, 
centred on post-agencification longevity and policymaking.  The middle portion of the chapter 
described the international prevalence and paradigmatic basis of agencification.  In so doing, it 
added a third, conceptual dimension to the empirical investigation, concerning the implications ǯǤǡapter looked to 
existing methodologies deployed to explore longevity and policymaking in the international 
agencification canon. Against the noted preponderance of large-N population studies, this thesis 
follows an alternative epistemological and methodological path in seeking to interpret post-
agencification longevity and policymaking as ineluctably social endeavours.  It is this meta-
theoretical agenda that Chapter 3 now elaborates. 








Having established an agenda for researching post-agencification longevity and policymaking, 
and the security of its paradigmatic basis in new public management, attention now turns to 
(meta-)theory and methodology.  Against the existing preponderance of epistemological 
positivism, large-N Ǯ ǯ  -deductive methods, the chapter 
formulates an alternative, interpretive logic of inquiry, drawing successively on post-empiricist 
philosophy (Berger & Luckmann, 1971; Miller, 2012; Wittgenstein, 1986), discursive 
institutionalism (Schmidt, 2010) and narrative and discourse theory (Fairclough, 2003; 
Feldman, et al., 2004; Patterson & Monroe, 1998).  Thereby assuming the continual, situated and 
social re-accomplishment of public governance, the manner of its practical and paradigmatic 
evolution is traced here not through high-level population trends and aggregate realignment on 
organisational and conceptual variables, but rather through the shifting structures of meaning 
that continually and discursively enliven agencification.  In essence, then, the thesis advances a 
multilevel comparison of historic and contemporary politico-bureaucratic narrative, which, for 
its grounding in socio-political context, registers interpretive (in)stability across policy, practice 
and paradigm. 
This epistemological, theoretical and methodological agenda is expounded in three parts below.  
The first addresses the relation between science and philosophy, the constructivist ontology 
from which interpretivism proceeds, and its implications for administrative science as regards  ȋǮemicǯȌ       Ǯǯ  Ǯǯ
multivocality.  Developing this, the second part proceeds to new institutional theory.  Built upon 
core interpretive precepts, especially in defining social institutions as intersubjective constructs 





is identified as an inchoate but promising theoretical proposition through which to trace 
diachronic evolution in agencification.  Finally, the third part turns to methodology.  A general 
analytic framework is developed from narrative and discourse theory as an aid to institutional 
reconstructionǤ       ǲ ǳ (Pader, 2006) which 
guides the empirical work in the Ministry of Justice and its interpretation. 
3.2 Interpreting agencification 
3.2.1 Science and philosophy 
The interrelation of science and philosophy has long been contested.  In particular, the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment sought to substitute metaphysical reasoning with rational 
observation and knowledge accumulation (White, 1999; Winch, 1958).  Work in the sociology of 
knowledge has since decried this disciplinary schism, deconstructing scientism as but one mode 
of inquiry which, for all its advances, remains a thoroughly human endeavour (Kuhn, 1962), and 
further positing that social research inevitably imbibes epistemological presupposition, 
whether or not this is purposefully chosen or explicitly rationalised (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; 
Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012).  For instance, particular meta-theories render certain logics of 
inquiry possible (White, 1999); research methods advance philosophic presupposition in 
interview structure, concept definition and researcher positionality (Haverland & Yanow, 
2012); and knowledge claims presuppose understandings of truth, reliability and causality 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1982; Sandberg, 2005).  Nevertheless, the apparent ineluctability of 
epistemology does not preclude research design plurality.  As Bevir and Rhodes indicate: 
ǲ
particular methodological toolkit for producing data. Instead, it prescribes a particular 
way of treating data of any type. Proponents ... should treat data in ways consistent with Ǥǳ(2005, p.178) 
Research therefǲǳ(Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p.266) by 
which incommensurate meta-theoretical assumptions are illogically conflated (Schwartz-Shea & 




Yanow, 2012; Wagenaar, 2011).  For this reason, philosophy is a conditioning force throughout 
social research. 
3.2.2 Interpretivism 
The ontological and epistemological assumptions which comprise the interpretive proposition 
are built from traditions of phenomenology, hermeneutics and symbolic interactionism (Yanow, 
2006).  In essence, this body of philosophy asserts the intangibility of social phenomena, the 
perspectival character of knowledge and observation, and the centrality of interpretation to all 
facets of human Ȃ political, administrative, scholarly Ȃ endeavour.  Meta-theory of this kind 
contrasts markedly with the (often implicit, but no less formative) empiricist assumption of a 
single, unmediated and atheoretical social reality, more or less available for detached, objective 
observation according to a particular (Enlightenment) mode of physical science (Hawkesworth, 
1988).  Indeed, while interpretivists recognis Ǯǯǡ  
theorised as the cognitive objectification of an otherwise plural, negotiated, and ineluctably 
human world.  As Berger and Luckmann (1971, p.70) contend: 
ǲSocial order exists only as a product of human activity.  No other ontological status may 
be ascribed to it without hopelessly obfuscating its empirical manifestations.  Both in its 
genesis (social order is the result of past human activity) and its existence in any instant 
of time (social order exists only and in so far as human activity continues to produce it) 
it is a human product.ǳ  
As explored below, in largely divorcing the ontologies of humanity and materiality, this 
constructivist proposition profoundly conditions theorising of both the nature of social reality, 
and the manner and extent of its knowability. 
Constructed social reality 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.260)ǡ    ǲ  
which attributes to the social world a reality which is independent of the minds of meȏǤȐǳǤ
Rather: 




ǲȏȐ            
beings who, through the development and use of common language and the interactions 
of everyday life, may create and sustain a social world of intersubjectively shared 
meaning.  The social world is thus of an essentially intangible nature and is in a Ǥǳ 
A wealth of conceptual and practical implications stem from this return to first principles.  For 
present purposes, three are particularly salient: the (inter)subjective basis of social reality; its ǲǳǢǤ 
The first implication pertains to the loss of ontological singularity.  No longer conceived as   Ǯ ǯǡ       ǡ        ǲǳ (Yanow, 1996), 
invoking and sustaining a plurality of meanings which are humanly generated in historical and 
social contexts.  By extension, unlike the largely structural explanations of social behaviour 
made in positivist inquiry, social actors are bestowed greater (but not unbridled) sociological ǮǯȂ that is, individual volition and creativity Ȃ through which they both inherit and author 
transmutable social institutions.  As Wagenaar aptly summarises, these meaning structures are ǲ ǡ  of and over ǳ (2011, p.58, original emphasis).  Therein, 
interpretivism does not relegate sociality to base relativism.  Rather, according to Burrell and ǯǡǡ  ǲintersubjectively shared ǳ Ǥ          
confirmed by Yanow: 
ǲThis is what is Ǯsocialǯ about ontological constructivism: that it has a shared character, 
developed in the course of living in common, interacting through the medium of 
political, cultural, and other artifacts in which the meanings embedded in these artifacts 
come to be known, tacitly, even when such communication is nonverbal.ǳ (2006, p.14) 
Thus, beneath individual, self-reported subjectivities, there lies a deeper, shared, more stable 
undercurrent of meaning-making, in dialectic with the subjective surface and similarly 
produced through (collective) human endeavour, but less consciously available.  Wagenaar 
(2011, p.18) formalises this distinction as one between ǲsubjectiveǳ and ǲǳ meaning, 




   ǲǡ ǡ        ǯ
consciousnessǳǡ      ǲthe group or communityǳ  ǲthe basic 
assumptions and conceptualisations that make a particular activity possibleǳǤ   
and intersubjective meaning Ȃ which remains neither transcendental nor immutable, but rather 
thoroughly human Ȃ is the locus of post-empiricist institutional inquiry, for which the central 
methodological challenge is registering its implicit and taken-for-granted basis. 
Proceeding from this loss of ontological singularity, the second implication of Burrell and ǯ definition   ǲ     ǳǡ  
shared meaning is understood to sustain and transform.  Just as interpretive plurality may 
register synchronically across and within interpretive communities, so too can meaning develop 
diachronically over time.  Meaning is never finite, but only reproduced, and even then in a 
potentially imperfect fashion (Miller, 2012, p.42).  Thus, as Heracleous and Hendry (2000, 
p.1276) ǡ ǲ             ǳǡ     ǲ      ǳǤ  
diachronic multivocality is significant when considering the sustenance of public management 
reforms and paradigms.  It forms the focal point of this analysis into continuity and change in 
agencification, and is discussed further below. 
	ǡ       ǯ definition relates to the central role of 
communication in the (re-)accomplishment of social phenomena.  As they suggested, it is ǲ ǳ
that subjective realities are rendered intersubjective.  Similarly, in their seminal constructivist ǡǲǳ (1971, pp.51-52).  They elaborate: 
ǲ          
signification.  Everyday life is, above all, life with and by means of the language I share 
with my fellowmen [sic].  An understanding of language is thus essential for any Ǥǳ 




By extension, language does not simply provide imperfect but workable access to an 
independent reality, but rather is the material of a large part of that reality (Barinaga, 2009; 
Heracleous, 2004; Heracleous & Hendry, 2000; White, 1999)ǤǮǯǤ 
Interpretation 
The ontological premise that meaning is constructed in situational and temporal context, and 
can thus register both synchronic (coexistent) and diachronic (temporal) multivocality, prompts 
the epistemological question of how it is constructed Ȃ that is, how meaning comes to be known 
locally if not by structural determination.  To interpretivists, the answer is: through 
interpretation.  More specifically, t     ǲ  ǳ (Palmer, taken 
from White, 1999, p.75)ǡ   ǯ      
surroundings (Miller, 2012; Torfing, 2005).  Thereby deconstructing the object-context and 
researcher-researched boundaries upon which empiricist social science is partly built, this    ǲ ǳ       ǲ ǡǡǳ
(Wagenaar, 2011, p.47).  This interweaving partly explains both the interpretive eschewal of 
aggregative, survey methods, which necessarily abstract phenomena from their meaning-giving 
situations (Bevir, 2011), and the contrasting, pseudo-   ǲǳ(Geertz, 2000).   
The part-whole dialectic of the hermeneutic circle is usefully explicated by the dynamics of 
linguistic interpretation, this being a principal site of intersubjective meaning-making, as noted ǤǡǡǲǳǲǳǡǲǤǤǤǡǳ(Miller, 2012, p.5).  In ǯ(1986) terms, discourse makes sense not necessarily by referencing some wider, 
stable system of essentialist meaning, but through the manner of its situated use Ȃ the 
performance ǲǳǤǡǡ




ȋǮǯȌȋǮǯȌ(Torfing, 2005), since 
it is by that context that words are performed (Wittgenstein, 1986).  In particular, as Miller 
(2012, pp.39-57) explains, such connotation proceeds through the forging of associations Ȃ even 
simply the positing of similarity or difference Ȃ between words as symbols and concepts: 
ǲȏȐ  -referential sign system, language is preoccupied with relational markers 
such as differences, equivalencies and connotations.  ...  Hence, [in interpretation] there 
is no closure, no final reading or decoding, just continuous association, deconstruction, Ǥǳ(Miller, 2012, p.42) 
Given this potential for reassembling, destructing or invoking new semantic associations within 
narrative or other forms of communication, it is language-in-use that largely constructs, 
maintains and changes intersubjective meaning.  This is the basis of a discursive approach to 
institutional analysis, which is developed more fully below. 
3.2.3 ǮǯǮǯ 
The assumption of referentially constructed meaning heavily conditions the manner in which 
administrative and policy phenomena come to be known interpretively as social Ȃ ǮǯȂ 
accomplishments.  Against the existing body of predominantly empiricist agency research 
described in Chapter 2, it engenders profound methodological realignment.  Principally, as 
Pollitt et al. (2004, p.16) ǡǲǮǯ       ǳǡ  ǲ 
shifting         ǳǤ    
aggregative agency counting performed in large-N population ecology.  Hannan and Freeman 
(1989, p.45) remarked in theorising that approach:  
ǲ
unitary character, which means that the members of the populations have a common 
standing with respect to the processes of interest." 
Interpretivism undoes this assumed unity, positing that there is at least the possibility of Ǯǯǡ




even within a single polity or sector of government (synchronically), and certainly over time 
(diachronically).   
In addition, regarding studies of post-agencification policymaking, being no longer available for 
benchmarking against universal criteria in the manner presupposed by quantitative analysis of 
administrative systems (Bach, 2010; Verhoest, et al., 2010), interpretive presupposition frames Ǯǯ  -defined reference points,  Ǯǯ Ǯǯ  phenomena (Colebatch, 
2002, 2006)Ǥ  ǡ  Ǯǯ-ǯ       
across a population proceeds on the basis of the insignificance of these local subtleties and 
subjectivities, assuming their largely inconsequential mediation of the underlying reality of 
interorganisational relations.  In short, as Verschuere (2007, p.124) testifies, the assumption is 
that actor peǲǡǡǳ.  It is 
this transcendentalism Ȃ the fact of policy autonomy Ȃ which interpretivism disavows, instead 
elevating those formerly dismissed subtleties as rather constitutive of governance itself. 
Accordingly, in formulating an overarching interpretive research strategy for investigating 
continuity and change in agency policy and practice, a prime implication of lost ontological 
singularity is the challenge to sidestep definitions of academic origin, as operationalised in 
survey research, and instead    Ǯ ǯ     Ǯǯ Ǯǯ
(see Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012).  In anthropological terms, this is an aspiration for 
registering emic knowledge inductively, rather than deductively testing etic preconceptions.  As 
Lett (1990, pp.130-131) explains: 
ǲEmic constructs are accounts, descriptions, and analyses expressed in terms of the 
conceptual schemes and categories regarded as meaningful and appropriate by the 
native members of the culture....  Etic constructs are accounts, descriptions, and analyses 
expressed in terms of the conceptual schemes and categories regarded as meaningful 
and appropriate by the community of scientific obǤǳ 




In practice, this etic-emic classification refers to ideals, rather than being a fully operable 
division.  Researchers can never wholly remove themselves from their endeavours, and nor can 
research be rendered absolutely inhuman, as the sociology of knowledge testifies.  Nonetheless, 
the distinction provides a useful methodological guide and critical apparatus, indicating 
particularly the current scholarly tendency to presuppose rather than probe the meaning of 
agencification.  As noted in Chapter 2, the academic (etic) assumption in UK literature is that Ǯ ǯ    ǡ ǯ-length governance through semi-
autonomous, if non-statutory, bodies that reside amongst other members of the British Ǯǯ(Elston, 2013; Flinders, 2008; Flinders & Skelcher, 2012; Gash, et al., 2010; James, 
et al., 2011).  A turn to local, contingent and emic meanings, however, might reveal marked and 
variegated divergence from this original Next Steps policy, and thereby recondition wider 
understanding of the extent and character of institutional fracture in contemporary British 
governance. 
3.2.4 Synchronic and diachronic multivocality 
While duly orientated towards emic perspectives, the thesis requires an overarching framework 
of academic design to assure analytic focus and progression.  Drawing on the tenets of 
constructivism, this is established below as two basic parameters of comparison, built from the 
previously detailed supposition of synchronic and diachronic multivocality.  
The synchronic parameter 
In tracing culturally-mediated reinterpretations of the NPM-inspired agency idea across 
different countries, the promising but thus-far confined interpretive output on agencification 
has already recognised the possibility of synchronic reinterpretations of what is, ostensibly, the 
same managerialist concept (Moynihan, 2006; Smullen, 2010).  Moreover, Smullen (2004, 
p.194) also   ǲ         
lower ǳǡ  within a polity.  It is therefore useful to 
conceive of public management discourse as focused at three key arenas Ȃ the macro, meso and 




micro Ȃ         Ǯǯ -making within an 
administrative system.  Macro discourse is ideational.  It conveys high-level, cross-governmental 
and often innovatory policy ideas, and is likely to be rhetorical in nature, aimed at influencing 
the public, the media, or public institutions about necessary change.  This is the locus of existing 
interpretive work on cross-national translation (Moynihan, 2006; Smullen, 2010).  Meso-level 
public management discourse, by contrast, is sectoral.  It is delimited by policy sector and, 
though potentially also political, is more confined in scope.  Finally, micro discourse is 
organisational.  This level further distils to individual public agencies, and is thus more 
bureaucratic than political in character, pertaining to local, day-to-day management challenges 
and opportunities.  Both meso and micro levels of discourse have received little or no attention 
in existing interpretive agency scholarship, following the wider tendency towards system 
analysis noted in Chapter 2. 
This threefold schema of public management discourse remains an etic construct, its macro, 
meso and micro levels representing a useful heuristic rather than necessǮǯ
as clearly divisible sites of meaning-making.  Nor do the ideational, sectoral and organisational 
strata preclude internal variegation Ȃ quite the reverse, in fact, particularly at the expansive 
micro level.  Nonetheless, the distinctions are useful for: first, fracturing the philosophically-
unsound ontological singularity assumed in much existing research into administrative 
decentralisation; second, recognising the potential reinterpretation negotiated in transitioning 
from (macro) policy idea to (micro) policy implementation (Yanow, 1996); and third, providing 
a focal dimension by which the multileveled complexity of agencified governance can be probed. 
The diachronic parameter 
Complementing the synchronic parameter, and similarly adumbrated in the previous meta-ǡǮǯȋFigure 3.1, overleaf).  This 
axis builds particularly on the constructivist supposition that meaning exists only through its 
continual re-accomplishment (Berger & Luckmann, 1971), and thus must be explored in 




different time contexts (Heracleous & Hendry, 2000).  The five empirical chapters unfold along 
both axes to form a multilayered interpretive analysis of historic and contemporary agency 
discourse.  Given the particular research focus on temporal continuity and change, what 
remains is to develop further the theoretical basis of diachronic multivocality, and then 
formulate a suitable methodological agenda by which this can be probed. 
Figure 3.1: Synchronic and diachronic multivocality 
 
3.3 Discursive institutionalism 
3.3.1 New institutionalism 
Institutionalist approaches to social and political science have proliferated since the 1980s, 
largely as a reaction to the overly atomistic explanations of behaviouralism (Rhodes, 2006a; 
Schmidt, 2008).  Disavowing tǯǡ
aggregations of individual behaviour explain collective societal and political movements, 
institutional theories instead presuppose the mid-level cultural constraint of actor agency, 
whether through incentive structures, historical contingencies or social norms (Ferris & Tang, 
1993; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Schmidt, 2010).  In these three Ǯ ǯǡ Ǯǯ Ǯǯ of analysis, new institutionalism is often deployed to address questions of 
diachronic continuity and change.  However, given the structuralist emphasis on actor 
constraint as a corrective to foregoing atomistic explanations, accounts are inclined to highlight 
continuity over transformation (Schmidt, 2010).  Specifically, in explanation, dramatic social 




and organisational upheavals are often required as instigators of institutional disaggregation 
and reassembly, thereby favouring a punctuated equilibrium model of stability-shock-stability 
(Carstensen, 2011). 
Searching for less dramatic accounts of institutional reformation, scholars from all three new 
institutionalisms have latterly turned to ideas and discourse in order to introduce greater 
sociological agency into explanations (Schmidt, 2008, 2010)Ǥ    ǲǳ
(Campbell & Pedersen, 2001; Schmidt, 2008, 2010)ǡǲǳ(Hay, 2006) ǲǳ
institutionalism (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010; Hay, 2001), this fourth branch of new institutionalism 
adopts the tenets of interpretive meta-theory, if often without direct acknowledgement.  The 
essential proposition is detailed below.  
3.3.2 Discursive institutionalism 
Redefinition 
Discursive institutionalism proceeds from ontological redefinition of institutions (Hay, 2006).  
As Campbell and Pedersen (2001, p.9) explain: 
ǲ... is in how institutions are constituted, framed, and transformed 
through the confrontation of new and old discursive structures Ȃ that is, systems of 
symbolic meaning codified in language that influence how actors observe, interpret, and Ǥǳ 
This pushes the definition of an institution firmly towards the sociological focus on cultural 
norms and frames, while, in a constructivist manner, also departs from any essentialist claim 
that meaning resides independently of actors in a pseudo-materialist fashion.  The extent of this 
realignment is profound, as Schmidt (2010, p.14) describes: 
ǲ	-institutionalisms, institutions are structures external to agents 
that constitute rules about acting in the world that serve mainly as constraints Ȃ 
whether by way of rationalist incentives that structure action, historical paths that 
shape action, or cultural norms that frame action.  For [discursive institutionalism], by 
contrast, institutions are internal to sentient agents, serving both as structures (of 
thinking and acting) that constrain action and as constructs (of thinking and acting) Ǥǳ 




This internalisation and destabilisation of institutions as cognitive yet intersubjective meaning 
structures that are both authored by and conditioning upon agents makes for an accurate 
translation of interpretive meta-theory.  Thereby offering a more dynamic conception of 
institutions as inherently transitive (being continually and thus imperfectly re-accomplished 
through discourse), rather than fixed between cycles of the punctuated equilibrium, this        ǲ-ǳ  
(Hay, 2006, p.60), addressing the overly structuralist precepts of the three older new 
institutionalisms, as well as their explanatory tendency towards exogenous-shock models of 
change (for a critique, see Bell, 2011).   
Institutional change 
This newly dynamic ontology of institutions as intersubjective meaning-structures makes for 
their diachronic transformation through subtle and gradual shifts in interpretation.  Modelling 
this process, Schmidt (2008, p.314) distinguishes between subconscious ideational maintenance 
and purposive discursive change, describing  ǲ  ǳ       ǡ   ǲ  ǳǡ
which allow agents to: 
ǲȏȐǡ ǡ         are inside them, to 
deliberate about institutional rules even as they use them, and to persuade one another Ǥǳ 
This foreground-background division provides the makings of an explanation of institutional 
change through purposeful transformation of policy and context.  However, to remain 
consistent with the interpretive meta-theory, the distinction should not be treated as absolute.  
In particular, by positing an underlying level of interpretive fixity over which discursive acts 
effect transformation, the distinction between maintenance and change risks undoing some of 
the newfound institutional dynamism of the discursive approach.  As Berger and Luckmann 
(1971, p.169) ǣ ǲ          ǯǳǤǡǲǳ




(Miller, 2012, p.90; see also Heracleous & Hendry, 2000), and thus,  Ǯǯ ǡ  Ǯǯ  ǡ     
require discursive performance.  Still, conceptually, the distinction is a useful heuristic for 
understanding the processes of institutional change which discursive institutionalism posits.  It 
is operationalised in Chapter 9ǯs account of continuity and change in UK agencies. 
In terms of the mechanics of institutional change, this again remains under-theorised within the 
still inchoate discursive institutionalist school.  Schmidt (2010, p.15) observes that a promising ǲ
be added to ideas [over time], thereby bringing about change in ideas incrementally even in 
time of staǳǤǡ relational meaning-making, 
as codified by the hermeneutic circle.  In what follows, a complementary narrative approach is 
adopted, building ǯ(2012, p.90) previously cited contention that it is by the forging 
and re-forging of semantic and symbolic associations within story-like texts  ǲǳǤ 
3.3.3 Application 
Although deploying concepts and meta-theory with long lineage in social science, discursive 
institutionalism remains a relatively recent addition to the new institutionalist canon.  Its 
adoption in this study of historic and contemporary agencification fulfils three key concerns.  
Firstly, there is the substantive interest in continuity and change, for which new institutionalism Ǥǡǯstarting observation that, 
ostensibly, the Next Steps approach appears to have stood the test of time (in employment 
figures, cross-governmental deployment, and so forth), and yet now operates in very different 
politico-administrative surroundings to those at its inception (see Chapter 2).  The discursive 
focus on within-ǡǲ-ǳ(Hay, 2006) is 
thus apposite for addressing this subtlety and apparent lack of dramatic change.  And thirdly, 
there is the methodological and meta-theoretical commitment to the socially constructed, 




discursive ontology of governance.  Although arrived at through internal critique of structure-
heavy explanations rather than, necessarily, by the epistemological deconstruction 
characteristic of the wider interpretive turn in public policy, discursive institutionalism 
translates the constructivist proposition of continual, social and discursively-accomplished 
meaning into an operable framework for exploring continuity and change. 
3.4 Methodology: a narrative turn 
Having expounded an epistemological and theoretical basis for researching post-agencification 
longevity and policymaking, what remains is to develop a suitable methodology.  Accordingly, 
the first subsection below draws on concepts from narrative and discourse theory to construct a 
three-part analytic framework by which to register meaning and institutional reconstruction in 
historic and contemporary agency discourse.  Thereafter, data requirements for macro, meso 
and micro discourse are addressed, and the fieldwork introduced. 
3.4.1 Narrative analysis: towards a general analytic framework 
Narrative analysis has received growing attention in the humanities and social sciences over 
recent decades (Chase, 2011; Elliott, 2005; Riessman, 2008), and has made tentative inroads 
into public policy and administration (Czarniawska, 2010; Feldman, et al., 2004; Fischer, 2003; 
Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Ospina & Dodge, 2005; Roe, 1994).  Underlying this is a 
broad commitment to the linguistic turn in social science, as well as a more specific 
acknowledgement of the intimate association between story and society.  As Barthes 
illustratively remarks, ǲnarrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society; it ǤǤǤǡǳ(cited in  Riessman, 
2008, p.4).   
    ǡ    ǲ ǳ   
single, defined technique (Quinn, cited in Riessman, 2012, p.369).  Generally, as Chase explains: 
ǲǣng making       ǡ     ǯ  





For this communication of ǲǳǡ ǲǳ  ǲǳǡ  
attractive to interpretive scholarship.  Moreover, evoking the referential operation of the  ǡ      ǲ  ǳǡ ǲǳ ǲǳ      ǯ     
generates not simply from the actual content relayed in story Ȃ that is, the explicit events and 
items described Ȃ but rather from the interplay of these elements with other, often more 
implicit devices of form and style.  These act as an important conditioning force on the ǡǲǳ
disparate storied events and ideas alone.   
Given this concern with interpretive wholeness, a central commitment in narrative analysis is 
the avoidance of traditional multisource textual disassembly and coding.  As Riessman explains, ǲprecisely because they are essential meaning-making structures, narratives must be preserved, 
not fractured, by investigators, who must respect respondentsǯ ways of constructing meaning 
and analyze how it is accomplishedǳ (taken from Franzosi, 1998, p.548).  Nonetheless, for all 
this concern with structural preservation, narrative analysis is not myopic.  Rather, stories are  ǲ ǡ  ǡ ǡǡ    ǳ (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003, p.30).  In other words, 
through their combination of explicit events and implicit form, narratives are repositories of 
tacit social institutions.   
Three particular aspects of narrative are probed here as a broad-based aid to textual 
interpretation.  These are argumentation, narrative voice, and discursive differentiation.  Each is 
considered below. 





Formally, narrative and argumentation are distinct types of discourse.  As Fischer (2003, p.181) ǡ ǲ         ǡ  ǡ   
through the device of a plot, an argument is structured around premises designed to logically ǳǤǡǡǲȂ 
implicitly or explicitly Ȃ ǳǡ 
conclusion (Fischer, 2003, p.181)Ǥ     ǯ ǡ ǡ   ǲǳǤǡ(2012, p.24) suggests, arguments represent ǲ ǳǤ 
	ǲȏȐ
the teller takes to be literally unremarkable, so commonplace or obvious that it is not worth  ǳ (Patterson & Monroe, 1998, p.329), narrative approaches to argumentation 
attend particularly to implicitness within contextualised arguments.  To this end, Feldman et al. 
(2004; also Feldman & Sköldberg, 2002) have developed an approach which, by examining Ǯǯ     ǡ    ǡ -for-granted 
meanings that underpin argumentation within organisational contexts.  Characterised as an 
incomplete or truncated syllogism (Jasinski, 2001, p.206), enthymeme is an Aristotelian device 
whereby part of an argument remains latent or unarticulated in such a way that the overall 
interpretation rests upon listener inference of the missing premise(s).  An example is: ǲ     ǯ ǳ (taken from Corbett, 1990, p.61).  This ȋǯȌȋ
the examination).  The unarticulated connecting premise, which makes sense of the given 
informatiǡǣǲǯȏǤȐǳǤBox 3.1 compiles this argumentation formally.  Following the convention 
in the rest of the thesis, double underlining indicates the implicit premise. 




Box 3.1: Example enthymeme 
Truncated syllogism (enthymeme): 
 
[a] ǯ Ǥ* [b] ǯ. [c] 
Therefore, John will fail his exam. 
[*Implicit premise] 
 
Demanding co-productive authoring of latent premise(s) and thereby inhibiting refutation of 
the  substantive claim, enthymeme is a dev  ǲ ǳ (Aristotle, cited in 
Jasinski, 2001, p.205).  Moreover, because   ǲ ǡ ǡ  ǡ      ǳ (Feldman, et al., 2004, p.152), the 
interp    ǲ Ȃ       ǳ
(Feldman & Sköldberg, 2002, p.276).  In this manner, not only does enthymeme account for 
policy and political rhetoric (Morrell & Hewison, 2013), but it also allows registering of the 
taken-for-granted intersubjectivities Ȃ  ǲǳ (Feldman & Sköldberg, 2002, p.286) Ȃ 
informing and enabling meaningful argumentation in particular public management contexts.  
In other words, enthymeme is predicated upon the implicit but formative social institutions that 
Wagenaar (2011, p.18) descrǲǳ. 
Narrative voice  ǲ  ǳ (Patterson & Monroe, 1998, p.316).  As Bal (1985, p.100) ǡ  ǲ       Ǯǯ ǤǤǤ     ǤǤǤ 
certain way of se ǳǤ      ǡ   ǲ             ǳ (Bal, 1985, p.100).  
Different voices can instantiate the characterisations made within stories Ȃ the overburdened Ǣǲǳ(see 
Pentland, 1999).  Moreover, vocal polarisation can eǲǳȂ that is, the framing of 
one social group as different from another (Miller, 2012, pp.30-31).  Together, then, narrative 




voice provides insights on authorial evaluation and socially-meaningful yet often implicit 
groupings and divisions (Fairclough, 2003, pp.714-715; Pentland, 1999). 
Discursive differentiation 
As noted above, the registering of sameness or difference is central to the interpretation of 
connotative meaning within discourse (Miller, 2012; Torfing, 2005; White, 1999).  Fairclough 
(2003, p.88) confirms this in arguing that ǲǮǯification is constantly going on in 
texts, with entities being either differentiated from one another, put in opposition to one ǡǳǤMeaning thus ǲǡ
objects, [and] organisations ... are differentiated in texts, and how differences between them are ǲǳǳ (Fairclough, 2003, p.88).  For 
example, as well as the divisions implicated through narrative voice (in characterisation and ǮǯȌǡ      ȋǮǯǡ ǮǯȌ   ȋǮǯǡ ǮǯȌ
relations within and between discursive units (see Fairclough, 2003, pp.88-91).  Moreover,     Ǣ  ǲ a storyteller describes a situation, one way to ǳ(Feldman, et 
al., 2004, p.151).  A discussion of good management, for example, serves to define, implicitly, 
poor management.  
In the remainder of the thesis, the narrative functions of argumentation, narrative voice and 
discursive differentiation are combined as a general analytic framework for registering 
intersubjective meaning making in documentary and oral texts.  They are illustrated 
systematically in the first data chapter (Chapter 4) and used more freely thereafter.   
3.4.2 Data requirements 
The synchronic and diachronic comparisons which the thesis is to undertake, aided by the 
general analytic framework and theorised with discursive institutionalism, require macro, meso 
and micro discourse of both historic and contemporary origin.  As defined previously, macro 
discourse pertains to cross-governmental politico-administrative ideas.  To source this, 




documentation surrounding the original Next Steps programme and various parliamentary 
materials provide ample historic resource, while, contemporarǡ   
ǯ
similarly high-profile Public Bodies Reforms offer a recent re-articulation of the intent and 
character of executive agency status, again through documents and parliamentary materials, but 
now supplemented by Cabinet Office interviews.  Meso and micro-level discourse are delimited 
by policy sectors and individual organisations, respectively.  These materials can usefully be       Ǯǯ      department and its 
agencies.  As detailed below, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and its three agencies are chosen for 
this purpose.  An extensive interview programme and further document analysis make for the 
contemporary meso and micro discourse.  Historically, published documents are available from   ǡ   ǯ   former Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, which together ǯ
creation in 2007 (see Chapter 5).  Requiring in-depth fieldwork, by definition, no historic micro-
level discourse is available (framework documents are treated as sectoral rather than agency 
discourse).  Table 3.1 summarises this mixed-method and multilayered data collection strategy, 
the synchronic and diachronic comparisons which it enables, and how these unfold across the 
five empirical chapters. 
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Empirical data generation proceeded minimally in the Cabinet Office and extensively in the MoJ.  
As the major fieldwork component, the MoJ work is detailed below.  The character of the 
separate Cabinet Office interviews followed the same conversational design. 
Case selection 
The Ministry of Justice is a large, politically-salient yet relatively new department of state, 
(in)directly employing some 90,000 staff, and with an annual budget exceeding £8.7bn (Justice 
Committee, 2012, p.44; MoJ, 2012a, pp.18, 23).  Through a complex network of executive 
agencies and non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs), it delivers civil and post-arrest criminal 
justice functions, including prison and probation services, court and tribunal administration, 
legal aid and public guardianship (Gibson, 2008; see also Chapter 5).  The MoJ family makes an 
apt case study for several key reasons.  Firstly,  ǯ    
departments Ȃ defence, social security, and tax (NAO, 2013, p.33) Ȃ MoJ remains heavily 
agencified.  Secondly, its core delivery functions have held agency status since the original Next 
Steps programme, and have been subject to many of the post-Next Steps trends identified in 
Chapter 2, including formal mergers and inter-agency grouping.  Thirdly, all three MoJ agencies 
operating in the early years of the Coalition Government have, at some point in their histories, 
had formal policymaking responsibilities devolved alongside their operational remits, although 
these have recently been curtailed by ǯ austerity-prompted restructuring (see Civil 
Service Capability Reviews, 2012).  In combination, this makes for an excellent opportunity to 
probe both the contemporary meaning of agencification, registering diachronic continuity and 
change against the original Next Steps precepts (Research Question 1), and changing agency 
involvement in public policymaking (Research Question 2). 
ǲǳ 
Participant observation is a mainstay of ethnography (Watson, 2011, p.206), but the two are not 
synonymous.  Indeed, ethnography often combines multiple qualitative methods (Yanow, 2000), 




and represents not simply a data generation method, but a philosophically-informed research 
aspiration, as Watson (2011, pp.205-206) explains: 
ǲǯ observation of and involvement with people in a particular social 
setting and relates the words spoken and the practices observed or experienced to the Ǥǳ 
Although resting upon participant observation, ǯǲǳ in which they are 
made meaningful, in line with the operation of the hermeneutic circle (see Section 3.2.2, above).  
As he continues,   ǲǳ   ǲrelating the details of the particular 
events and utterances ...    ǳ (Watson, 2011, p.206).  Baszanger and Dodier 
(2004, p.12) confirm this interpretive intention, writing: 
ǲA study becomes ethnographic when the fieldworker is careful to connect the facts that 
s/he observes with the specific features of the backdrop against which these facts occur, 
which are linked to historical and cultural contingencies.ǳ  
By this ǲprocess of totalizationǳ,   ǲintegrates the different observation 
sequences into a global referential frameworkǳ (Baszanger & Dodier, 2004, p.13).  This    ǲ ǳ (Geertz, 2000) characteristic of interpretive 
research.   
Although some Whitehall ethnographies have emerged in recent years (see Rhodes, 2011; 
Wilkinson, 2011), the present requirement for discursive rather than observational data, 
alongside practical considerations of organisational access, led to the eschewal of such an 
approach here.  Still, in the absence of participant observation, it remains appropriate to draw 
upon the underpinning philosophy of ethnography and some associated research design 
characteristics.  T ǲ ǳ (Pader, 2006)  ǲethnographic ǳ
(Watson, 2011, p.216) pursues the contextualised elucidation of sensemaking within delimited 
settings; is open-ended and flexible so as to follow unexpected leads in the field; therein, 




elucidates emic meanings through loosely-structured, conversational interviews about ordinary Ȃ even mundane Ȃ day-to-day experiences; combines and interrelates multiple qualitative 
sources; engages in rich contextual description in a manner enabling part-whole reference; and 
retains a reflexive orientation to researcher positionality (Guba & Lincoln, 1982; Schwartz-Shea 
& Yanow, 2012).  It is on this basis that the MoJ fieldwork proceeded. 
The fieldwork engagement 
The MoJ agreed participation three months after the initial request was submitted; separately, 
each agency consented within several weeks, as did the Cabinet Office.  Appendix II details the 
ethical scrutiny undertaken prior to these negotiations, and the access and consent procedures 
implemented thereafter.  Although there was some overlap, principal work in each agency was 
undertaken successively, while interviews in the core MoJ and the Cabinet Office proceeded 
concurrently.  The engagement lasted eight months, during which time site visits both to 
Westminster and various offices around the country were made on several days during most 
weeks.  Agency management contributed to the research agenda, particularly in suggesting     ǯ    J-agency collaboration in the ǤǡǮǯȂ 
historic and ongoing restructuring, interorganisational engagement, and priorities and 
challenges Ȃ interviews were sought with departmental and agency officials specifically 
associated with these policy examples.  In all, five areas of engagement were explored across the 
three agencies, and these form the basis of the Ǯ ǯ retold in Chapter 8. 
In order to secure emic concept definition and free narrative discourse, the interviews were 
largely unstructured conversations guided only by the high-level research themes of agencies 
and policymaking detailed in the project information and consent materials supplied to 
participants before meetings (see Appendix II).  Occasionally, specific topics for discussion were 
agreed in advance (for instance, with the five policy examples).  A minority of email requests for 
interviews received no response, and four people explicitly refused participation.  Many 




participants    ǡ Ǯǯ
meant that some were in new posts or project areas.  This multiplied the stories that officials 
could relate about their work, but also prompted some caution in describing unfamiliar roles.   
Opportunities for further research exposure were taken when possible; for example, attendance 
at a large stakeholder meeting; a tour of a regional office; and a guided explanation of an office 
wall display.  A diary recorded these events.  In addition, documentation was collected 
throughout the fieldwork, and some additional requests were made as follow-ups.  This material 
is enumerated in Appendix III, and includes PowerPoint presentations, organisation charts, 
corporate governance arrangements, meeting minutes, tendering information for potential 
contractors, HR policy documents, staff consultation exercises, and monthly issues of the MoJ 
staff magazine, Insight.  Some sensitive documentation required special permission for release 
and is not referenced directly in the analysis.  Texts would frequently be examined at meetings, 
often at the behest of interviewees. 
Data profile 
In total, 53 formal meetings were held, involving  ? ?Ǯ-ǯ
grades (Table 3.2).  Several were met on multiple occasions, and eight meetings involved two 
participants (Table 3.3ȌǤǮnon-ǯ (as defined in Appendix II), and all 
but two were recorded.  Several officials requested transcript review rights, which were met.  
Appendix III lists by organisation the anonymity codes referred to in the analysis.   
Table 3.2: Interview participants by organisation and grade 
 MoJ Whitehall 






7 4 8 1 3* 1 1 
Other grades  10 8 3 5 N/A* 3 1 
Total  17 12 11 6 3 4 2 
 
     Total 55 
* Not classified as civil servants;  ?Exploratory interviews with (ex-)civil servants 




Table 3.3: Meetings by organisation and type 
 MoJ Whitehall 






10 11 11 7 1 3 2 
Two-person 
interviews 
4 1 - 1 1 1 - 
Total 14 12 11 8 2 4 2 
 
     Total 53 
 
Analytic approach 
Once the interviews were fully transcribed, these and the documents were subject, first, to high-
level thematic analysis, and then to closer textual deconstruction according to the general 
analytic framework of argumentation, voice and differentiation (described above).  Latterly, 
emergent observations were cross-referenced, in line with the operation of the hermeneutic 
circle.  For example, the three organisational identities registered in Chapter 6 inform and 
enliven the distinct interpretations of the policymaking process in Chapters 7 and 8.   
Writing conventions 
Appendix IV details the full transcription conventions used in the empirical presentation.  In 
brief, full- Ǯǯ  quotation 
(italicised) and replacement paraphrasing (non-italicised).  This method preserves story and 
argumentation structure and key textual features (voice, differentiations), while rendering the 
content more manageable.  The summaries are encased within boxes and indexed at the start of 
the thesis.  Single underlining aids cross-referencing between extracts and surrounding 
commentaries.  Where non-narrative extracts are employed as further illustration or 
contextualisation, these are simply added as regular quotations, either subsumed within the 
commentary or, for longer passages, separately indented.  Where not detrimental to ǡǮǯǤ 





Across three distinct sections, this chapter has articulated the epistemological, theoretical and 
methodological base from which the research now proceeds.  It began by making the case for 
philosophic reasoning in social research, before outlining the tenets of constructivism upon 
which the interpretive endeavour is predicated.  This generated two particular implications for 
the study of agencification, the first pertaining to the need to privilege emic over etic knowledge, 
and the second concerning the synchronic and diachronic parameters by which multivocality 
can register.  Accordingly, it is the task of the next five chapters to advance gradually from 
macro politico-administrative ideas through departmental reform discourse to micro, agency-
specific texts.  Individually and collectively, this facilitates synchronic and diachronic 
comparison of intra- and inter-episode meaning-making in agencification policy and practice.   
From philosophical beginnings in interpretive social science, the middle section, above, drew on 
an emergent branch of new institutionalism to further theorise the temporal, diachronic 
parameter of multivocality.  Based on the ontological redefinition of institutions as 
intersubjective structures of meaning, Chapter 9 ǯ ǮǯǮǯ ideas to account for the continuity and change in agency policy and 
practice indicated by the empirical materials.   
Finally, the third section addressed methodology.  Firstly, it drew together concepts from 
narrative and discourse theory into a general analytic framework which is deployed hereafter 
as an aid to data interpretation.  It also elucidated the empirical design of the research, which 
principally comprises an extended case study in the Ministry of Justice and its three executive 
agencies.  Conducted with an Ǯethnographic sensibilityǯ, this approach proved conducive to the 
social practice of storytelling, as Chapters 6-8 demonstrate particularly. 
 




Chapter 4 Ȃ Reinterpreting the Agency Idea 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Between 1988 and 1997, the Next Steps Team in the Cabinet Office sought to embed agencies 
across the Whitehall spending departments.  Before turning to that process of adoption within 
the justice sector specifically, this first empirical chapter registers the character of the seminal 
Next Steps agency idea which provided their inspiration, and traces its own latter-day evolution 
within macro politico-administrative discourse.1  Drawing material from the initial 
agencification programme and the Public Bodies Reforms initiated by the Coalition Government 
in 2010, this ideational analysis both establishes a historical benchmark against which 
subsequent comparisons can be made, and advances an initial assessment of diachronic 
continuity and change.  Moreover, by combining ǯ (2011) model of the composite 
political idea with the previously-defined narrative functions of argumentation, narrative voice 
and discursive differentiation, the referential operation of the hermeneutic circle and the three 
components of the general analytic framework are illustrated systematically, allowing for their 
freer deployment in the subsequent meso- and micro-level analyses of justice agencification.   
The chapter begins with ǯ model of political ideas.  This posits a composite, 
internally-variegated ideational structure, formed from multiple, potentially shifting Ǯelements 
of meaningǯ.  Thereafter, separate discourse pertaining to the Next Steps and Public Bodies 
programmes is examined consecutively.  Finally, having registered two distinct ideational 
configurations, the discussion compares their elemental substructures, noting discontinuity on 
all three parameters of the general analytic framework.  Thus, despite the ostensible continuity 
implied by the retention of the executive agency label, the ǯs essay a marked 
reinterpretation of the original concept, replacing its initial predication on bureaucratic critique, 
                                                             
1 Much of this chapter is in press as Elston (forthcoming). 




managerial empowerment and decentralisation by asserting the constitutional propriety of 
departmental governance and its enabling of politically-proximate executive operations.  This 
departmentalisation  ǯ-length agency model prefigures some of the meso- and 
micro-level evidence offered in subsequent chapters. 
4.2 Ideas and ideational change 
Carstensen (2011) models political ideas as composite interpretive structures, formed from     ǲ  ǳǤ  Situated within a wider ideational 
environment, the combination of these internal elements and the external environment 
promotes particular but transitive sensemaking experiences.  For instance, in the 1990s, New ǯ      Ǯǯ     constituted by 
notions of human capital and personal incentive, which together forged a particular, election-
seeking reinterpretation of the ǯidea of welfare individualism, but places 
new emphasis on social responsibility (Carstensen, 2011, pp.607-608).  Following the part-
whole dialectic of the hermeneutic circle detailed in Chapter 3, ǯ model posits a 
relational rather than given epistemology, where language represents ǲ    
element can be defined independently of the oǳ(Laclau, cited in Carstensen, 2011, p.600).  
Interpretation thus proceeds not simply by summation of substructural elements of meaning, 
but through their combinative interrelation.  Moreover, since composite ideas cannot exist 
independent of the wider system in which they are rendered, interpretation also rests upon the 
interrelations between internal substructure and external ideational context.   
Accord  ǯ model, potential avenues for diachronic ideational change include 
both internal alterations to substructure and external change at the environmental level, albeit 
with the hermeneutic caveat that neither can be defined without the other.  At the ǯ
subǡǲǳǲǳ, contributing to a greater 
or lesser extent to the overall sensemaking, depending on their strength of articulation within 
discourse (Carstensen, 2011, pp.601-602).  Thus, substructural evolution can proceed through 




either the changed emphasis of individual elements, or, more radically, the outright substitution 
of old elements for new (Carstensen, 2011, p.607).   
This model of the non-unitary, relational and continually re-accomplished political idea befits 
the epistemological stance adopted throughout this thesis, and is useful for relating internal 
variegation to diachronic processes of reinterpretation.  Nonetheless, having been subject to 
limited empirical application, it remains untested and incomplete.  In particular, despite the 
central emphasis on the differentiated weighing of elements of meaning, this remains an 
abstract concept, it being unclear how to quantitatively register ǲǳ  ǲǳ
difference, and, qualitatively, how elemental domination or subordination reflects at the 
discursive surface.  Moreover, although elegant and epistemologically consistent, the relational 
understanding of sensemaking as produced by the interacting substructure and environment 
again remains abstract, devoid of a clear methodological path for capturing this hermeneutic 
function.  To render the model operable for comparing diachronically separate renderings of the 
agency idea, therefore, modifications are needed. 
Carstensen (2011, p.612) advocates discourse analysis for populating his framework.  However, 
the ǯ general analytic framework, which draws both on narratology and discourse theory, 
also makes for a productive method.  In particular, by attending to argumentation Ȃ the 
sequential interlinking of separate premises Ȃ and its combination with narrative voice and 
discursive differentiation to forge a meaningful whole, ǯ model of the ǲǳ itical idea is operationalised.  Moreover, as noted in Chapter 3, rhetorical 
enthymeme makes for discursively emphasised Ȃ that is, ǲprivilegedǳ Ȃ elements of meaning, 
while its basis of inference in the intersubjective ǲǳǲcommonplaceǳ understandings 
of an interpretive community (Feldman & Sköldberg, 2002)  ǯ idea-
environment interaction.   
On this basis, the remainder of this chapter now applies ǯ to macro agency 
reform discourse by attending systematically to argumentation, narrative voice and discursive 




differentiation.  The analysis begins with the original Next Steps project and then proceeds to 
the 2010 Public Bodies Reforms. 
4.3 The Next Steps programme 
Although greeted as a far-reaching administrative reform, the initial articulation of the agency 
policy was relatively confined, involving the document, Improving Management in Government: 
The Next Steps (Efficiency Unit, 1988)ǡ  ǯ    ȋǡ
18th February 1988).  Moreover, although presented as an essay in rational and instrumental 
policy analysis, the report, completed in March 1987, actually remained unpublished until the 
following February.  Many claims of pre-publication doctoring have been laid, citing Treasury 
scepticism about financial decentralisation and the ill advisability of releasing a critical review 
given the impending general election (Haddon, 2012; Lawson, 1992, pp.390-393).  Hennessey 
(1990, p.620)      ǲ-ǳȂ the de-burdening of 
ministers Ȃ that led to the delay and eventual dilution, although allegations of significant 
reworking have been refuted by those involved (Jenkins, 2008).   
Below, this 35-page Efficiency Unit report is the principal focus.  Its original expression of the 
agency idea is shown to rest upon enthymematic referencing of the  
ǯ
prevailing managerialist ideology, and adjoining narratives of frontline empowerment and 
decentralisation.   
4.3.1 Argumentation Ȃ the managerialist enthymeme 
The Next ǯtwo founding syllogisms, relating to problem 
diagnosis and policy remedy (see Box 4.1 and Box 4.2).  The first, diagnostic syllogism is 
enthymematic, containing two explicit components [labelled #1a and #1c] and one implicit 
connector [#1b].  Hence, whereas the report explicitly identifies a series of deficiencies in 
bureaucratic practice, and affirms that management should be improved, the reasoning behind 
this prescription is left implicit, requiring enthymematic inference to render the overall 




argument complete.  Box 4.1 collates the three components of this truncated syllogism.  The 
implicit premise is double-underlined, and the explicit material is illustrated.   
Box 4.1: Problem diagnosis 
Truncated syllogism (enthymeme): 
 
[#1a] Service delivery is being hampered by overly-centralised controls, institutional 
rigidities and poor local responsibility. [#1b] Overly-centralised controls, institutional 
rigidities and poor local responsibility represent defective management.* [#1c] 
Therefore, management must be improved.  
[*Implicit premise] 
Illustrations of explicit premises in Efficiency Unit (1988): 
 
[#1a]: Ǯǡ
effective system, but also on the way in which resources can be managed.  Recruitment, 
dismissal, choice of staff, promotion, pay, hours of work, accommodation, grading, 
organisation of work, the use of IT equipment, are all outside the control of most Civil 
Ǥǯ (p.5) 
[#1c]: ǮǤǯ (p.16) 
 
The report identifies many practices as antithetical to effective service delivery.  The Findings 
chapter (pp.3-5), for example, lists seven key issues, including the centralised personnel and 
management controls cited in Box 4.1, ǯlivity for policy work rather than ǲǳ.  Further evidence is then presented in a ten-page appendix (pp.21-30).  This 
provides for a strong narrative underpinning to the contention that bureaucracy is hampering 
service delivery Ȃ the first component of the syllogism [#1a].  Moreover, the concluding call for 
improved management capability [#1c] is similarly emphatic: for instance, as well as the ǲǳȋBox 4.1), there is the reportǯ, Improving 
Management in Government and its advocacy of ǲ  ǳ ȋǤ ?ȌǤ  What is 
missing from the narrative surface, however, is a similarly explicit connecting premise 
explaining how the apparently manifold bureaucratic deficiencies represent an issue to which 
improved management is the solution.  This diagnosis requires enthymematic inference of what 




ǮǯǮǯȏ ? ?ȐǤcentralised 
controls and diffuse accountability are so obviously symptoms of poor management, its explicit 
establishment is redundant or even banal.  That bureaucracy should be remedied with      ǲcommonplaceǳ   ǲǳ   ǡ   	
and Sköǯ(2002) terminology.   
This claim for intersubjectivity is supported by existing research on the institutionalisation of 
managerialism in the 1980s and 1990s (Clarke & Newman, 1997; Pollitt, 1993).  As Clarke and 
Newman (1997, p.86) ǡǲǣ
action, shared typifications of the world, shared cognition, which produce regularities of ǳǤǡǣǲ
practices, at the core of which burns the seldom-tested assumption that better management will 
prove an effǳ(1993, pp.6-10).  What 
the enthymematic underpinning particularly reveals here is the interconnectivity of this 
ideational background of shared believes and assumptions to the ǯ
construction.  Latterly, this proves an important contrast with contemporary agency discourse. 
Advancing from problem diagnosis to policy remedy, the second of the two structural syllogisms 
makes the case for agencification.  It is firmly connected to the former, diagnostic enthymeme 
through the restating of its conclusion as the new starting premise [#1c/#2a] Ȃ a common 
device within chained arguments (Feldman, et al., 2004, p.152).  The report then discusses 
extensively the benefits of agencies [#2b], emphasising particularly the managerial freedoms 
which may be granted within a quasi-contractual framework document, as well as ǲǳs and the implications for parliamentary accountability 
(pp.9-11).  The recommendation for adoption [#2c] is reinforced through the listing of 
implementation strategies; for example, by appointing a senior project manager.  Together, this 
makes for a perfect Ȃ if dependent Ȃ second syllogism (Box 4.2). 




Box 4.2: Policy remedy 
Perfect syllogism:  
 
[#2a] [Previous conclusion:] Management needs to be improved (because of 
centralisation, processual rigidities and non-devolved responsibility). [#2b] Agencies 
facilitate relaxed controls, innovation and local responsibility. [#2c] Therefore, 




[#2a] Previous conclusion (#1c, above) 
Illustrations in Efficiency Unit (1988): 
 
[#2b] Ǯ[O]nce the policy objectives and budgets within the framework are set, the 
management of the agency should then have as much independence as possible in 
deciding how those objectives are met. ... The presumption must be that, provided 
management is operating within the strategic direction set by Ministers, it must be left as 
free as possible to manage within that framework.  To strengthen operational 
effectiveness, there must be freedom to recruit, pay, grade and structure in the most 
effective way as the framework becomes sufficiently robust and there is confidence in the 
capacity of management...ǯȋǤ ?Ȍ 
[#2c] Ǯ   ǲǳ d be established to carry out the executive 
functions of government....ǯȋǤ ?Ȍ 
 
Overall, then, the Next Steps argumentation proceeds in two stages.  The first diagnoses the 
policy problem rhetorically by recourse to managerialist ideology which presupposes the 
superiority of management over bureaucracy (Box 4.1); and the second prescribes agencies as a 
policy solution via a perfect syllogism (Box 4.2).  
4.3.2 Narrative voice Ȃ empowering the frontline 
Often, the Next Steps narrative is voiced not by a dissatisfied political or bureaucratic elite, but 
from the perspective of a self-critical, frustrated and constrained civil service.  As well as 
granting bottom-up legitimacy to the ǯ findings and aiding civi  Ǯ-ǯǡ 
particular use of narrative voice Ȃ ǲǯǳ(Pentland, 1999, p.714) Ȃ makes 
for a wider discourse of empowerment.  Specifically, coming as a response to the concerns and 




desires of managers themselves, the granting of increased frontline autonomy is framed as 
emancipatory Ȃ Ǯletting ǯǮmaking ǯǡ
coin the much-cited NPM tension. 
An example of this subjective vocalisation is:  
ǲȏȐmanagement and staff concerned with the delivery of government services (some 95 
per cent of the Civil Service) are generally convinced that the developments towards more 
clearly defined and budgeted management are positive and helpful.  The manager of a 
small local office in the north east said that for the first time in 20 years he felt that he 
could have an effect on the conditions under which his staff worked and therefore on the 
results they produced.  But this kind of enthusiasm is tempered by frustration at 
constraints.  ...  Middle managers in particular feel that their authority is seriously 
circumscribed both by unnecessary controls and by the intervention of Ministers and senior 
officials in relatively minor issues.  People who had recently resigned from the Civil Service 
told us that frustration at the lack of genuine responsibility for achieving results was a 
significant factor in encouraging them to move to jobs outside.ǳ (Efficiency Unit, 1988, 
p.3) 
The underlined words highlight the subjective presentation, and, by implication, the eschewal of ǮǯǤ
on the attitudes of those whom the report, if implemented, will most affect Ȃ the ǲ95 per centǳǤǲthe manager of a small local officeǳ and what ǲǳ considered helpful, before 
broadening again to identify wide- ǲfrustration at constraintsǳ.  A division is erected ǲmiddle managersǳ  ǲministers and senior officialsǳ.  This 
disassociates the Efficiency Unit, which was itself based in the core executive, from such top-
down dysfunctionality.  Thereaǡǲpeople who had recently resignedǳ 
implies regret at their disaffection.  In this manner, the diagnosis of defective bureaucracy is 
made on the basis of what the Unit were told by the frontline, rather than what it observed for 
itself.  The impression is that there can be no greater assurance of the urgent need for change 
than from within the (faulty) institution itself.   
This privileging of the subjective rather than objective perspective, and its depiction of the ǯ -up rather than top-down and political initiation, is similarly evident in 




ǯ      Ǥ       ǡ 
instance, the prime minister repeatedly distances  ǯ    
overseen ǡǯ ation decision comes ǲǳ-service demands: 
ǲȏȐǤ	  the report presented to me, a considerable number of 
people in the civil service want Ǥǳ 
(Hansard, 18th February 1988) 
ǲ     a report not by us, but to us, on improving management in 
Ǥǳ 
ǲǡa report presented to us, is to reply to the desire 
of many people in the civil service to have more responsibility and the wish of the 
government to have an organisational arrangement that will increase efficiency and the 
Ǥǳ 
The three extracts establish veracity   ǯ     apolitical 
authoring.  The fǲǳǡǡǲǳǢǲǡǳǢǯǲǳȂ acquiescence, even Ȃ rather than an edict.  This Ǯotheringǯ (see Miller, 2012, p.30) of ǯȋǲǳǡǲǳȌǡǲǳǲǳǤ 
Returning to the Next Steps Report itself, in addition to the subjective vocalisation, the absolving 
of civil servants from direct blame and the promise of corrective reform also contributes to a 
sense of emancipation.  This is revealed in its emotive language: 
ǲȏ  Ȑ         
agency management is set free to manage...Ǥǳ(Efficiency Unit, 1988, p.10) 
ǲ 	 ȏ  Ȑ      ȏ  Ȑ 
clamouring for management jobs.ǳȋǤ ? ?Ȍ 
ǲ frustration in many local offices is the inadequacy of the service staff 
feel they are giǤǳ (p.26) 




ǡ ǲǳ Ȃ ǯ-theme Ȃ is diagnosed not by the Efficiency Unit, 
nor, ǡǡǲstaffǳ  ǲǳ.  Moreover, all three extracts suggest 
that it is not for want of trying that government is suboptimal; rather, due to factors beyond 
their control, officials are being constrained.  Hence,      ǲ ǳ, the 
implication is that it is presently constrǢ     ǲclamouringǳ for 
management positions, these must presently be rationed; and if staff are frustrated at 
inadequate service, there must be external, inhibiting factors.   
This de-blaming of officials is furthered by the narrative personification of government 
organisations Ȃ that is, their establishment as characters with sociological agency and a 
coherent voice (see Pentland, 1999, p.714).  As the following passage demonstrates, this 
supplies an alternative focal point for apportioning blame: 
ǲrule imposed by the Treasury is that there should be no movement of money 
from non-running costs to running costs.  Rules about moving money between different 
running costs items are generally imposed by departments themselves.ǳ(Efficiency Unit, 
1988, p.28) 
Again, it is not that officials do not want to improve public service management; rather, 
inanimate institutions are causing obstructions.  
In sum, proposing agencification on the basis of a subjective, bottom-up critique frames the 
policy as an emancipatory or empowering solution, supplied by a concerned political and 
bureaucratic elite keen to assist the frustrated and disempowered frontline.  While testament, ǡ    ǯ     -in for its reforms, 
frontline empowerment is also an acknowledged theme of managerialism (Peters & Savoie, 
1994), thus further confirming the paradigmatic basis of the Next Steps proposals. 
4.3.3 Differentiation Ȃ the decentralisation narrative 
The foregoing analysis has identified several paired oppositions within the Next Steps Report.  
Most broadly, there is the coupling of the policy-remedy syllogisms Ȃ a common pairing in 
policy documents (Fairclough, 2003, p.91).  Mapping onto this structural dualism are many 




subordinate pairings; for example, the constrained versus empowered frontline, and the 
dysfunctional versus effective Whitehall (see Table 4.1).  Another important opposition ǯconstruction of decentralisation.  This is explored below. 
Table 4.1: Discursive differentiations in Next Steps discourse 
 Policy problem Policy solution  
Argumentation 
 
Old, dysfunctional New, effective 






 Pre-agency Post-agency 
Narrative 




Executive functions in Ǯcǯ Executive functions in Ǯpǯ 
 
Combined policy and 
delivery 
Separated policy and 
delivery 
 
In formulating agencification as a mode of decentralisation, the report constructs an opposition    Ǯcǯ  ǯ-length ǮpǯǤ   discussion of framework 
documents illustrates this discursive differentiation: 
ǲThe setting of a policy and resources framework is needed not only for agencies but also in 
situations where the department has to proceed by influence rather than by direct control.  
It applies therefore to the relationship with any organisation which is providing services 
for which the department carries some responsibility, whether agency, nationalised 
industry, local authority, or public body....  In any ǯ
task is to set a framework, tailored to the job to be done...  It will also need to ensure that 
indicators of effective performance are developed and used for regular monitoring.  For 
directly managed agencies, Ministers and civil servants must then stand back from 
operational details and demonstrate their confidence in the competence of their managers 
and the robustness of the framework by leaving managers free to manageǤǳ (Efficiency 
Unit, 1988, pp.10-11) 
The underlining in this passage identifies the collapsing of discursive boundaries to form 
equivalences between new executive agencies and existing for  ǯ-length governance.  




	ǡ ǲnot onlyǳ for agencies but ǲalsoǳ for ǲanyǳ 
other decentralised situations, ǲwhether ... nationalised industry, local authority or ǳǤ
This constructs a united perip       ǲǳǡǲǳǡǲǳǲǳ(see Fairclough, 2003).  Facing this decentralised population of public 
service organisations is the governing centre, whose implication comes through the grouping of ǲǳȋǲtheir ǳȌǡǲǯ ǳǤ   centre and periphery are then further separated by the contractual 
terminology (ǲǳǡǲǳǡǲǳǡǲǳǲǳ) and the call    ǲ ǳ   ǲǳ  Ǥ   
thereby narrated through an opposition between the centre, being ministers, civil servants, and 
their departments, and the pǡ  ǡ  ǡ   ǯ-
length entities.  This represents another point of contrast with the contemporary agency idea. 
Complementing this narrative of decentralisation is the question of the policy-delivery task 
division.  As Chapter 2 demonstrated, agencification is widely recognised internationally as an 
administrative reform that decouples policymaking from operational delivery (see Verhoest, et 
al., 2010; Verschuere & Bach, 2012)Ǥ       ǡ ǯ  ǯ as removing to departmental agencies ǲthe executive functions of government, as distinct from policy adviceǳ(Hansard, 18th February 
1988), and, indeed, Next Steps has since been widely interpreted as driving at this separation 
(Gains, 1999, p.62)Ǥ  ǡ    ǯ    iquity of this 
interpretation, no such undertaking to divorce policy and operations is articulated explicitly 
within the report itself.  Rather, from the given premises that, firstly, policy and management 
are different and independent tasks, and, secondly, that agencies are a management solution, it 
is through enthymematic inference that the notion of the policy-less agency is arrived at.  Box 
4.3 formalises this logic.  




Box 4.3: Policy-management dichotomy 
Truncated syllogism (enthymeme):  
 
[#3a] Ǯǯ  Ǯǯ  ǡ   . [#3b] 
[Previous argumentation:] Agencies are a management solution. [#3c] Therefore, 
agencies are not about policymaking.* 
 
[*Implicit premise] 




not through managementǯǤǳ (p.3) 
[#3a-ii] ǲȋ




[#3b] Previous argumentation (Box 4.1 and Box 4.2, above) 
 
This enthymeme relies upon an overt distinction between policy and implementation as 
separate categories of work [#3a], and  ǯ  advocacy of agencies as a 
management solution [#3b].  It ǮǯǮǯǮǯǢǡ
ministers to focus on policymaking.  As the illustrations demonstrate, there is also explicit 
discursive differentiation between these two categories of work: [#3a-i] distinguishes between ǲnot ǤǤǤǳǡȏ ? ?-Ȑǲ ǤǤǤas opposed to ǳǤ On this 
basis, the first component of the Box 4.3 argumentation has a strong discursive basis.  Similarly, 
the subsequent premise that agencies resolve problems of management [#3b] is established by 
the structural syllogisms of the Next Steps argument (Box 4.1 and Box 4.2, above).  As was 
demonstrated thereǡǯ
failure and the rhetorical and intersubjective prescription of management improvement as 
remedy.  In combination, this makes for Box 4.3ǯ      




about policymaking [#3c], since, firstly, they are a management solution [#3b] and, secondly, 
management is not the same as policy [#3a].  As with the enthymeme in Syllogism #1, audience 
co-production instils rhetorical emphasis into this component of the agency idea, with the 
policy-management dualism further reinforcing the decentralisation narrative of the governing ǮcǯȋȌǮpǯǤ 
4.3.4 Summary: the Next Steps agency idea  
In applying the narrative framework to the Next Steps Report, three elements of meaning have 
been identified as the substructure of the original agency idea ǯ.  
These are: (i) managerialism, implicated enthymematically; (ii) frontline empowerment, evoked 
through the bottom-up narrative voice; and (iii) decentralisation, asserted by differentiating the  Ǯcǯ  Ǯpǯǡ    Ǯǯ  Ǯǯ 
responsibilities.  Rhetorically,  ǡ    ǯ
superiority over bureaucracy registers as the privileged component.  What remains now is to 
consider whether or not similar ideational foundations underpin the post-Next Steps agency 
idea. 
4.4 The Public Bodies Review 
Through various legislative and administrative reforms, the Coalition Government has ǯ-length body reform, aimed at enhancing ministerial accountability 
and reducing costs (Cabinet Office, 2010; Flinders & Skelcher, 2012; Gash, et al., 2010).  While 
there is considerable precedent for British political parties to promise so- Ǯǯ    (Flinders, 2008, ch.3)ǡ  ǯ -election follow-
through is largely unparalleled.  As Flinders and Skelcher (2012, p.327) explain, the reforms ǲǤǤǤǡǡ   ǳǤ  Similarly, the NAO (2012, p.9) conclude that, if fully 
implemented, the plans will  ǲ       ǳǤ  A cross-Whitehall review of 904 bodies proposed 496 closures, mergers and other 




major restructures (NAO, 2012, p.13), but, significantly, excluded executive agencies on the 
grounds that they are legally and constitutionally synonymous with their sponsor departments.  	ǡǮǯǡ
the creation of new agencies, most notably in the Department for Education.  Given their ǯ-length governance, residing amongst the  Ǯpǯ (in the terms adopted above), this new assertion of essential difference 
between agencies and quangos has prompted some consternation (Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2012; Flinders & Skelcher, 2012; Rutter et al., 2012).  Accordingly, what follows 
draws upon documentary and interview materials to explore the apparent contemporary 
reconstruction of the agency idea.  First, an enthymematic narrative of constitutional propriety     ǯ   Ǥ           Ǯǯ   ȋ-delegated) 
governance, thereby     ǯ     centre.  A brief 
case study of discourse rationalising the new Standards and Testing Agency then probes this ǮǯǤ 
4.4.1 Argumentation Ȃ constitutional propriety 
Since 2010, the principle of increasing the accountability and efficiency of public bodies has 
enjoyed broad political consensus, albeit with some disputes over individual reforms.  Indeed, 
sǮǯ
the need for change.  Distilled from contributions to parliamentary debate, this bipartisan 
narrative of constitutional propriety is formalised in Box 4.4. 
Box 4.4: The constitutional default 
Truncated syllogism (enthymeme): 
 
[#4a] Departmental delivery, overseen by ministers, is the legitimate mode of state 
administration and the Westminster system default.* [#4b] The Public Bodies Reforms 
are returning functions to departments (although these may not have originated in 
departments in the first place). [#4c] Therefore, the reforms represent a return to the 
constitutional default.* 





Illustrations from Hansard, 14th October 2010: 
 
[#4b-i] ǮǤǤǤg a host of functions back into departments, such as those of the 
Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission and the Renewable Fuels Agency to 
Ǥǯ ȋǯȌ 
[#4b-ii] ǮǤǤǤ          he Major 

ǤǤǤǯ (Opposition frontbench question) 
[#4b-iii] Ǯ

ǫǯ (Government backbench question) 
Illustration from Hansard, 15th December 2011: 
 
[#4b-iv] Ǯ            
Ǥǯ 
 
The argumentation summarised in Box 4.4 is strongly enthymematic, with both the first 
premise [#4a] and conclusion [#4c] remaining largely implicit, their sense being extrapolated 
from the explicit middle premise [#4b].  This situation is frequently encountered by Feldman et 
al. (2004) in their development of this approach.  ǡǯȂ but implicit Ȃ 
argument that the Public Bodies Reforms reinstate constitutional propriety [#4c] is inferred 
from the explicit contention that functions are being returned to departments.  The emphasis on Ǯǯ  crucial, and can be seen in all four illustrations.  In [b-i], the minister speaks of  ǲback into departmentsǳ; in [b-ii], the opposition spokesperson talks of the ǲhigh point of the unaccountable quango stateǳ, thereby implying there was also a low point; in 
[b-iii], the backbencher refers to quangos  ǲ ǳǢ   ȏ-iv] the minister    ǲnever againǳ will they proliferate (see Box 4.4).   The significance of 
this literary trope comes from the fact that, in many cases, quangos originated in their 
independent, ǯ-length format, rather than first belonging to a Whitehall department only to 
be subsequently hived-off.  By implication, if not originally established within government, talk  ǯ return refers less to chronological reversal than to a return to constitutional 




propriety Ȃ that is, to the way governance should proceed, according to doctrine [#4a].  In other 
words, it is a matter of principle that state administration belongs in departments overseen by 
ministers.  As such, the reforms are returning to this default.     
4.4.2 Differentiation Ȃ Ǯcǯ 
The narrative of constitutional propriety, identified above, propagates an opposition between 
appropriate and inappropriate Ȃ default and deviant Ȃ governance, and the deliberate exclusion      ǯ     with this ǯ       Ǥ     ǡǯ-length      ǯ  ming of agencification as a mode of 
decentralisation and ministerial distancing.  As was demonstrated above, agencies were there Ǯpǯǡǡǡǡ
nationalised industries Ǥ  ǯ
both political and bureaucratic discourse pertaining to the current reforms.  As the minister 
explained, first in his opening parliamentary statement: 
ǲI stress that departmental agencies Ȃ executive agencies Ȃ are not ǯǤ
They are directly controlled by Ministers who are accountable to Parliament for what they 
do.ǳ(Hansard, 14th October 2010) 
Then, in response to an opposition question: 
ǲI think that [the right hon. Gentleman] confuses the role of executive agencies with the 
function of a quango.  It seems to me perfectly proper that when Members of Parliament 
ǯǤ
That does not mean that the agency is not accountable to Parliament through what a 
Minister says and does.ǳ (Ibid) 
And similarly, when questioned in committee: 
ǲ[W]e deliberately exclude executive agencies on the basis that those are already 
accountable.  Ministers take responsibility for what executive agencies do.ǳ (Public 
Administration Select Committee, 2010, ev.12) 




All three citations frame agencies as substantively diffeǯ-length bodies, first through 
individualisation ȋǲǳǲǳȌȋǲǳǡǲǳǡǲǳǲǳȌǤǡ
extracts also con  Ǥ  	 ǡ     ǲǳǡ ǲǳ  ǲ ǳ Ȃ by implication, non-agencies are 
uncontrollable, unaccountable and improper, following the constitutional narrative. 
Away from political discourse, this reframing of agencies as a form of centralised governance 
resurfaces in the following Cabinet Office interview conversation: 
Interviewee: ǲ[T]here is a very clear case through Public Bodies Reforms, and this is what 
we talk about with accountability for public functions, about there being a [emphasis] very 
strong centre Ǥ ǯǡ 
  ǡ ǯ      ǡ either to an agency or in the 
central department Ȃ because the ministers have taken a view that it should, rightly, be a 
minister who is responsible for the final decision.  And so I think that does refer to the 
nervousness about  ǯ-length bodies, and a lack of accountability. So 
ǯȂ at least, they are deciding things that 
ǯȂ ǯelected mandate to do so. 
Thomas: Yeah, okay. 
I: So I think that does then lead to a direction where you pull more policymaking decisions 
into the centre....ǳ(Interview_016) 
This passage is predicated on a centre-ǡǲ  ǳ ȋȌ ǡ  ǡ   -centre.  The 
interviewee populates the former by discursively collapsing department-agency distinctions Ȃ ǲeither to an agency, or ǳǤ	ǡǡǡ ǲǯ-length ǳǡ ǲǳǤ  ǡ      ǡ     ȋȌǡǲǯǳǤ 
Another official similarly differentiated agencies and public bodies:   




I: ǲI thi ǯ    ǡ  ǯ     
which that is happening. And the agency model is an important part of that, because 
unlike, for example, an NDPB [a quango], an agency is part of a department; ministers are, 
I think, held to be more directly involved and responsible and accountable where it 
   ǡ   ǯ    para- ǯ-length body Ȃ a 
satellite on the outside.ǳ (Interview_019)  





I: I mean, I think they are different beastsǤǡǯ part of a department.  I 
ǡǡ  Ǯǯ-ǯ   
will be a variation in the distance Ȃ in the length of the arm Ȃ whichever sort of analogy 
you want to use.  I think they are a business unit, of a kind, within a department.  They are 
staffed by civil servants; they are usually headed by a chief executive who is also a civil 
servant, who has a direct line of accountability not to an independent board but to the 
minister. 
T: ǯy distinction, is it? 
I: Ǥǯnot a separate entity in any sense.ǳ (Interview_019)      ǲ    ǳǡ        Ǥ    ǲ ǳǡ    ǲ ǳǲnot to an 
independent board but  ǳǤ ǡǲ ȏ 
department] in ǳǤ 
Table 4.2 summarises the explicit and implicit opposition within the political and bureaucratic 
discourse reviewed above.  Against the background narrative of constitutional propriety, the 




suggestion is of the discursive departmentalisation of the agency idea, effected through the 
collapsing of department-agency distinctions and the forging of new non-equivalence with ǯ-length public bodies.   
Table 4.2: Discursive differentiation in Public Bodies discourse 
 Agencies Public Bodies 
Argumentation  






Controllable Less controllable 
Accountable to and via 
minister 
Less accountable  
Ǯcǯ Ǯpǯ 
Bureaucratic 
differentiations  Ǯcǯ Ǯpǯ 
 









The foregoing analysis has relied on constructions of Ǯagencyǯ within discourse that is more 
centrally concerned with critiquing so- Ǥ       ǯ
business case for establishing a specific new executive agency, argumentation more fully 
concerned with the agency idea itself is examined to test whether the observed reinterpretation 
extends beyond anti-quango rhetoric.  Of the seven new agencies announced by the Coalition 
Government four are in the Department for Education (Elston, 2013, p.67).  Its first is examined 
below. 
4.4.3 Establishing the Standards and Testing Agency 
The Department for Education (DfE) previously owned 17 public bodies and no executive 
agencies (Cabinet Office, 2010).  Indeed, historically, the education sector has made little use of 




the agency model, the only Next Steps agency being the short-ǯǡ
established in 1992 but contracted out by 1996 (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1997, 
p.28).  Latterly, reflecting both the central Public Bodies programme and major policy change 
within the department, the Education Act 2011 returned many formerly-delegated 
responsibilities to ministers.  To deliver this expanded departmental remit, four executive 
agencies have since been established, employing some 1,350 officials.  The Standards and 
Testing Agency (STA) was the first of these, assuming functions from the Qualifications and 
Curriculum Development Agency (QCDA) Ȃ an abolished quango.  The published business case is 
analysed briefly below. 
Following the wider narrative of constitutional propriety, the document asserts strong ǯǣ 
ǲMinisters made it clear that not all functions currently carried out by QCDA will cease.  
They indicated that statutory assessment ... would continue.... [T]he Secretary of State 
signalled his intention to establish a new Executive Agency, the Standards and Testing 
Agency, within the Department for EducationǤǤǤǤǳ(DfE, 2011, p.1) 
This political ownership contrasts with Next Stepsǯ overtly bottom-up, emancipatory voice, 
which framed agencification as a response to the disempowered and frustrated frontline.  
Indeed, no reference is made to disaggregation and deregulation from central controls.  Rather, 
the change of status serves to fulfil requirements of ministerial responsibility and 
accountability: 
ǲMinisters are clear that they are accountable to Parliament for delivery of this important 

ǯǤBringing the work into an Agency within DfE 
provides for that clear line of accountability.ǳ (DfE, 2011, p.5) 
This extract alludes to the overarching narrative of constitutional propriety, with ministerial 
accouǲȏȐǳ by ǲǳǤ  Thus, a new inside-
outside, centre-periphery dualism is constructed which again relocates agencies to the 
ministerial side.   




This discursive repopulating of the governing centre to include both core departments and 
agencies is bolstered by the business ǯǤ	ǣ 
ǲDelivering the current programme of statutory assessment and testing through an ǯ-
length delivery model is considered inefficient and less effective.  In particular, as a non-
departmental public body (NDPB) QCDA delivered its own corporate services.  There are 
economies of scale to be gained from merging those functions (such as HR, 
Communications, Finance and IT) with those in the Department to create a single shared 
services approach for all proposed DfE Executive Agencies....ǳ (DfE, 2011, p.2) ǯ-length bodies, and a 
single, integrated back office in the department (inclusive of agencies).  Thus, not only are        ǯ ǡ    
represents an efficiency-enabling consolidation (ǲmergingǳ, ǲsingleǳ, ǲallǳ) through shared 
corporate services.  This multiplicity-to-singularity narrative resonates with the earlier 
interview discussion of the single centre versus the implied, disparate periphery. 
The DfE business case makes no reference to managerial independence being assured by the 
granting of agency status.  However, there is a slight challenge to the prevailing 
departmentalisation        ǯ   
school test standards (DfE, 2011, p.8).  It is largely this requirement of impartiality Ȃ a relic of 
the former ǯ statutory independence Ȃ that leads to the favouring of agency status over Ǯǯǣ 
ǲThe development and delivery of tests ... require[s] high levels of public confidence.  Giving 
direct responsibility ... to a Directorate in the Department Ȃ as opposed to an Executive 
Agency Ȃ would create reputational risks.  The Government could be open to accusations of 
political interference... [Therefore] although option three Ȃ bringing the function in-house 
Ȃ has the same NPV [net present value] as option two, the risk to the statutory assessment 
and testing system are too significant to make option three the preferred option.ǳ (DfE, 
2011, pp.5-6) 
In differentiating agencies from ǲ-ǳǡ-erects a department-agency 
distinction.  Nonetheless, and crucially, the necessity of independence in quality assurance is 
rationalised as ensuring technocratic, apolitical decision-making, rather than, as was formerly 




the case with Next Steps, to protect against monolithic, government-wide regulation and Ǥ  ǡ      Ǯ   ǯǡ   
newly-involved ministers in their rightful position in one small area of agency business. 
4.4.4 Summary: Tǯ  ? ? ? ?ǯǡ
meaning have been identified as constituting the contemporary executive agency idea.  These 
are: (iv) constit ǡ ǯ  with which prompted their exclusion 
from the cross-governmental quango Ǣ ȋȌ  ǡ    ǯ
overt, top-down political ownership; and (vi) centralisation, effected through the discursive 
repositioning of agencies within the governing centre.  Implicated through rhetorical 
enthymeme, constitutional propriety is elevated as a privileged element according to ǯ.   
4.5 Discussion: Next Steps and beyond 
Illustrating the general analytic framework of argumentation, narrative voice and discursive 
differentiation, and drawing on ǯ (2011) model of incremental ideational change, 
this chapter explored the evolution of the executive agency concept as a macro politico-
administrative idea.  It began by demonstrating how, through intertextual and rhetorical 
reference to wider managerialist ideology, beliefs and assumptions (Clarke & Newman, 1997; 
Pollitt, 1993), the Next Steps argumentation posited organisational independence as an enabler 
of public service improvement.  Vocally, the call for reform was represented as self-critique 
from within the civil service itself, making, at least overtly, for the agency solutionǯ framing as 
operationally empowering or even emancipatory.  Moreover, in terms of differentiation, the 
discourse constructed a foundational division between the governing centre and periphery, 
with the new agencies conceptually (if not legally) analogous to public bodies, nationalised 
industries and local authorities, all of which are distanced from ministers by quasi-contractual 
arrangements.   




Latterly, parliamentary and interview discourse associated with the  
ǯ
Public Bodies Reforms was shown to contrast markedly with this original framing of the 
decentralised, independent agency.  In terms of argumentation, contemporary advocacy of the 
model centres upon an enthymeme of constitutional propriety, whereby non-devolved, 
departmental governance is accepted intersubjectively as the default and legitimate mode of 
Westminster-style administration.  Therein, vocally, the reforms speak of ministerial rather 
than managerial empowerment, with agencies better assuring political control commensurate 
with political accountability.  Finally, in terms of the continuing differentiation of the governing 
centre and periphery, by virtue of their exclusion from the Public Bodies Review and 
(re)framing as departmental, efficient, controllable and accountable, the Coalition narrates 
executive agencies as constitutionally-appropriate, centralised administration. 
As detailed aboveǡǯ(2011) framework for modelling incremental ideational change 
proceeds from the ontological assumption that political ideas are composite interpretive ǡ ǡǲǳȋ (i)-(vi) below).  Populated through narrative methods, this schema enables 
diachronic comparison of multiple ideational substructures, using rhetorical force to signal 
what Carstensen terms  ǲǳǤ  	  ǡ       ǯ    ȋȌǡ , for the 
Coalition, intersubjectivity was forged through the presumption of constitutional propriety in 
departmentalism (iv).  In addition, voice and differentiation identified four further elements of 
meaning across the two substructures: frontline empowerment (ii), and administrative 
decentralisation (iii); and ministerial control (v), and centralisation (vi).  Following Carstensen, 
these two configurations are graphed in Figure 4.1, with ǲǳ   
enlarged circles. Most significantly, no substructural element repeats across the two iterations, 
suggesting considerable interpretive evolution beneath the ostensible continuity of agency 
name and pseudo-legal status.   




Figure 4.1: Diachronic change through elemental substitution 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In demonstrating the intersubjective significance of managerialist ideology to the first rendering 
of the agency idea, this chapter has reaffirmed the intimate association between first-generation 
agencification and the NPM paradigm (Massey & Pyper, 2005; Verhoest, et al., 2011).  The  ǯ          
management, nor explain how this remedies traditional bureaucracy; rather, these were taken 
as obvious or commonplace, to be readily inferred by a culturally-competent audience schooled 
in ǲǳǲǳ(Lowndes, 1997, p.51).  Conversely, in 2010, 
protection from monolithic government by deregulation and decentralisation was registered        ǯ   Ǥǡǲǳ(Wagenaar, 2011) was identified in the assumption 
of the constitutional propriety of departmental governance, with laudable executive agencies 
thereby framed as a centralised mode of governance, under direct control of ministers and ǯ-length periphery but within the governing centre.  Indeed, within this 
narrative, sole mention of agency independence in the education agency case study concerned 
the assurance of apolitical decision-making in properly technical matters Ȃ less a call for neo-




Next Steps management decentralisation than a further invocation of constitutional propriety, 
with ministers wishing to assume but not exceed their rightful political control.   
     ǯ-length agency idea as in fact centralised and 
ministerially-proximate challenges existing conceptions of the nature of agencified governance, 
and points to the need for an inductive return to its (supposedly managerialist) character.  As 
explained in   ?ǡ     ǲǳ  f ǲǳǡǲǳǲǳpursued internationally during this period 
(Pollitt, et al., 2004).  All three characteristics propagate a bifurcation between the governing 
centre and periphery which, crucially, dislocates operational agencies from ministers and 
ministerial departments.  As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, this reform logic is 
nowhere to be found withi  ǯ    ǡ 
discourse collapses former department-agency distinctions and, in so doing, significantly 
reconstructs the agency idea.  Uncovering the extent to which agencies have practically been so 
reconceived through re-aggregation, reregulation, and the subordination of former principal-
agent contractualism is the task of subsequent chapters.  As these will reveal, this macro-level 
reinterpretation of the idea of agencified governance adumbrates many changes narrated at the 
meso and micro levels of agency practice.   
 




Chapter 5 Ȃ Agencification in the Justice Sector 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter initiated the empirical analysis by charting the reformulation of the 
original agency idea within the 2010 Public Bodies Reforms.  The registered discontinuity of 
meaning and context strengthens the case already argued for an inductive return to agency 
practice.  Specifically, the identification of constitutional propriety, ministerial control and 
administrative centralisation as key elements of meaning enlivening the contemporary agency 
idea raises further doubts about the extent to which old Next Steps precepts, and the ideal-type 
NPM model which they formerly instantiated (Pollitt, et al., 2004), continue to reflect governing 
practice in the ostensibly still-agencified Whitehall.  In short, it is unclear that agencification 
means what it formerly did.   
Pursuing a similarly diachronic comparison of historic and modern discourse, but now with 
greater sensitivity to synchronic multivocality within and between macro and meso material, 
this chapter delves beneath cross-governmental reform aspirations to trace evolving 
interpretations o Ǯǯ     specifically.  Through documentation and 
interviews, this meso-level analysis instigates the embedded exploration of agencification as a 
situated, rather than reified, phenomenon Ȃ an approach elaborated hereafter through the 
micro interpretation of administrative stories.  Therein, this part-comparative, part-prefatory 
chapter performs several interrelated functions.  First, it historically situates the current 
Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and its diverse policy responsibilities against a backdrop of post-1979 ǡǲǳ(Baszanger & 
Dodier, 2004) of contemporary governing practice.  Second, by exploring three examples of 
1990s agencification, the previous ideational analysis is extended to localised adoption, thus 
elaborating the Next Steps benchmark against which contemporary fieldwork can be read.  And 




thirdly, in comparing historical and modern agency discourse, previous conclusions on 
ideational discontinuity are cross-   ǯ  -specific 
comparisonsǡǯǤ 
The chapter divides into three.  Initially, it chronicles modern developments in criminal and civil 
justice, noting the politicisation of law and order, an increasingly punitive approach to penal 
policy, the overhaul of administrative justice and public guardianship, and major constitutional 
reform to politico-judicial relations.  Secondly, it turns to 1990s justice agencification, 
employing the general analytic framework to interpret official accounts of the detachment and 
autonomisation of HM Prison Service, the Court Service and the Public Trust Office.  Although 
distinct rationales are found between prison and non-prison agencification, the common 
emphasis on de-politicisation, managerial empowerment and contractualisation complements     ǯ elements of meaning registered in Chapter 4.  Finally, the third 
section turns to recent restructuring within the MoJ family, and the creation of the Legal Aid 
Agency.  Stories of these events construct the agency concept through notions of integration, re-
politicisation, and corporate governance, thereby further instantiating the contemporary 
departure from original Next Steps precepts. 
5.2 Locating the justice sector 
Established in 2007, MoJ is one of the largest departments in Whitehall, sitting amongst its top 
four service providers, alongside the Ministry of Defence, the Department for Work and 
Pensions and HM Revenue and Customs (NAO, 2013, p.33).  Of these, it is the only department ǡǯǡ ǯ fication of social security delivery, and the much earlier abandoning of Ǯ-ǯ(Elston, 2013; Talbot & Johnson, 2007).  Ministerial 
responsibility rests with the combined Justice Secretary and Lord Chancellor, the latter being an 
ancient judicial-political office formerly presiding over ǯ




2003, and latterly the Department for Constitutional Affairs.  In May 2007, further 
reorganisation merged this with parts of the Home Office to form the MoJ.   
By 2011-2012, MoJ commanded an annual budget of £8.7bn, a direct and indirect staff of nearly 
90,000 FTE, and a national estate second in size only to the military (Justice Committee, 2012, 
p.44; MoJ, 2012a, pp.18, 23).  Policy responsibilities include burials and cremation, freedom of 
information and human rights, but mainly pertain to the activities of the now four justice 
agencies (Gibson, 2008).  These key delivery responsibilities are usefully introduced by their 
various contributions to criminal and civil justice in (principally) England and Wales (see Figure 
5.1, where circles represent agencies and boxes represent functions).  The National Offender 
Management Service provides criminal justice punishment and rehabilitation; HM Courts and 
Tribunals Service administers both criminal trials and civil proceedings, which are presided 
over by the independent judiciary; the Office of the Public Guardian performs civil functions 
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005; and the new Legal Aid Agency distributes funding for 
criminal defence and some civil litigation. 








This jurisdictional split is necessarily a simplification, neglecting the increasing crossover 
between civil and criminal law (Ward & Akhtar, 2011, pp.5-8), and potentially imparting a 
falsely etic bifurcation onto differential emic realities.  Nonetheless, it ǯ
multifarious responsibilities, as well as their long Ȃ and until recently independent Ȃ histories. 
5.2.1 Criminal justice, past and present 
Largely through centralisation and consolidation, the criminal justice system has rationalised 
considerably in recent years, departing from some of the complexity produced by an extended, 
piecemeal development.  Still, ǲǡoards and ǳ(Ward & Akhtar, 2011, p.567), acting ǲǤǤǤǡȀǳ(Nutley & 
Davies, 1999, p.47).  National responsibilities now divide between the Home Office, overseeing 
the police; 
ǯ, responsible for the Crown Prosecution Service; and the 
MoJ, which administers trial, punishment and rehabilitation.  The historical development of 
these latter, post-arrest responsibilities is considered below. 
Policy and politics 
Crime        ǡ  ǲ cedented          ǳ (Wilson, 2001, pp.124-125).  ǯǲǳǡ
feverish activity broke with post-war consensus by pursuing right-wing measures to curb rising 
crime and placate penal populism (see Raynor & Vanstone, 2007, p.68).  Between 1993 and 
1998, the prison population expanded by 24,200, reaching upwards of 65,000 (MoJ, 2013b, p.7).  
Moreover, against a growing Whitehall scepticism about traditional probation (Nutley & Davies, 
1999, p.48; Raynor & Vanstone, 2007), efforts were made to strengthen community sentences 
as a realistic (and economic) prison substitute  Ȃ ǲǳǯǡǲ-ǳ(Nash & Ryan, 2003, p.162).   




Meanwhile, fresh from electoral defeat, the Labour party of the 1990s distanced itself from its ǲsoft on ǳ image (Brownlee, 1998; McLaughlin & Muncie, 2000).  Bǯǲtough on crime 
and tough on the causes of crimeǳ rhetoric signalled a new twin emphasis on victim-centred 
justice and deterrence by punishment, forcing the Conservatives still further down the punitive 
agenda (Gelsthorpe & Morgan, 2007, p.9).  In office, Labour continued the hard-line approach, 
overseeing increased criminalisation, further police powers and out-of-court penalties, and 
expanded definitions of, and sanctions against, terrorism (Sanders, 2011, p.15).  The prison 
population rose further, reaching 85,184 by March 2010 (NOMS, 2010, p.73).  However, 
following the wider evidence-based ideal, rehabilitative optimism resurfaced (Nutley & Davies, 
1999), instilling new confidence into the Probation Service (Raynor & Vanstone, 2007, pp.68-
69). 
Pre-Labour managerialism 
Managerialism made slower inroads into criminal justice than elsewhere (McLaughlin & 
Muncie, 2000; Raine & Willson, 1996), partly because of the autonomy and lobbying power of 
the police and judiciary (Creaton, 2003; Fitzpatrick et al., 2001; Leishman et al., 1995).  ǡ  ǲ    ǳǡ prompting  ǲble avalanche of 
policy, legislative and structural changeǳ (Painter, 2005, p.307).  ǡ ǯ typically 
incoherent nature (Aucoin, 1990), and the historical circumstance underpinning the criminal 
justice system, prompted part-contradictory custodial, community and court service reforms. 
Local gaols had been nationalised into the Prison Commission in 1877 (Watts, 2001, p.19), and 
continued in a top-down, centralised manner until finally being absorbed into the Home Office 
in 1963 (Nash & Ryan, 2003, p.157).  NPM first appeared in the performance indicators and 
personnel reforms of the 1980s (Jones, 1993, p.198; Pollitt, et al., 2004, p.135), and then 
gathered pace through outsourcing and restructures, aided by successive reviews into 
overcrowding, rioting and escapes (Learmont, 1995; Woodcock, 1994; Woolf, 1991).  The 
Criminal Justice Act 1991 enabled private prisons, first with short-term management contracts, 




but soon alongside facility construction agreements, given the rising population (Panchamia, 
2012).  Moreover, after Woolfǯ (1991) recommendation of more visible senior leadership, 
contractual relations between ministers and the director general, and greater local delegation to 
governors, the Lygo Report advocated agency status ǲǳ operations 
(1991, p.11).  Proving a high-profile test of Next Steps, HM Prison Service (HMPS) became an 
agency in April 1993, with operational responsibility and some parliamentary accountability 
transferring to a director general from the private sector, Derek Lewis.  Despite an otherwise 
improving picture, further escapes led the pressurised Home Secretary Howard to dismiss 
Lewis, as per the terms of Next Steps contractualism (Barker, 1998; Lewis, 1997).  Later 
awarded considerable damages, Lewis was vindicated in the eyes of many, including a junior 
minister at the time, who all considered Howard to have exploited an untenable policy-delivery 
distinction in absolving himself from responsibility. 
Though admittedly tempered by political interference and NPM-style regulation (Nash & Ryan, 
2003, pp.159-160), this prison decentralisation contrasts markedly with developments in 
probation.  Unlike custody, the delivery of community rehabilitation was only fully 
professionalised after World War II (Nash & Ryan, 2003, p.157), whereupon it retained a 
devolved character as ǲǤǤǤǳ (Raynor & Vanstone, 2007, p.76).  In the 
1980s, growth in central funding, concerns over prison demand, and calls to ǲǳ (NAO, 1989, p.6) all made for increased Home 
Office intervention (see Gelsthorpe & Morgan, 2007; Jones, 1993; Nash & Ryan, 2003).  For 
example, the 1984 Statement of National Objectives and Priorities and 1992 National Standards 
both centralised formerly local strategy (Senior et al., 2008, pp.107-108).  Whilst geared 
towards the same ends of economy and efficiency, therefore, the effect of managerialism on 
probation differed from HMPS. 
The criminal courts occupied a middle ground between prisons and probation.  Local Courts of 
Assizes and Quarter Sessions had been abolished in 1971 with the creation of the consolidated 




Crown Court (Ward & Akhtar, 2011, p.261).  This new national structure was supported 
centrally by the Lor ǯ ǡ    formerly-marginal 
delivery remit (see Woodhouse, 2001, p.6).  Within Next Steps, the Court Service agency was 
established in 1995 to pursue customer-service improvements (Court Service, 1995c).  
Meanwhile, first-instance Mǯ Courts remained independent.  As Fitzpatrick et al. 
describe: 
ǲ  d in 1980 was of a large number of courts, each with its own 
administration and with considerable variations in sentencing policy from one court to 
another.  The effects were fragmentation, inefficiencies and a lack of professionalism Ǥǳ(2001, p.102) 
The possibility of promoting efficiency and standardisation through a national agency was 
mooted early in the Next Steps programme (Home Office, 1989), but not pursued, given 
opposition in the magistracy (Ward & Akhtar, 2011, p.263).  Nonetheless, administrative duties ǯ; performance data proliferated; and 
a national inspectorate emerged (Fitzpatrick, et al., 2001).  Hence, just as NPM represented an 
affront to ǯ traditional ethos, this centralisation of formerly-local justice delivery 
posed a similar ǲ ǤǤǤ        ǯ ǡ  
their very ǯ²ǳ(Fitzpatrick, et al., 2001, p.105).   
ǯlism 
Labour continued criminal justice managerialism, albeit more cautiously (Painter, 2005; Senior, 
et al., 2008).  Expanding the Court Service agency into HM Courts Service, magistrate 
administration was finally centralised in 2005ǡ  ǯ (2001) recommendation of 
closer alignment with the Crown Court.  ǯ   continued apace, 
culminating in nationalisation in 2001.  Again, delivery from a new executive agency was 
deliberated (Home Office, 1998), but direct Home Office oversight was eventually chosen 
(Raynor & Vanstone, 2007, p.71).  As for prisons, following the Howard-Lewis affair and a 
manifesto   ǲ      ǳ (Labour, 1997), 




ministers quickly resumed all parliamentary duties.  Simultaneously, an internal management 
report ǲareness of, and sensitivity to, the nature and demands of ministerial 
responsibility ... at all levels of the agencyǳ(HMPS, 1997, p.7), before the quinquennial review 
concluded that ǲ   ǳ had usefully modified the originally distant 
department-agency relationship (Home Office, 1999, p.11).  Indeed, latterly, Labour even  ǣ ǲ Prison Service has, in practice, been a Next Steps Agency in name only for ǳ(Home Office, 2004, p.15).  This declining autonomy is explored further in Chapter 
6. 
Alongside the extension, modification and partial reversal of Conservative managerialism, 
Labour pursued more ǲ- ǳ(Senior, et al., 2008, pp.70-71).  Initially, full prison-
probation amalgamation was considered ǲ   ǳ (Home Office, 1998, p.12), but the 
question arose again after creation of the National Probation Service in 2001, particularly in two 
seminal reports by Patrick Carter.  The first observed tǲiently focused           ǳ (Carter, 2003, p.17).  It 
recommended establishing a National Offender Management Service (NOMS) to combine 
custodial and community responsibilities and extend mixed-economy commissioning.  Formed 
in 2004 within the Home Office, the original intention for NOMS was that HMPS would lose its ǲǳtmental delivery arm, responding to central 
tendering alongside private competitors (Home Office, 2004, p.15).  In fact, HMPS retained its 
separate classification (see Chapter 6), while private prison contract management and the 
National Probation Service were housed within NOMS.  As such, the prison-probation merger 
was incomplete. 
 Ǯ ? ?ǯǡ     ǡ continued until 2008, advancing end-to-end 
offender management but with less contestability than originally envisaged (Interview_014; 
_024).  Prompted by this shortfall and the ongoing prison population crisis, the then ennobled 
Lord Carter returned to the issue in 2007.  His second report recommended super-Ǯǯ




prisons and reduced duplication between the NOMS commissioner and HMPS provider (Lord 
Carter, 2007).  ǯ  was a fuller NOMS-HMPS merger, creating a combined 
commissioner-provider agency Ȃ Ǯ ? ?ǯ Ȃ with responsibilities for both prison and 
probation (MoJ, 2008).  In the remaining Labour years, this pursued contestability, regional 
service integration and cost reduction, as the global financial crisis loomed larger. 
5.2.2 Civil justice, past and present 
Civil justice pertains to the non-criminal law, involving ǲ-bag of matters and participanǳǡ
including businesses, citizens and public institutions (Glenn, 1997, p.160).  As Glenn remarks, 
such diversity precludes accurate description of a civil justice system.  Accordingly, this 
subsection adopts a more disaggregated approach to explaining key developments which 
parallel or intersect with those in criminal justice. 
Civil courts 
County courts handle most civil litigation, from insolvency proceedings to divorce.  First 
established in 1846, their jurisdiction has since expanded considerably (Glenn, 1997), but 
always with some national administration (Polden, 1999).  With the Courts Act 1971, which 
formed the consolidated Crown Court, a unified criminal-civil administration was formed 
(Polden, 1999, pp.196-197).  As noted above, this became the Court Service agency during Next 
Steps, and then HM Courts Service agency in 2005 with the further addition of ǯ
courts.  Civil and criminal business alike was subject to NPM-style consumerism (see The Law 
Gazette, 1992). 
Tribunals 
Administrative justice pertains to citizen redress against wrongful government decision-making 
(Le Sueur, 2011).  Considered by some to fall within civil justice (Glenn, 1997; Leggatt, 2001) 
and others to hold its own jurisdictional identity (Cane, 2009), this area has expanded 
considerably over the twentieth century.  Traditionally, adjudication proceeded through 
tribunals rather than the civil courts.  With the nineteenth-century expansion of state 




responsibilities, these emerged individually within the bodies they were adjudicating (Cane, 
2009)ǡ    Ǯǯ  Ǯǯ Ǥ     ǡ
however, the lack of independence was found wanting, and tribunals were reinterpreted as 
properly part of the separate judicial branch (Cane, 2009). 
Labour contributed most significantly to this ǲǳ    (Cane, 
2009, p.47).  Upon taking office, the Court Service agency already administered some tribunals, 
but most were distributed across central government.  Tasked with rationalising the system, 
Andrew Leggatt concluded: 
ǲTribunals are an alternative to court, not administrative, processes.  They will keep the 
confidence of users only in so far as they are seen to demonstrate similar qualities of 
independence and impartiality to the courts.ǳ(2001, p.27).   
Leggatt thus argued for one overarching legislative and judicial structure, supported by a single 
agency.  Accordingly, the Tribunals Service was established in 2006, consolidating cross-
departmental administration, including the existing Appeals Service and Employment Tribunals 
Service agencies (Tribunals Service, 2006).  Thereafter, the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement 
Act 2007 legislated for two generic tribunals at first-instance and appellate levels, and extended 
the judiciǯ constitutional independence to tribunal members (Cane, 2009; Le Sueur, 2011).  
Latterly, Labour announced the merger of the Tribunals Service and HM Courts Service agencies 
(HM Treasury, 2010, p.10).  This was enacted by the Coalition Government in 2011, which also 
plans to combine the post of Senior President of Tribunals with the Lord Chief Justice Ȃ the head 
of the regular judiciary (Le Sueur, 2011, p.271).  Such a move would further consummate ǯǤ 
Legal Aid 
Means-tested legal aid Ȃ ǲǳ(Robins, 2011, p.9) Ȃ is available 
in both criminal and civil matters, but for clarity is only discussed here.  Established in its 
modern form by the Atlee Government, public funding was initially for criminal defence and 




divorce, but has since expanded to include other areas of civil law (Robins, 2011).  It was 
administered by the Law Society until 1988, when an independent Legal Aid Board was created.  
Thereafter, spiralling expenditure and a lessening emphasis on social welfare led to further 
reform (Creaton, 2003; Robins, 2011).  In 1999, the Legal Services Commission was created as a 
non-departmental public body (NDPB), aiming for increased join-up and customer-focus, 
particularly in civil funding (Creaton, 2003).  However, the Commission latterly suffered repeat 
underperformance, and, as Labour left office, the Magee Review (2010) proposed ǯ 
centralisation as an executive agency.  Again, this was enacted by the Coalition (see Section 
5.4.2, below). 
Public guardianship 
The safeguarding and empowerment of those disadvantaged by mental incapacity has grown 
considerably as a public policy issue in the last twenty years.  Formerly, Enduring Powers of ȋȌǮǯo designate substitute decision-makers for financial matters 
only, with minimal central regulation.  Without an arranged EPA, the old Court of Protection 
appointed Ǯǯ Ȃ normally relatives or friends, but occasionally government officials 
(Burns & Bowman, 2003; Committee of Public Accounts, 1994).  Growing dissatisfaction with 
this in the 1990s made a coalition for modernisation.  Following Law Commission reports, 
Labour consultations, and two draft bills, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 was eventually passed, 
becoming fully operational in 2007 (Bartlett, 2008, pp.38-39).  As Hartley-Jones (2011, p.161) 
explains, ǲunderlying philosophy ... is to ensure that those who lack capacity are empowered 
to make as many decisions for themselves as possible and that any decision made, or action 
taken, on ǳǤThe Act thus establishes a number of key 
principles, including decision- and time-specific tests of capacity.  It also strengthens the Court 
of Protection and replaces the system of receivers and EPAs with Ǯdeputiesǯ and Lasting Powers 
of Attorney (LPAs).  Enhancing donor protection, LPAs can pertain to both estates and personal 
welfare; must be established with a statutory form, where the donor is independently certified 
as possessing capacity at its creation; and only deployed once registered (Hartley-Jones, 2011; 




MoJ, 2010b).  The Public Guardian, a new statutory officeholder, registers these deeds, 
supervises Court-appointed deputies, and investigates allegations of abuse. 
Until 2001, Court of Protection and EPA-receiver administration was housed within the Public 
Trust Office Ȃ a division of the L ǯ     Public 
Trusteeǯ   and the banking services of the Court Funds Office (PTO, 1994, 
pp.2, 4-5).  Agency status was granted in 1994, but the first quinquennial review concluded that 
these disparate functions had failed to coalesce (Chant, 1999).  Hence, in 2001, the agency was 
further disaggregated, the executor and banking functions transferring to the Official Solicitor 
office and Court Service agency, respectively, while safeguarding became a new Public 
Guardianship Office agency (Hansard HL, 29th March 2001;  Public Guardianship Office, 2001).  
With the new Mental Capacity Act, this was replaced by the current Office of the Public Guardian 
in 2007.  Court of Protection administration then passed to HM Courts Service in 2009, leaving, 
overall, a much reduced agency remit since Next Steps, albeit one with exponentially-growing 
service demand. 
5.2.3 Constitutional reform 
Tribunal judicialisation, political devolution, House of Lords reform, freedom of information 
legislation, and the diminution of the office of Lo     ǯ
constitutional innovations (Bogdanor, 2005; Hazell, 2007; Le Sueur, 2011).  These have been   ǲ  ǳǡ        
(Bogdanor, 2005, p.74).  For the MoJ agencies, alterations to politico-judicial relations 
represented a particularly salient development. 
Reforming the office of Lord Chancellor 
As cabinet minister, head of the judiciary and speaker of the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor 
was long seen as a constitutionally dubious office, plainly subverting the separation of powers 
(Woodhouse, 2001).  Unlike other constitutional reforms, Labǯ decision to remove the 
legislative and judicial functions was taken neither in public nor through sustained deliberation, 




being rather announced in a cabinet reshuffle ǲin an almost whimsical, ǳ, as one 
official mused (Interview_039).  This casual dismissal of a near-ancient institution, and the 
failure to consult over its ramifications, prompted much judicial acrimony and several major 
political concessions (Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2007; Crook, 2013; Le Sueur, 2004).  To 
many, far from endangering judicial independence, the constitutionally-hybrid Lord Chancellor 
represented the judicial ǲǳ(Cane, 
2009, p.106).  By virtue of this seat in cabinet, judges were party to court resourcing decisions.  ǡǯ the separation 
of powers, any claim for strengthening judicial independence rested upon a narrow 
interpretation, unreflective of the extent to which adjudication rests upon its supporting 
administration (see Purchas, 1994; Woodhouse, 2007; also Lord Chief Justice Phillips in 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2007, ev.27).  In making this case, the senior judiciary won 
important concessions, first codified  Ǯǯȋ HL, 26th January 
2004), and then legislated in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.  Significantly, as well as 
reforming judicial appointments and transferring extensive powers to the Lord Chief Justice 
(who became full head of the judiciary), the Act placed upon the diminished Lord Chancellor a 
statutory obligation to protect judicial independence (Hazell, 2007, p.17; Woodhouse, 2007).  
Although the precise nature of this responsibility remained unclear, political-judicial harmony 
was re-established until early 2007. 
Towards a Ministry of Justice 
The possibility of establishing a dedicated department for justice was raised at various times 
during the twentieth century, including in the 1918 Haldane Report and before the 1987 and 
1992 general elections (Drewry, 1987; Woodhouse, 2001, pp.207-211)Ǥ   ǡ  ǯ
eventual creation in 2007 was, in some respects, long in the making, although previous 
discussions envisaged various functional combinations.  Labourǯ    merge the 
Home Officeǯ Ǯ ǯ with the still-fledgling Department for Constitutional 
Affairs, therǮ-ǯdepartment (Cabinet Office, 2007; Gibson, 2008).  




This decision largely stemmed from the size of the Home Officeǯ challenges in the middle of the 
decade, which included the expanded terrorist threat and reputational damage suffered after 
accidental release of foreign national prisoners (Gibson, 2008, p.14).  This scandal prompted 
dismissal ǯ  ǲǳ(BBC, 2006).   
Speculation about a split between national security and justice emerged early in January 
(Hennessy, 2007), and advanced plans were published in March (Cabinet Office, 2007).  Once 
again, the judiciary were taken by surprise, and an even more public disagreement with the 
executive ensued.  Whereas removal of the Lord Chancelloǯ     ? ? ? ?
had been significant, the transition to the Department for Constitutional Affairs impacted only 
minimally upon judicial administration.  Ministers continued to oversee a closed portion of  ǡ   Ǯ  ǯ Ȃ that is, courts and legal aid.  Conversely, the ǯ   
for whom this was the sole, or even large, concern.  Moreover, both executive and judicial 
branches of government would now vie for a single funding allocation, with the potential for 
prison population pressures to force court underfunding.  Thus, while ministers regarded MoJ 
as simply a machinery of government change, the judiciary saw another constitutional upheaval 
and publicly demanded new safeguards (see Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2007). 
Resolution was more protracted than in 2003-2004, but eventually resulted in further political 
concessions.  A re-issued framework document estaǮpartnershipǯ 
agency of the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice, bringing the head of the judiciary into 
resourcing decisions, ensuring their representation at the agency board, and granting the whole 
judiciary the dual loyalty of all agency officials (HMCS, 2008).  This made for complex and 
constitutionally-unparalleled agency governance that continues today in the amalgamated HM 
Courts and Tribunals Service (see Lord Chancellor & Secretary of State for Justice, 2011). 




5.2.4 Summary ǯ Figure 5.2, overleaf.  The first conclusion to ǯ
since the 1990s.  Extensive tribunal reform, nationalisation of the Probation Service and  ǯ ǡ        ǯǤǡthere is 
the perennial nature of reform: delayed managerialism left its mark under both the 
Conservatives and Labour, combining regulation and centralisation with outsourcing and 
autonomisation.  Thirdly, there is the tension been continuity in, and modification of, justice 
agencification.  Officially, all major functions devolved within the Next Steps programme 
continue today in agency-based ǡ  ǯ   direct delivery 
departments.  Nonetheless, beneath this ostensible continuity, both the Howard-Lewis affair 
and latter-day constitutional reform have reconditioned modern agency practice, de-
autonomising HMPS and establishing HMCS as a judicial-executive partnership.  The extent to 
which these modifications make for an emic reinterpretation of agency identity is the focus of 
the next chapter.  For now, attention turns to diachronic comparison of meso-level discourse 
across the period reviewed above. 
  




Figure 5.2: MoJ genealogy 




5.3 Next Steps in the justice sector 
This section explores official accounts of 1990s justice agencification, employing once more the 
general analytic framework of argumentation, voice and differentiation (see Chapter 3).  While 
registering some synchronic variation between prison and non-prison reform, whereby Ǯagencyǯ 
represents either a de-politicisation solution to performance failure or an enabler of justice 
consumerism, the shared emphasis on decentralisation and management empowerment makes 
for continuity and elaboration of the central Next Steps precepts.  
5.3.1 HM Prison Service ǯǡǡcomplexity and political 
salience (Gains, 1999, pp.100-101).  Although the first major autonomisation within the justice ǡǯǡ
the Passport Service and Forensic Science Service.  Operationally, the early 1990s proved 
challenging for HMPS.  Serious rioting led to the Woolf Report (1991) and the white paper, 
Custody, Care and Justice (Home Office, 1991, p.3), which navigated ǲa course for the Prison 
Serviceǳ      ? ? ? ?Ǥ   ǯ ǡManagement of the Prison Service 
(1991), quickly followed, identifying agencification as a necessary first step towards achieving 
the ambitious turnaround.  This, and the first framework document, are analysed below. 
The Lygo Report 
Lygo essays a forceful warning to ministers, formalised in Box 5.1, on probable further failure 
should the Home Office not relinquish control on HMPS. 
Box 5.1ǣǯ 
Perfect syllogism: 
[#1a] Organisational change requires independence. [#1b] HMPS is not 
independent. [#1c] Therefore, presently, organisational change will fail. 
Illustrations from Lygo (1991): 




[i] ǲȏȐt was very clear that unless [#1a] there was a preparedness on the part of 
the Home Office to take its hands off the management of the Prison Service in its 
day to day business [#1b] and allow itself to be constrained by matters of policy 
only [#1b], then it would not be possible [#1c] to effect the changes which you 
deem desirable and which have become very clear to me as being necessary... 
[#1c]ǳ (covering letter) 
[ii] ǲ    without [#1a] a change in the managerial framework 
within which the Service operates, the chances of achieving the ambitious agenda 
set out in the recent White Paper will be significantly diminished [#1c]Ǥǳ(p.2) 
[iii] ǲAs others before me have noted, there are a number of fundamental 
managerial problems [#1b] which need to be addressed if [#1a] the Prison Service 
is to do more than simply cope on a day by day basis with the demands made on it 
[#1c]Ǥǳ (p.5) 
 
The first premise in Box 5.1 is an overt statement of causality, linking successful organisational 
change to managerial independence [#1a].  The association of these two quasi-variables is 
established by conditionality Ȃ ǲǳǡǲǳ [i]; ǲǳȏȐ; ǲǳȏȐǤǡthe positing 
of agreement with previous reports (ǲas   ǳ [iii]) both strengthens 
veracity and anticipaǯ
to act (see ȌǤ  ǡ     ǯ   
independence [#1b], describing animatedly the problems of over-regulation by stating that the 
Home Office should ǲtake its hands offǳ  ȏȐǤ  As in the main Next Steps Report, this 
institutional apportioning of blame is reinforced by departmental personification Ȃ ǲon the part    ǳ [i].  Finally, the ǯ conclusion that, presently, performance 
turnaround is unlikely [#1c] is the logical product of [#1a] and [#1b].  Reflecting the already-
established causality, this warning is expressed in terms of probability, with all three 
illustrations alluding to likelihood of success Ȃ ǲǳȏȐ; ǲǤǤǤǳȏȐ; ǲǳȏȐ.  This constructs a decision point for ministers: do something, or 
face likely recurrence. 




ǯcritique of previous, unfulfilled reform prescriptions.  
Frequent reference is made to earlier recommendations Ȃ ǲǤǤǤǳ; ǲǤǤǤǳ(1991, pp.5, 6).  As well as verifying his diagnosis, ǯ central challenge to ministers: forǡǲǳ
about the need for de-politicisation, the problem becomes less about identifying a suitable 
reform strategy than understanding why ministers have failed to implement it: 
ǲIf the Prison Service is to achieve the direction and unity for which successive reports have 
called, it must be allowed to operate much more independently....  Why has this not 
happened in the past despite the recommendations of successive reports?  I can only 
conclude that Home Secretaries and their advisers have not thought it wise to separate 
Ministers from day to day involvement....  I assume also that there has been a reluctance on 
the part of the Home Office to envisage a separate Prison Service.  Nevertheless, if the 
deficiencies which I and others have identified are to be remedied, this is the key question 
which has to be resolvedǤǳ (1991, p.8) 
This admonishment of ministers  ǯ overall contention.  The first sentence re-
invokes the causality of Box 5.1, linking improvement with independence through conditionality ȋǲǳȌ   ȋǲǳȌ, and establishing a foundation against which ministerial and 
departmental culpability is levelled, given earlier failures to act.  The ministerial challenge then 
comes explicitly in the rhetorical question.  Alongside ǯve answers ȋǲ ǤǤǤǳ  ǲ ǤǤǤǳȌ, this implies that, had previous advice been heeded, many 
problems could already have been solved.  Finally, and confirming this, Lygo throws down the 
gauntlet in identifying ministerial hesitancy as the present barrier to performance turnaround.  
In so doing, decentralisation is prescribed as a non-negotiable given: there is no doubt that 
HMPS must be separated from the Home Office Ȃ the question is how to persuade ministers of 
the fact. 
After this warning and challenge, Lygo turns to the proposed decentralisation.  He differentiates 
between appropriate and excessive autonomisation, stating that his proposals ǲǳ   ǲ  ǳ  ǲ    ǳ (1991, p.9).  As he continues: 




ǲǡaccountability probably rules out running the Prison Service as a 
quango or as a separate authority.  Equally, however, the need for greater managerial 
independence suggests a move away from the present arrangements and towards a much 
more independent Prison Service, clearly separate from the rest of the Home office but 
having responsibility to the Home Secretary.  In current Civil Service thinking, this would 
ǮǯǤǳ 
Tǲǳǲǳbetween the first and second sentences, and the  ǲǳ in the penultimate statement, both indicate the balancing of ǲǳ  ǲ ǳ as potentially opposing organisational 
properties.  ǡ        ǲǳcutive agency reflects recent anti-ǡǯ
as still ǲ ǳ and ǲǳ of the Home Office, and the weighing of both 
options as potential decentralisation and de-politicisation strategies, are commensurate with ǯ  ǮpǯȋChapter 4).  As Lygo 
later confirms: ǲǮǯ ... regard themselves and be 
regarded as the Prison Servǳ(1991, p.22).   
ǯ.  Indeed, unlike 
contemporary Public Bodies discourse, so firmly separatist is his understanding Ǯǯthat, 
for the complex and politically-charged HMPS, only strengthened departmental oversight and 
sponsorship   ǡǲ  [from] 
becoming isolated and inward-looking, which some have suggested would be a consequence of 
agency statusǳ(1991, p.12).  Thus, although different to quango delivery, outright agencification 
may induce such independence as to completely detach HMPS, to the detriment of ministerial 
responsibility and good governance.  For this reason, the Next Steps model should be tempered. 
Framework Document ǯion was accepted in 1992, and HMPS became an agency the following year.  
Containing 74 per cent of Home Office staff (Talbot, 1996, p.5), it was the third largest in Next 
Steps (Whitmore, 1994, p.4).       ǡ ǯ ministerial 




ǡ   ǯ   as director general, the first framework 
document is notable for its master narratives of organisational release, operational de-
politicisation and chief executive authorisation. 
Lygo had framed agencification as a watershedǡ   ǲ   ǳ  ǲ ǳ (1991, pp.20, 21).  This replicates in the framework, with its ministerial 
foreword describing ǲǳ, ǲ ǳǡ   ǲ  ǳ of 
agency status: 
ǲ             ȏȐ  Ȃ 
which means higher standards and better value for money.  The opportunity is provided by 
more autonomy, and the freedom to develop new and imaginative ideas.  I know there is a 
reservoir of talent at all levels in the Service Ȃ agency status will provide the means to 
release Ǥǳ (HMPS, 1993, p.2) 
As well as advancing a classically-NPM politico-bureaucratic ǲbargainǳ (Hood, 2001), in which 
autonomy is exchanged for value-for-money improvements, the minister here evokes a sense of 
organisational release, ǯ narrative.  There is, for example, 
talk of ǲǳǡǲǳǲǳǡ aǲȏȐǳǲ reservoir  ǳ.  All imply that, previously, officials were constrained.  This sense of release is 
heightened at the ǯe: 
ǲǤ

taking advantage of the opportunities Ǥǳ(HMPS, 1993, p.2) 
The minister distances himself from director general: HMPS staff now report to the latter, and 
the politician departs with a word of encouragement as they engage with the new ǲǳ-politicisation Ȃ a further invocation of Next Steps emancipation. 
Instantiating this removal of politics from operations is the absence of the Home Office logo and 
branding throughout the framework document, and the confinement of the first-person 
ministerial voice to its foreword.  Moreover, the presence of two further voices Ȃ a personified 
agency perspective, and the dispassionate, quasi-contractual voice Ȃ enhance this department-




agency distancing.  The former is found in the ǲaskǳ, where bureaucratic (not 
political) control of prison operations is asserted through first-person ownership Ȃ ǲour ǳ; ǲour ǳ; ǲour ǳ(HMPS, 1993, p.4).  The latter states dispassionately the authorities and 
obligations placed upon those party to the new relationship.  For example: 
ǲ Home Secretary receives reports   ǯ     
inspections of prison establishments.  The Home Secretary will ask the Director General to 
respond Ǥǳ(HMPS, 1993, p.7) ȋǲǳǡǲǳǡǲǳȌȋǲǳǡǲ
ǳȌǡ-person narrative voice enhances 
the evocation of principal-agent contractualism, compounding the politico-bureaucratic bargain 
previously expounded in the ministerial foreword. 
 ǯ           Ȃ somewhat 
prophetic, giǯ.  This is particularly evident in the apportioning ǲǳ ǲ-ǳǣ 
ǲ            
 
matters for which the Director General has delegated responsibility. ... When a Member of 
Parliament asks a Parliamentary Question on a delegated matter, the Home Secretary will 
normally reply to the effect that the Director General will write direct to the Member.  ...  
Parliamentary Questions on non-delegated matters will normally be answered by 
ǡ
Ǥǳ (HMPS, 1993, p.7) 
As if delivering responsibilities from ministers to the director general, this differentiation 
between ǲǳand ǲ-ǳ matters again reinforces the sense of organisational 
release, contractualism and de-politicised operations.  Notably, responsibility for parliamentary 
correspondence is not HMPSǯ generally, or even that of its communications staff; rather, the 
agency head himself must fulfil this obligation.  This level of specificity illustrates how the 
framework is less about the department-agency relationship than that between ministers and 
the appointed, newly-profiled bureaucrat.  Although occasionally referencing HMPS as itself a 




contractual party, the document mostly anticipates the personal minister-director general 
relationship: 
ǲ    receive reports from the Director General on the following 
matters...Ǥǳ (HMPS, 1993, p.6) 
ǲ         irector General to the Home 
Secretary...Ǥǳ (p.8) 
ǲǯ	jointly by the Home Secretary 
and the Director General....  The Home Secretary, the Permanent Secretary or the Director 
General may propose amendments....  Any amendments are subject to agreement by the 
Home Secretary, the Director General, the Treasury...Ǥǳ (p.10) 
Of these personalising extracts, the final particularly elevates the director general to a position 
of authority.  S/he will be ǲǳnvolved in the frameworkǯ review; may propose changes; 
and must agree unscheduled amendments, alongside the Home Secretary.  As such, the agency 
head is no ordinary official, but is empowered to discuss, debate and agree.   
Such was the emphasis on the director generalǯ-agencification authority that, prior to the ǯ ǡ there was some uncertainty about the continuing need for a junior prisons 
minister (Lewis, 1997, p.14).  This was also raised in a subsequent parliamentary hearing: 
Chairman: ǲ[N]owhere in the documentation ... is there any description of a role for a 
Prisons Minister: the key players are to be the Home Secretary, the Permanent Secretary 
and the Chief Executive.  What role ... are you expecting to play in the future...? 
Minister: ǲǤǤǤWhat it will mean in practice is that I will continue to interest myself in the 
operational matters of the Prison Service....  I will in fact not make final decisions on those 
matters which are operational, but I shall certainly keep up-to-date.... I will not be making 
some of those operational decisions which I formerly had to make. ... I will see similar sorts 
of papers, only I will not make the final Ǥǳ (Home Affairs Committee, 1993, p.11) ǯǲǳǯ 
personalised contracting between the Home Secretary and authorised director general, while 
his questioning of post-agency arrangements reinforces the idea of an organisational watershed.       ǯ ǡ when a before-and-after comparison and 




ǲǳ-operational matters illustrates the new, 
de-politicised decision-making arrangements, for which the minister will monitor and observe, 
but not instruct.  Thus, as elsewhere in the Next Steps-era discourse, agencification is 
interpreted in strongly autonomising and de-politicising terms.   
5.3.2 The Court Service 
The pre-agency Court Service Ȃ a division of the LoǯȋȌ Ȃ already 
published an annual report.  This subsection considers the last of these prior to agencification, 
and the folio of documents accompanying the re-launch (Court Service, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; 
LCD, 1995).  Principally, it examines the framing of Ǯagencyǯ as an enabler of consumerism, the 
chief executiveǯauthorisation, and the newly contractual department-agency relationship. 
Enabling consumerism ǯǡl service reform continued apace.  Tǯ emerged 
in 1991 to further entrench government consumerism (Prime Minister, 1991), and LCD 
embraced this, producing ǲǳǲǳ(The Law Gazette, 1992).  Accordingly, courts agencification discourse identifies 
the restructure as advancing this customer-service agenda.  Box 5.2 formalises the enthymeme. 
Box 5.2: Court consumerism 
Truncated syllogism (enthymeme): 
 
[#2a] The Court Service is improving customer service. [#2b] Better customer 
service is enabled by agency freedoms.* [#2c] Therefore, agency status will 




Illustration from final pre-agency annual report: 
 
[i]: ǲhe key challenges identified for the agency has been further to improve 
the service provided to court users.  Work on meeting this challenge started some 
time ago, and there is evidence in this report of the progress that is being achieved. 
[#2a] ... The change to agency status will provide the management of the Court 
Service with the opportunity to concentrate on operational issues.  I am confident 




that this, together with the greater freedoms and flexibilities that the change 
brings, will enable the Court Service to achieve further improvements [#2c]Ǥǳ(LCD, 
1995, ministerial foreword) 
 
Illustration from framework document: 
 
[ii]: ǲ
public and the judiciary [#2a] and I am confident that the current move to agency 
status will enable it to demonstrate still further improvements in that service [#2c]. 
... As an agency, the Court Service will strive to improve the quality of service 
provided to the public in the courts [#2c]Ǥǳ (Court Service, 1995c, ministerial 
foreword) 
Box 5.2ǯ enthymeme contains an explicit first premise and conclusion [#2a/#2c], and implicit 
connector [#2b].  Both illustrations cite active consumerism [#2a], the first noting the ǲprogress 
that is beiǳ the second anticipating  ǲ ǳstill available.  
Similarly, the conclusion that agencification will advance this agenda [#2c] is made directly, 
with both illustrations emphasising the familiar empowering function of agency status Ȃ ǲǳǢ ǲǳǢ ǲǳǤ  As for the implicit connecting premise [#2b], although ǯ ǲǳ   ǲ  ǳ are cited, the mechanism 
behind their improvement of customer service remains latent.  The requisite reader co-
production is rhetorical (Jasinski, 2001) and signals taken-for-granted intersubjectivity 
(Feldman, et al., 2004).  Therefore, as demonstrated with the Next Steps Report in Chapter 4, the 
benefits of independent management are treated as an unquestionable given. 
Authorising the chief executive 
Outside of the ministerial foreword, the Court Service framework is vocalised through a 
contractual third-person.  This polarisation between the political foreword and managerial 
framework-proper once again invokes de-politicised operations, although, unlike HMPS, there is 
no support from a first-person personified agency.  Still, throughout the agencification 
literature, new chief executive authority is emphasised: 
ǲ
the Headquarters of the Department, leaving Court Service managers free to concentrate 




on the operational management of the courts.  The Court Service is now headed by a Chief 
Executive, rather than an official in LCD HQ, who is directly accountable to the Lord 
Chancellor....  He now has direct management responsibility, inter alia, for personnel/ 
training and the Court Building Programme/estate management in the Court Service, 
functions which previously fell to the Principal Establishment and Finance Officer for LCD.  
... The post of Chief Executive will be subject to open competition no later than April 1997Ǥǳ
(LCD, 1995, p.73) 
This extract reiterates several previous ideas.  Firstly, agency status is again narrated as an 
organisational watershed, here through the before-and-after comparison ȋǲǤǤǤǳǢǲǤǤǤǳȌand anticipation ȋǲ ? ? ? ?ǳȌǤSecondly, it is framed 
as empowering; for example, in the claim of ǲleaving Court Service managers free to concentrate    ǳ.  This narrated  ȋǲǳǡ ǲǳȌ mirrors both the ǯBox 5.2ǡǡǯ
narrative.  As for chief executive authorisation, the extract distinguishes between this new role 
and that of the former, less-empowered ǲǳ who oversaw both court policy and 
delivery.  In particular, even though this is initially to be   ǡ  ǯ , 
heighted status as a chief executive is established through its singular presentation, as if 
identifying a particular type of leadership from a range of possibilities (ǲa ǳȌ, and       ȋǲ     ǤǤǤǳȌǤ  
endowment of corporate service autonomy contrasts markedly with contemporary emphasis on 
inter-agency shared services, discussed below. 
There are many further examples of leadership authorisation.  As with HMPS, the chief 
executive will handle parliamentary correspondence (Court Service, 1995c, p.9), and, alongside 
the Lord Chancellor, will set agency targets: 
ǲȏ details how] the Court Service aims to ... meet the key targets set for it 
for the year by the Lord Chancellor.  It also lists the supporting targets which the Chief 
Executive has himself set...Ǥǳ (LCD, 1995, p.74) 
This joint ministerial-bureaucratic ownership, whereby both parties contribute to a hierarchy of 
target setting, is paralleled in the frameworkǯǣ 




ǲhis plans for current and 
capital expenditure...Ǥǳ(Court Service, 1995c, p.12) 
Here, the chief executive owns the agency agenda Ȃ ǲhis plansǳthat ministers endorse.  
Indeed, such is the extent of the anticipated delegation that explicit qualification is needed in a 
small framework appendix: 
ǲȏȐ
of issues.ǤǤǤǳ (Court Service, 1995c, p.8) 
This mandating of judicial consultation reads as an ex-post qualification of autonomy, testifying 
to the extent of bureaucratic authorisation elsewhere.  Furthermore, regarding judicial relations 
specifically, and compared with the post-MoJ partnership established in 2008 (see Section 5.2.3, 
above), this original requirement for consultation is significant for its implication of judicial-
agency distance. 
Agency contracting 
A final prominent discursive feature of the Court Service literature is the contractual framing of 
the future department-agency relationship, demonstrated by this opening of the financial 
memorandum: 
ǲAll references to the Department should be read as meaning officials acting on behalf of 
the Lord Chancellor or Permanent Secretary ... ǯ
officer.  References to the Court Service should be read as meaning officials acting on 
behalf Ǥǳ (Court Service, 1995b, p.1) 
Not only does this passage establish a contractual, party-to-party basis for the relationship ȋǲǳȌ, but it also attacȋǲas ǯ  ǳȌǤ  ǡ the extract  ǲthe Departmentǳ and ǲ
Court Serviceǳreporting lines, thereby elevating the chief executive to comparable ǡǲǳǲǳǤAs with HMPS, 
therefore, Courts Service staff are not LCD staff.   




In anticipating the Public Expenditure Survey (PES) process, the financial memorandum then 
elaborates upon this hierarchical, principal-agency relationship: 
ǲǤ
to: determine...; commission...; scrutinise and consider...; advise the Lord Chancellor...; [and] 
recommend....  The Chief Executive is responsible for seeking the resources he needs....  The 
Court Service: submits...; supports...; sets out its priorities and planning assumptions...; 
provides...; [and] participatesǤǤǤǤǳ (Court Service, 1995b, p.2) 
The passage again portrays chief executive ownership ȋǲthe resources he ǤǤǤǳ), and yet the 
contrasting departmental and agency responsibilities Ȃ ǲǳǡǲǳǡǲǳǡǲǳǡ ǲǳ; ǲsǳǡǲsǳǡǲs outǳǡǲǳǡ ǲǳ Ȃ reasserts the ǯ subservience.  Thus, the LCD, as 
contractual principal, determines the final outcome; the Court Service (specifically, its chief 
executive), as agent, ǲǳ a request. 
5.3.3 The Public Trust Office 
Given their shared origins within the LCD, there is much continuity across Court Service and 
Public Trust Office (PTO) discourse.  As such, this final brief subsection takes the opportunity of 
further illustrating this non-prison, consumerist approach to justice agencification by examining 
the PTO framework document. 
Departure 
Agencification came when the coalition for modernising public guardianship was emerging (see 
Section 5.2.2, above).  Acknowledging, therefore, the uncertainty about future developments,          ǡ   ǯ  ǯ ǲ ǳ        ǲ    ǳ (PTO, 1994, p.2).  This evokes once more a sense of departure and 
expectation.  Moreover, as previously, departmental-agency distancing is enhanced by the 
confinement of ministerial voice to the opening foreword, while the contrasting first-person 




agency Ȃ ǲOur approach ... we ǳǢ ǲour ǳ (1994, pp.4, 11) Ȃ vocalises the newly 
devolved ownership. 
Enabling consumerism ǯ underperformance was a concern during this period (Committee of Public Accounts, 
1994).  Reflecting its markedly differing operation to the troubled HMPS, however, and 
following the Court Service model, Ǯagencǯ is framed as enabling consumerism rather than 
performance turnaround: 
ǲenhance its ability to deliver these services 
more efficiently and effectively to its clientsǤǳ (1994, p.2) 
ǲ         as an agency will provide the right 
environment to allow it to meet more effectively the needs of its various, and in some cases 
disadvantaged, customerǤǳ (p.2) 
In both extracts, performance improvement is described in terms of citizen benefit, whether ǲǳǲǳǤǯǯǡ
noted above.  Moreover, agencification is again ȋǲǳǡǲǳǡǲǳȌǡ       ȋǲits ability  ǳǡ ǲright environmentǳȌǤ 
Authorisation and personalisation 
Another similarity between PTO, HMPS and the Court Service is the personalisation of the  Ǥ    ǯ ǲǳ   ǡ as is their personal 
accountability.  For example, the assertion that both the chief executive and permanent   ǲliableǳ         
public service bargain of autonomy in exchange for service improvements Ȃ a logic formulated 
more explicitly in the ministerial foreword: 
ǲ[This framework] outlines the managerial freedoms that the Public Trustee possesses in 
order to run and be accountable ǯǤ 
areas in which the performance of the PTO will be monitoredǤǳ (1994, p.2) 




Again, the bargain is constructed between the newly-empowered chief executive, who is ȋǲǳȌȋǲǳȌǡȋǲǳȌȋǲǳȌǤ
with HMPS and the Court Service, this authorisation makes for a personalised framework: 
ǲThe Chief Executive will carry out the full range of receivership duties when she is 
appointed by the Court....  She will manage and administer, in their best interests, the 
Ǥǳ (1994, p.5) 
ǲǡthe 
ǯǤǤǤǳ (p.13) 
Here, it is not the PTO agency that performs incapacity receivership duties, but rather a single 
official Ȃ ǲ  ǳǤ   ǡ ǲǳ       
financial statements Ȃ ǲǯǳǤ 
5.3.4 Summary 
Referencing both the policy histories described above and the Next Steps ǯ elements of 
meaning registered in Chapter 4, this section sought interpretations of 1990s justice 
agencification.  Occurring prior to the major reconfigurations that rationalised the landscape 
into its current MoJ-led format, these disaggregations removed functions from the Home Office 
and former LCD, aiming either for performance turnaround through de-politicisation or 
advanced consumerism.  Both arguments complement the Next Steps belief in managerialist 
public service improvement, while voice and discursive differentiation similarly extend that 
central narrative, evoking de-politicised operations, contractual decentralisation and a newly 
empowered frontline.  What remains now is to compare contemporary justice reforms against 
this Next Steps-era benchmark. 
5.4 Restructuring the Ministry of Justice 
Upon its formation in May 2007, MoJ reviewed how to craft the disparate Home Office and 
Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) functions into a coherent departmental structure.  




The resulting ǲ ǳ   groups: NOMS; Access to Justice; Democracy, 
Constitution and Law; Criminal Justice; and Corporate Performance (MoJ, 2009).  NOMS thus ǲǳǡformer ǯ
activities Ȃ courts, tribunals, public guardianship, and legal aid Ȃ were grouped together under 
the ǲAccess to Justiceǳ heading.  The three additional groups conducted further policy, strategy 
and sponsorship, and delivered some pan-MoJ corporate services.  Thereafter, further ǲTransforming Justiceǳ reforms launched in 2009, responding to the emerging fiscal tightening.  
Ten projects included developing alternative sentencing options, downsizing the senior civil 
service, incentivising local justice agencies to reduce reoffending ȋǯ
Payment-by-Results pilots, see Chapter 8), and expanding cross-departmental shared corporate 
services (Gash & McCrae, 2010, p.15).  However, by 2010, the deteriorating economic situation 
meant that pre-election planning expanded the (stalled) senior civil service redesign into a ǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
The efficiency imperative then ǯSpending Review, which required of 
MoJ 23 per cent cost reductions, including 33 per cent in administration (HM Treasury, 2010, 
pp.81, 87).  Justice was amongst the last settlements agreed (Interview_053), and, during 
ongoing Treasury negotiations, the Operating Model Blueprint was finalised.  Alongside policies 
reducing prison and legal aid demand, this would deliver savings through the already-
announced court-tribunal merger, the recreation of the Legal Services Commission as a new 
executive agency, extensive reform within the wider Public Bodies programme (see Chapter 4), 
and increased inter-group sharing of corporate support and middle-office functions.  The 
Blueprint thus removed IT, HR, procurement and other back-office services from individual 
agencies, to deliver them thereafter on a pan-MoJ Ǯ ǯ   (Document_13; Civil 
Service Capability Reviews, 2012).  It also made a single Justice Policy Group to undertake the 
entire policymaking activity of the MoJ family, which, as Chapter 7 explores, had formerly been 
distributed across the central department and its agencies.  




The practical impact of this centralisation and consolidation is recounted in the remainder of 
the thesis, the fieldwork having been completed during and immediately after  ǯ 
fast-paced implementation.  Complementing the historic analysis above, the remainder of this 
section probes contemporary reform discourse for additional meso-Ǯǯ
through MoJ staff interviews and (un)published documentation.  Initially, it considers the 
Operating Model redesign itself, before turning to the new Legal Aid Agency.   
5.4.1 Agencies in the MoJ Operating Model Blueprint 
The Blueprint 
Twenty-one PowerPoint slides codify the Operating Model Blueprint (Document_13).  Detailing ǡǯ-length 
bodies, initially through the graphic and text reproduced in Figure 5.3, which distinguishes ǯǲǳǲǳǤ 
Figure 5.3: The old MoJ 
 
(Adapted from Document_13, p.4) 
ǲ[sic] key business groups.  Each group is 
charged with delivering directly or indirectly ȋ ǡ   ǯ-length 
ȌǤǳ (Document_13, p.4) 




Figure 5.3   ǲ  ǳ       Ǥ
Therein, NOMS and the three Access to Justice agencies (HM Courts Service, the Tribunals 
Service, and the Office of the Public Guardian) are depicted alongside other departmental units,  ǯ-length bodies (including LSC) are externalised by their alternative, 
cross- Ǥ         ǲǳ ǲǳ  (cited beneath Figure 5.3), with only the vertical silos Ȃ not the horizontal ǯ-length bodies Ȃ ǯǤ 
staff engagement, the five critiques on the right of Figure 5.3 diagnose this incumbent ǯ
problems, and thus prompt    ǯ Ǥ   ǡ   -
outside, agency- ǡ    ǲ   ǳǡǲ ourselvesǳǡ  ǲ      ǳ   
removal of agency sponsorship (see below). 
Figure 5.4 reproduces the visual impression of a newly interconnected MoJ.  Unlike Figure 5.3, it 
has five columns, with the Legal Aid Agency gaining its own lengthways box next to the other ǯ-length bodies.   
Figure 5.4: The new MoJ 
 
(Adapted from Document_13, p.5) 




This redrawing of MoJ-quango relations Ȃ from horizontal and detached to vertical and 
connected Ȃ follows the wider Coalition commitment to re-involving ministers and departments  ǯ-length bodies.  Thus, the Corporate Performance Group box is replaced by a cross-
cutting ribbon that binds together all functions through their new sharing of single support 
services.  Two further ribbons similarly denote the all-encompassing reach of the policy ǲǳǡuch more integrated justice operatives. 
The remainder of the Blueprint proceeds to detail the new sharing of corporate and policy 
services, the necessary elimination of inter-group duplication, and the ǲǳ, which, in a further   ǡǲ ǤǤǤ   ǳǤ  ǡ  -quango distinction continues.  For ǡǡǲhis applies 
to ALBs ȏǯ-length bodies] as well as the core department and ǳ ȋDocument_013, 
p.9).  Here,      ȋǲ  ǳǢ ǲǳȌ further implicates an 
internal-external distinction, albeit one that the Blueprint is subverting in order to release 
economies of scale.  Furthermore, following Figure 5.3ǯ ǡ     the ǯ      ǲ  ǤǤǤ  
through sponsoring our exeǳǡǤǡǯ-agent contractualism, as implemented in 1990s justice agencification, all  Ǥ   ǡ ǡ  ǯ-length bodies, the Blueprint aspires towards 
strengthened ALB oversight.  Overall, then, this makes for a strongly integrative story, albeit one 
resting upon a foundational agency-quango distinction. 
Agency as governance mechanism 
Compounding this reinterpretation of agencies as departmental and not ǯ-length, a senior 
official spoke publicly of their distinct transparency and controllability when compared to 
quangos: 




ǲYou have to understand the difference between an executive NDPB and executive 
agencies.  If you are an executive agency, your primary accountability is to me.  I employ 
you and so you have to tell me everything that is going on and all the systems are geared 
towards that.  So I have full sight of everything that is going on in NOMS and in the Courts 
Service and the Tribunals ServǤǡǯnot even the employer.  I ǯ the 
chief executive.  I ǯ  the team.  This is at ǯ . ... [T]hat is why the 
government think it is wrong ... Ǥǳ (Committee of Public Accounts, 2011, 
ev.10)  ǯǡ 
explicit and implicit differentiation with quanǡ   ǲ    
differenceǳǡ            Ȃ ǲprimary ǳǡ ǲ  everythingǳǡ ǲfull sight of everythingǳǢ  ǲnot even the ǳǡ ǲǯ sǳǡ ǲwrongǳǤ  ǡ as in the wider Public Bodies Reforms,  ǲǯ-ǳNDPBs is again opposed by the departmental status of agencies, for which full 
disclosure is a given. 
On a similar understanding of agency-enabled transparency, the ǯ
status for the large MoJ business groups was rationalised in an interview conversation by the 
accountability infrastructure that it endows (see Box 5.3, below).  Eschewing any reference to 
the guarding of managerial autonomy, this interpretation accords with the Public Bodiesǯ 
reframing of agencification as a departmentally integrated format, and yet, significantly, its 
argument develops without any reference to unaccountable quangos.  Given that in Chapter 4, 
conversely, this reinterpretation was effected primarily through discourse aimed at denouncing 
NDPBs, its recurrence here is notable for signalling a commensurate but alternatively derived 
reframing of the accountability-ensuring agency.  
Box 5.3: Agencification for accountability 
 
[T: Why is NOMS an agency and not just a business group?] 
 
I: Good question.*  ǲȏȐ          a more formal 
board governance structure with non-execs there, which is really helpful, because non-
execs can add real value, experience, and maybe having them at the board is not the only 
   ǡ  ǯ     adds another level of scrutiny.  I guess I 




would [also] probably say, because their budgets are so big, having to report their own 
accounts is useful; and, along with that, having Agency Accounting Officers accountable 
ǯmore direct accountability. 
ǲǯǣresponsibility and accountability to a 




[*Hereafter, italicised text is direct quotation; non-italicised text is paraphrasing.  This 
formatting was outlined in Chapter 3.  The full style sheet is detailed in Appendix IV] 
 
Box 5.3 narrates ǮǯǤǣǲgovernance ǳǢǲǳǢǲaccountabilityǳǲǳǤǡǲ-ǳ  ǲ another level of scrutinyǳ.  For these reasons, agencification ensures ǲ ǳǡ   raph confirms, while also allowing    ǲǳ     Ȃ attractive, given ǯbudgetary size. 
Sponsorship 
Given the decentralisation and principal-agent contractualism envisaged by Next Steps, a key 
component of the traditional agency model has been oversight by a departmental sponsorship 
unit which considers performance, target setting, and policy relations (Cabinet Office, 2006; 
James, et al., 2011).  Indeed, as noted above, to prevent against full detachment of HMPS, Lygo 
(1991) saw a strong departmental sponsorship function as vital for its success as an agency.  As ǡǯ ? ? ? ?
significant departure.  Box 5.4 elaborates on this decision, drawing again on the contemporary 
notion of Ǯagencyǯ as itself guaranteeing intra-ministry transparency by virtue of its structural 
indivisibility from the core department. 




Box 5.4: Agencies: a mature relationship 
 
I:  In deciding not to sponsor agencies, ǲthey almost forgot about the OPG [Office of the 
Public Guardian] ǤǤǤǯ
being chief exec [and] coming to the [MoJ] board,  ǯ  ... a group of people 
    ǡ     ǳ, as should HM Courts 
and Tribunals Service (HMCTS)Ǥǲǯǡ
then [the permanent secretary] should be able to say to [NOMS chief exec] or to [HMCTS 
ȐǣǮǫǯǯǡ
of people asking pointless questions. ...  
ǲǢgot that we had the OPG at a smaller 
level...Ǥǳ (Interview_018) 
 
Principally, Box 5.4ǯ ǡ
ǲǳǡ
then the much larger, director-general-led HMCTS and NOMS, which require no sponsorship 
because their leaders attend the departmental board.  This everyday interaction is enlivened by 
the vocal switch from third-  ȋǲthey  ǳȌǡ  -person  ȋǲyou ǯ ǳȌ, to first-person permanent secretary (ǲǮ me  ǯǯǳȌ.  This progressionǡǯȋȌǡ
normalises agency-department transparency as a conversational matter, thereby reinforcing 
the closing contention that formal sponsorship was ǲǳǡ ǡ ǡ ǲourselvesǳredesign (Figure 5.3, above).  The 
smaller OPG, however, has no board-level representation and thus has latterly been given 
differentiated treatment, as Box 5.5 explains. 
Box 5.5: Sponsoring OPG? 
 
I1: ǲǯ
....  I ǯǯ as, 
ǡ    ǯ       ǡ  ǯ
about the fact that ... they are a small body, and therefore it seems appropriate to perhaps 
have some of the principles and things ȏ ?ǯȐǤǳ 
 
I2: ǲI think we sort of refer to it as a Ǯ-ǯ, because ǯ
sponsorshipǡ Ǯ  ǯ   Ǥ   ǯ   ǡ Ǥǳ 
(Interview_029) 
 




Box 5.5 again differentiates OPG by its size, this explaining its partial reversal of the no-ǲǳ-
sponsorship principle.  However, both interviewees emphasise the continuing agency-ALB 
differentiation, the first remarking that, ǲ ǯ  ǯ   ǳǡ   
confirming, ǲ ǯ  ǳǤ  ǡ   ǯ  
contractualism and the politico-administrative bargain, this new framing of intra-departmental 
agencies (as opposed to external Ȍ   
ǯ  representing an 
anomaly, and ǲǮ-typeǯǳǤ 
5.4.2 The Legal Aid Agency 
Replacing the Legal Services Commission (LSC) in April 2013, the Legal Aid Agency (LAA) 
provides public funding for criminal defendants and some civil claimants.  This reorganisation 
was incomplete during the fieldwork, and LAA does not feature in subsequent chapters.  
However, it was central to the Blueprint redesign and provides useful illustration of recent 
justice agencification.  Accordingly, this final subsection considers the business case (MoJ, 
2011d) and new framework document (MoJ, 2013a). 
The case for change 
LSC performance declined under Labǯǡ
the quango as unresponsive to departmental direction.  Asked to review governance and 
delivery, Ian Magee (2010, p.3) ǲwho is 
now calling the shots over policyǳǤǡ
an agency, and this was quickly accepted by the outgoing Labour Lord Chancellor and then 
legislated by the Coalition.  The very publication of a supporting business case departs from 
Next Steps practice.  Its two principal arguments centre on organisational performance and 
political control.  The first, formalised in Box 5.6, is that quango ǯ
decline, and must be reversed. 




Box 5.6: Performance improvement 
Truncated syllogism (enthymeme): 
[#6a] Isolation creates performance failure.* [#6b] As a statutory quango, LSC is 




Illustrations from MoJ (2011d): 
[i]: ǲ   ǤǤǤ    ǡ    
organisational barriers [#6b] Ǥǳ (p.6) 
[ii]: ǲwill be able [#6c] to operate a standard performance management 
framework consistent with businesses within its remit and better [#6c] align  all 
justice policies ... with other agencies.  It will allow a rapid response [#6c] to 
ǡǤǤǤǤǳ(p.6) 
[iii]: ǲ   olicy implementation should be considered in 
conjunction with sister organisations/agencies in order to ensure wider efficiency 
and service improvements [#6c] through improved resource management across 
the justice system. It will provide greater opportunity [#6c] for efficiency savings 
through rationalisation ... and through sharing corporate functions with the wider 
Ǥǳ (p.7) 
 
Box 5.6 is enthymematic, with an explicit second premise and conclusion [#6b/#6c], but 
implicit opening [#6a].  Thus, ǯ        ǲǳȏȐǡ in anticipating improved integration Ȃ ǲbetter ȏȐǳȏȐǢǲin conjunction ǳ
[iii].  Similarly, the conclusion that centralisation should be pursued [#6c] is conveyed explicitly 
through positive description Ȃ ǲ ǳǡ ǲǳǡ ǲǳ ȏȐǢ and ǲǳǡ ǲǳ ȏȐǤ    s, therefore, agencification represents a solution, but to a 
fundamentally different problem: organisational isolation, rather than monolithic bureaucratic 
integration.  Thus, whereas the  ǯ Report made enthymematic recourse to the 
benefits of management independence (see Chapter 4), here the business case relies upon 
intersubjective recognition of the problems of isolation [#6a].   




Like the wider Public Bodies Reforms, the LAA ǯhat agency 
status will increase ministerial control over, and accountability for, legal aid (Box 5.7). 
Box 5.7: Improving control and accountability 
Perfect syllogism: 
[#7a] Ministers and the MoJ are inevitably perceived as accountable for LSC. 
[#7b] Statutory isolation is incommensurate with accountability. [#7c] 
Therefore, LSC must be integrated. 
Illustrations from MoJ (2011d): 
[i]: ǲ      [#7b], if its Commissioners and Chief 
Executive choose to operate in an uncooperative manner and contrary to 
Government policy then it could be difficult for ministers to exert sufficient 
influence and gain an acceptable level of control which matches the accountability 
they have and are perceived to have by the public [#7a].  Equally the Departmental 
Accounting Officer needs [#7b] direct accountability for the legal aid fund which 
 ? ? ?ǯǳǤ (p.4) 
 
[ii]: ǲǣ [#7c]Ǥǳ (p.10) 
 
Box 5.7 is a perfect syllogism.  Following the contemporaneous narrative of constitutional 
propriety that underpinned the Public Bodies Reforms (see Chapter 4), the argument is      ǯ   for quangos [#7a].  The 
underlying claim of unfairness at their incommensurate level of control [#7b] extends to the  ǡ ǡ  ǲ  ǳǡ    financial Ǥǡǲǳ
case, the contention is that this assures appropriate control both for ministers and the 
department [#7c].  In other words, aǲǳ
ministers and the permanent secretary, being located, in the terms of Chapter 4, within the Ǯcǯǯ-ǮpǯǤ 
In this manner, both arguments posit foundational difference between agencies and quangos, 
with departmentalisation correcting the poor performance and political control associated with 




isolation.  This reconstruction of the governing centre as inclusive of agencies is bolstered by   ǯ        ǡ
particularly evident in its evaluation of tǲ-ǳ
reforming LSC as an independent quango: 
ǲǣdivision and duplication between ... LSC and MoJ will continue to cause 
confusion, continuing the practice of uncollaborative working.  ...  There is a significant risk 
that indirect management of this budget could lead to poor risk control....  Perception from 
external stakeholders that nothing has changed and confusion Ǯǯ
Ǥǯngth and issues around accountability 
and lack of clarity would continue; ministers would have limited direct control.  The LSC 
would remain an outside player ǤǤǤǤǳ(MoJ, 2011d, p.9) 
In this extract, the idea of old dispersal and new concentration is evoked through differentiating 
terms (ǲǳǡ ǲǳǡ ǲǳ, ǲǳ  ǲǳ) and the implied 
characterisation of agencies with their antonyms Ȃ unity, clarity, collaboration, direct and 
inside.  This makes for the further framing of agencification as integrative, as is confirmed later  ǲǳǡ ǲǳ ǲǳ(MoJ, 2011d, pp.10, 19)ǤǡǮǯ-isolation through 
consolidation and organisational singularity. 
Framework Document 
Primary legislation abolished the LSC quango in 2012, transferring its powers and obligations to 
the Lord Chancellor.  Illustrating key contemporary themes of agencification, and their 
departure from the 1990s model, the new LAA framework document (MoJ, 2013a) provides a 
useful empirical conclusion.   
The 1990s justice frameworks, reviewed above, evoked operational de-politicisation, chief 
executive authority and politico-bureaucratic bargaining through vocal polarisation.   In 2013, 
conversely, the LAA framework contains no ministerial foreword and no personified agency 
voice.  Moreover, here, the description of new roles and responsibilities emphasise intra-




departmental contracting between civil servants, rather than an internal-external politico-
administrative bargain: 
ǲ	arrangements for the ... Legal Aid Agency, agreed 
between the Permanent Secretary and the Chief Executive ... with the approval of the Lord 
Ǥǳ (MoJ, 2013a, p.1) 
ǲAny departure from the provision of the Framework Document must be agreed in writing 
on a case-by-case basis between the Permanent Secretary and Chief Executive, if 
appropriate, with the approval ǤǤǤǤǳ (Ibid.) 
Both extracts retain the 1990s frameworkǯ tonǡȋǲǳǢǲǳȌcontractually ȋǲǳȌǤ ǡ
continues the old, quasi-contractual presentation, with numbered paragraphs and the narration 
of MoJ and LAA as ostensibly separate, contracting parties.  However, whereas, contractual 
agreement was before largely narrated as between chief executives and politicians directly, here 
it primarily ǲand ǳȋǲǳheir 
equivalence), and only requires  ǲǳ Ǥ    ǡ therefore, 
contemporary agencification represents within-department delegation between senior civil 
servants, following Box 5.4ǯ  of the conversational rather than formal nature of 
agency accountability.  It has no material impact upon ministerial responsibilities, since LAA 
and MoJ officials are undifferentiated in terms of their direct reporting to ministers. 
The LAA framework emphasises the statutory independence of the Director of Legal Aid 
Casework Ȃ a post legislated in 2012 to ensure apolitical adjudication of funding requests (MoJ, 
2013a, pp.9-10).  However, as in the wider Public Bodies discourse (and particularly Chapter 4ǯ
example of the new education testing agency), the framing of agency autonomy is confined to 
this technical impartiality, without mention of management independence.  Indeed, generally,  ǯ  is on organisational integration rather than decentralisation.  For ǡ     ǡ    ǲ   
terms and conditions (including all issues to do with pay and remuneration) of employment and 




ǳ (MoJ, 2013a, pp.16, 18-21)Ǥ  ǡ ǲ   ǳǡǤ
original Next Steps proposals, as well as the Efficiency Unǯ (1991) subsequent advocacy of 
further    ? ? ? ? ǯ expectation of additional chief 
executive responsibilities being made available in the months after agencification, including in 
matters of pay and grading.  Therefore, the terms of the MoJ-LAA relationship modify former 
justice agency practice considerably. 
5.5 Discussion 
Together, this meso-level discourse from the 1990s and 2010s makes for two different readings 
of justice agencification.  Initially, while some synchronic multivocality was registered between ǯ ǯ
autonomisations, both interpretations cohere with the core Next Steps idea of the managerialist, 
empowering and decentralised agency.  Indeed, this historic discourse concretised the central 
idea of de-politicised operations: explicitly, through references to personalised public service 
bargains between ministers and newly-authorised chief executives; and implicitly, through 
contrasting first-person political and third-person contractual narratives.  Moreover, in terms of 
differentiation, vocal polarisation against the personified HMPS and PTO compounded the   Ǯǯ      and cemented the Next Steps 
bifurcation of the governing centre and periphery.  By contrast, after 2010, ǯ
and wider MoJ Blueprint redesign narrate a very different role for agency status.  As in the 
contemporaneous Public Bodies Reforms, agencification is pursued principally to assure 
political accountability for, and control of, executive operations.  Hence, although still 
representing a public management ǡǯlegal aid delivery 
is motivated by a desire to improve performance, transparency and political control through 
eliminating isolation and achieving full departmental integration.  In short, agencification is now 
about re-politicisation and de-Ǥ ǡǡǯrepresents 




an intra-departmental agreement, rather than a contractual politico-administrative bargain.  
Moreover, it guarantees independence only in terms of apolitical funding adjudications.  Table 
5.1 summarises this second diachronic comparison.  
Table 5.1: Comparing justice agencification 

































































This chapter began by outlining key justice developments since the 1980s, including expanded 
penal populism, maǯ    ǡ ǡ 
public guardianship reform.  Setting aside the only-recently agencified legal aid operation, these 
functions Ȃ offender management, courts and tribunals administration, and mental incapacity 
safeguarding Ȃ are amongst ǯresponsibilities, and their delivery through NOMS, 
HMCTS and OPG is explored further in the remaining empirical chapters.  Together, they make 
for a significant department of state, with a large and multifarious remit that carries significant 
political and social consequences for failure.  Moreover, by virtue of its constitutional role as 
executive partner of the judiciary, the MoJǯ court and tribunal functions face governance 
challenges that are unparalleled across Whitehall.   




Against this backdrop, the chapter latterly charted the meso-level reinterpretation of justice 
agencification since the original Next Steps rollout.  Epitomised by initial doubts over the 
continuing need for a junior prisons minister in the post-agencification Home Office, this first-
generation reform was narrated as operational de-politicisation and autonomisation, following ǯcentral recommendations.  By contrast, justice restructuring in the 
early 2010s reconstructs agency status as an anti-isolation and integrative measure, better 
assuring operational performance, corporate transparency and political accountability through 
departmentalisation.  Commensurate, therefore, with the ideational reinterpretation registered 
previously in the Public Bodies Reformsǡ  Ǯ-as-corporate-ǯ
construct recurs in some of the emic accounts of organisational identity explored in the next 
chapter.  




Chapter 6 Ȃ Agency Identity in the Ministry of Justice  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 advanced a second comparison of historic and contemporary agency discourse, 
complementing the foregoing ideational analysis by examining sector-specific developments.  
Again, this found diachronic discontinuity between Next Steps and Coalition Government 
restructuring, but notable synchronic consistency within the two reform episodes.  Specifically, 
reflecting the disparate contexts of prisons, courts and public guardianship, their agencification 
was originally rationalised either for performance turnaround or improved consumerism.  
Predicated on ministerial distance, chief executive authorisation and contractual accountability, 
these reform arguments promulgate Next Steps themes of managerialism, empowerment and Ǥ  ǡ   ? ? ? ?    Ǯǯ   
externalisation and de-politicisation, but internal corporate governance and political control, 
particularly Ȃ but not exclusively Ȃ ǯ-length bodies.  This contemporary        ǯ   
centralised executive agency, pointing, again, to macro-meso consistency, albeit gathered 
around a marked reinterpretation.  Overall, then, the suggestion thus far is of synchronic 
consistency beneath diachronic change, with departmental (meso) discourse elaborating 
transitive (macro) politico-administrative ideas.  
The final exploration of agency meaning, below, now considers whether this synchronic macro-
meso harmony extends to localised agency practice.  Assuming relationally-constituted 
organisational identity (Ashforth & Mael, 1996), and attending particularly to narrative voice 
and discursive differentiation, the chapter examines claims of interorganisational similarity and 
individuality in the contemporary justice agencies Ȃ the National Offender Management Service, 
HM Courts and Tribunals Service, and the Office of the Public Guardian.  Not only does this story 




something of the emic experience of contemporary governance, but it also offers interpretive 
resources for registering the embedded, situated accomplishment of agency meanings following 
the ethnographic sensibility and part-whole dialectic of the hermeneutic circle (Baszanger & 
Dodier, 2004; Watson, 2011; see also Chapter 3). 
The first section elaborates the relational basis of organisational identity, and the following ǮǯǤ
then undertakes the synchronic and diachronic comparison.  While some evidence of 
contemporary departmentalisation is noted, in line with previous macro- and meso-level 
interpretations, more profound is the intra-Ǯǯ
variously gather around the (unfulfilled) promise of de-politicisation in prisons, constitutional 
correctness in courts and tribunals, and businesslike corporate governance in public 
guardianship.  This polyphony indicates a differentiated evolution across the macro, meso and 
micro platforms. 
6.2 Relational organisational identity 
The chapter proceeds from the hermeneutic assumption that the imposition of sameness or 
difference is central to meaning-making (Miller, 2012; Torfing, 2005; White, 1999).  Following 	ǯ (2003, p.88)   ǲ     ǳǡ 
maxim already underpins the general analytic framework, having highlighted, for instance, the 
reframing and departmentalisation of agencies in the Public Bodies Reforms, effected through 
reversing former agency-periphery equivalence and agency-centre difference (see Chapter 4).  
Such comparative classification is similarly worked in identity production.  As Cheney and 
Tompkins (1987, p.5) ǡ ǲǳ       ǲǮǯ ǮǯǮǯǳǤ ǡ
Albert and Whetten (1985, p.267)ǡ     ǲ  
recognizably different from otȋȌǳǤǡǲǳ(Tajfel and Turner, in Ashforth & Mael, 1996, p.24).   




The subject matter of identity research has latterly expanded from individuals to groups 
(Brown, 2001).  Thus, as Albert and Whetten (1985, p.267) contend, ǲ
they are by creating or invokin   ǳǤ
Similarly, Ashforth and Mael suggest: 
ǲ    -ground contrast for crystallizing 
and articulating a unique identity.  Like any social actor, a given organization is 
measured against similar referents ... because this enables the perceiver to draw subtle Ǥǳ(1996, p.24)   
Relational identity is largely a linguistic accomplishment (Brown, 2001; Cheney & Tompkins, 
1987)ǡ          ǲǳ (Humphreys & Brown, 2002, p.440).  Indeed, according to Cortazzi (2001, 
p.388), ǯ  ǲ   ǳ by 
allowinǲȏȐ ǳǤ  Attending to the imposition 
and subversion of textual and vocal distinctions, the general analytic framework developed in 
Chapter 3 can register explicit and implicit claims to interorganisational sameness and 
difference in stories from the MoJ agencies.  ǡ ǮǯǡǮǯ. 
6.3 The National Offender Management Service 
6.3.1 Overview   ǯ  ǡ    ? ? ? ?    ? ?   ǡ
commission private prison places, and manage the public custodial estate.  In 2011-2012, 
operating costs were £3.93bn, and directly-managed staff (excluding probation) averaged 
45,352 FTE (NOMS, 2012, pp.52, 68).  As Chapter 5 explained, NOMS initially formed in 2004 to 
house the still-fledgling National Probation Service headquarters and sponsor HM Prison 
Service (HMPS) Ȃ a separate agency since 1993, soon at the centre of the Howard-Lewis affair.  
In 2008, agency status expanded to encompass the whole National Offender Management 
Service (MoJ, 2008)ǡ        Ǯ ? ?ǯǤ   




regional commissioning across 2008-2010, after which the Spending Review prompted 
development of five restructure options, including outright de-agencification (NAO, 2012b).      ǡ       Ǯǯ
structure (NAO, 2012c), seeking annual savings of £884m by 2014-15.  This third iteration Ȃ ǲ ? ?ǳ  ǲ-Mark- ?Ǥ ? ?ǳǡ     ȋ ? ? ? ?Ǣ  ? ? ? ?Ȍ Ȃremoved 649 of the 
previous 2,400 headquarters posts (NAO, 2012c; NOMS, 2012).  Central directorates include: 
Commissioning and Commercial; National Operational Services; Probation and Contracted 
Services; and Public Sector Prisons, where nine managers oversee the uniformed Prison Service 
(NOMS, 2011a).  Although participating in MoJ shared services, there are also finance, ICT and Ǥǯ-locate with other justice functions directly opposite ǯǤ 
NOMS is undergoing considerable policy reform.  Eight public prisons were tendered in 2011-
2012 (MoJ, 2011c), and Payment by Results and prisoner employment schemes are advancing a Ǯ ǯ ȋ Chapter 8).  ǡ     Ǯ-as-ǯ ǡ        ? ?ǡ ? ? ?    ? ? ? ?(NOMS, 
2012).  Against this backdrop, the following subsections attend to identity production through 
interorganisational differentiation and integration.  Thereafter, and by way of these identity ǡǮǯȋȌ-politicisation and, 
minimally, a guardian of HR independence. 
6.3.2 Differentiating NOMS 
Politics 
Below, Box 6.12, Box 6.14 and Box 6.5 all differentiate NOMS by its political salience, referring 
to ǲ      ǳ, the ǲ ǳ  ǡ and its ǲ   ǳ to ministers.  Moreover, Box 6.1ǯ   specifically 
attribute unrealised agency autonomy and successive reorganisation to politics. 




Box 6.1: Politics 
[i]: 
 
[T: ǯMoJ-NOMS border?  Is it like a quango?] 
 
I: ǲshould have been.  Agencies, I always thought, were quitǯǡ but, as long 
ǯ, it never has been.  And it might be a feature of the fact- the nature of the 
businessǡǯǢǤǮthe original 
thought ǯt really have any dealings with agencies; they would 
deal with the main department, and the agencies would just go off and do whatever, and 





[T: Why successive reorganisations?  Is it politics, changing circumstances-?] 
 
I: ǲ...ǯǢhot topic, politically.  We are very fortunate, and 
I think if the Secretary of State changed, the world would be a really different place.  
Because of his experience and his approach ... ǯpolitical 
fallout Ȃ some of the things that happen Ȃ than if you had a wet-behind-the-ears minister, 
ǯǤǳ (Interview_015) 
 
Box 6.1-ȏȐǲǳ-realisation.   Ǯǯ          -desire but rather an external 
reform (ǲI always thought...ǳǢ ǲ would   ǤǤǤǳȌ     
promise, whereby the inescapability of politics Ȃ  ǲǳ  ǲ   ǳ Ȃ is        ǲshould have beeǳǤ  ǡ  penal risk 
(ǲthings that happenǳȌ     ǲ ǳǡ Box 6.1-[ii] welcomes 
ministerial experience.  Moreover, its description of this particular offender management ǲǳ frames NOMS   ǡ      ǮǯǤ
Evoking 
ǯ (1991)      ǲ ǳ, the same 
metaphor is similarly employed below by officials describing the severity of operational  ǲ     ǳ ȋBox 6.2-[i]) and in contrasting NOMS delivery with MoJǯ ǲǳȋBox 6.2-[ii]). 




As well as high ministerial politics, NOMS provokes internal civil service disputes.  For instance, ǡǲǳǡǯǲǳȋ_014) and frequent ǲacross 
the departmentǳ(Interview_027).  Box 6.2 narrates this bureau-politics. 
Box 6.2: Bureau-politics 
[i]: 
 
I: Itǯ  ǲ this organisation has come together Ȃ the prisons/probation 
joining together in what was just a dreadfully painful organisational transitionǤǳ  NOMS 
was ǲconflict, really, with the Prison Service. ... We had a really painful couple of years 
where the regional structures were emerging and the Prison Service was resistant....  And 
then, of course, the delivery agency turned round and ate it up Ȃ ran NOMS. ...  [Y]ou still 
see those moments of conflict and tension... The relationships have all felt like theǯ
come from a variety of directions, and have never quite gelled really. ... And it has such 
pressures; as an organisation, [chief executive] as the leader of it is under so much 





I: Regarding NOMS and MoJ, ǲ    ǡ     Ǥ  ǡ
ǡ      Ǥ    ǯ  healthy tension, 
ǯǤǯ understanding of delivery at all, and what is 
    ǯ     ǤǤǤ  ǡ  Probation, from the 
Home Office ... and they all say [about MoJ]: ǮYou, over there in your policy world: you sit 
and you work through your policyǯǤ  ǯbusy ǡǡǡǯ
delivering on the ground with our [Probation] Trusts and our prisons Ȃ this is reality. ...  
ǲǡǯ
criticise each other, and both organisations are very quick- Ǯǡǡǯǡ




Box 6.2-[i] stories three acrimonious relationships: first, ǲǳ ǲǳMoJ and elsewhere; second, internal prison-probation tension, evident in ǲdreadfully painful ǳ and ongoing ǲconflict and tensionǳǢǡthird, 
commissioner- ǡ       ǲǳ o  ? ?ǯǡǡ having ǲturned round and ate it up Ȃ ran NOMSǳ.  Able to effect 




such role reversal, the Prison Service is thus personified as powerful and autonomous Ȃ a 
recurring theme below.  In a similarly differentiating vein, Box 6.2-[ii] elaborates an MoJ-NOMS, Ǯ-and-ǯ Ǥ         ǡ 
from descriptions of interorganisational collaboration to conflict.  Thus, after identifying a ǲ ǳǡ   paragraph expounds overt MoJ critique and NOMS defence.  
Rhetorically, the allegation of departmental misunderstanding gains credibility from the citation 
of third parties (Treasury, Home Office), who, with assumed external oǡǯǲǮ ǯǳ    delivery, which is ǲǳǡ ǲ  ǳ  ǲǳǤ
Naturally more virtuous than their antonyms (idle; in-the-air; surreality), these characteristics ǯdis-identification with MoJ.  Moreover, this conflation 
of delivery and realism Ȃ ǲ ǳȂ is another identifying trait adopted elsewhere (see 
Box 6.3 and Box 6.5).  Latterly, the second paragraph replicates the foregoing harmony-conflict 
progression, first asserting the importance of interorganisational communication before again 
defending against vocalised first-person critique Ȃ ǲǮOh NOMS ... ǯ  ǡ  lways puts ǡǯǤǤǤǯǳǤǡǯspontaneity again implies an entrenched 
bureau-politics.   
Risk ǡǮǯrecurrent in the 1990s.  There has since been 
a considerable turnaround Ȃ ǲǯ   ǳǡ    ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
Nonetheless, the ever-   ǲdeath and destructionǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ  ǯ
active management of this risk, differentiates the agency from the innovation-focused MoJ, as 
Box 6.3 explains. 
Box 6.3: Risk management 
 
[T: ǯȀ-as-usual divide?] 
 
I: ǲǤ ...  At the moment, the joint stuff Ȃ or the stuff that is owned across the road [in 
MoJ], with us inputting Ȃ    ǯ Ǥ       ... 




predates this governmentǡǮ-as-ǯǤǳ Day-to-day, my 
role concerns ǲmanagement of risk Ȃ security, corruption, counterterrorism, escapes, 
assaults, riots Ȃ Ǥǯ
the stuff that will lose my [director general] his job; will lose the Secretary of State his job.  
 ǯ  really interesting dynamic, actually...Ǥ     ǯ  
[ministers] the sack, ǯ ... iǯǡ
had [recently]Ǥ             Ǥǳ 
(Interview_026) 
  
Box 6.3 distinguishes innovation from business-as-Ǥ     ǯ 
focus, given the potential of operational failure to prompt resignations and dismissals, the 
passage evokes once more Box 6.2-ȏȐǯ -reality, MoJ-surreality pairings.  In particular, 
driven by ever-    ǲ  ǳǡ  ǯ
business-as-usual is conferred a steadfastness that is divorced from fickle political whim.  This 
is confirmed in the sarcastic qualification, ǲǯprobably not Payment by Results [that prompts Ȑǳǡ with     ǯ        ǡǯto protect ministers from these real custodial dangers.   
As Chapter 5 explained, the MoJ Blueprint adopted in 2010 mandated shared corporate services.  
Evaluating this reform, Box 6.4 similarly differentiates NOMS by its risks.   
Box 6.4: Risky bread buying 
 
I: NOMS was ǲ   ǳ with shared services, but the policy ǲcaused real 
cultural problems....  [Governors were] used to having the person who orders the bread for 
ǡǯ ... they can shout at 
somebody out there and get it sorted out. ... And the degree of nervousness ... when that 
was taken out of their control [was considerable]Ǥǳ  Still, it economised, and cross-MoJ 
expansion was inevitable. 
 
[T: Do you lose synergy, moving beyond prisons?] 
 
I: Yes.  Gaol purchasers ǲknew exactly what the consequences were of getting the wrong 
bread.  If you deliver brown bread .ǤǤ  ǤǤǤ ǯ  ... or if you deliver thin-
sliced ǤǤǤǯǤ... ǯ, and the purchasers in the prison 
knew that and understood that, and they were part of the machine and they realised that.  
The g     ǯ    [at the Shared Services 
Hub] ǯ... without understanding that you must have them on time, 




it must be thick-sliced, it must be white bread, it must....  You can get away with that ... for 
ǡǯǡǡ
Jobcentres, and airports, ... then you lose that degree of attribution and subtlety...Ǥǳ
(Interview_053) 
 
Box 6.4 recounts the dangers of consolidated purchasing, given penal volatility.  This identity 
differentiation  ǯ   is enlivened by listing multiple mistakes that could 
prompt disorder Ȃ ǲIf you deliver ... or if ... or if...ǳǤ  The reciting tone and repetitious structure ȋǲǳ; ǲǳǢǲǳȌ evokes the orderliness of prison regimes, everything being done 
according to national guideline in order to minimise risk.  Unfamiliar to non-operational staff, 
this reality Ȃ ǲǳ d constant vigilance Ȃ renders shared services problematic for 
NOMS, thereby differentiating the agency from other, less risky public services. 
Pride 
The uniformed Prison Service has previously been characterised as powerful (Box 6.2) and risk 
aware (Box 6.4).  Extending this, another official remarked: ǲOperational people are very, very, ǤǯǯǨǳ (Interview_013).  
Box 6.5 frames this pride as a differentiating trait. 
Box 6.5: Prison Service pride 
 
I: ǲǣa very significant political risk.  Foul-ups in NOMS 
... Ǥǳ 
 
[T: Given that, is it unfair to say probation is the Ǯǯ?]  
 
I: ǲ    Ǥ             ....  I 
experienced a kind of prejudice when I arrived.... [T]here were still times ... where senior 
managers would say to me: ǮǡǯǤǯ
get thatǤǯreally understand ǯ.ǯ  And the NOMS that I joined Ȃ 
[virtually] every member of the board ...     Ǥ  ǯ  
through the ranks ... so it was, almost, institutional group think.  And I think that ... is so 
deeply engrained Ȃ      ǯ    a 
landing, ǯ    .ǳ ǯ     ǲconvince the 
ǤǤǤǤǳ(Interview_053) 
 




Box 6.5 reaffirms the differentiating traits of risk and politics, before recounting the operational 
perception that, without frontline experience, ǲǮǯ  really  ȏȐǳ  ǲ[never] 
really ǯreally likeǯǳ.  This recurrence of Box 6.2ǯdelivery-realism conflation, 
and its separation of management from operations, is reinforced by polarising two first-person 
voices: the non-ȋǲǳȌǡȋǲǮǯǤǤǤǯǳ) 
with their almost accusatory, othering ȋǲǮǯǯǳǡǲǮǯǯǳǲǮǯǳȌ.  Similarly invoking ǡǣǲ   
follow, the strategy is to get a governing governor out to lead it, because there is an element of Ǯǯǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡ
pride of its operational arm. 
Contestability  ? ?ǯ      across 2004-2008 was one factor 
precipitating the restructure to NOMS#2 (Interview_014; _024).  Combining both commissioner 
and provider roles, this internalisation of contestability is again differentiating, as Box 6.6 
explains. 
Box 6.6: Internal contestability 
 
I: ǲ[I]t might seem quite a strange setup  ǯ ǡ   
commissioning services..... Some people might think it looks odd ... you know, Ǯ 
that operate?ǯ ǤǤǤǯǯǤǯǤǤǤ
more successful than NOMS Version 1....  I think that caused a lot of tension....ǳ  That 
ǲmight have been culture, and the strength of the prisons, saying: Ǯǯ 
  ǯ. ... [Y]ou had NOMS-Version-1 people telling prisons what to do, but they 
ǯ  ... people who had experience of prisons, and the culture of prisons 
ǣ Ǯ ǯ     ǡ  ǯ   ǡ Ǯ  ǯ 
what youǯǨǯ ǯe mark....  This NOMS[#3] model 
might seem odd on paper.  Because of the strength of [prisons], you have to have someone 
overseeing this who can hold these people to account, drive change forward, but also not 
be-  ǯ  Ǯbulliedǯ, but is intelligent to manage the public sector prisons...Ǥǳ 
(Interview_027) 
 




ǯǲǳ-provider, Box 6.6 invokes 
previous differentials of bureau-politics and pride.  Proceeding from overt individualisation ȋǲǳǢ ǲǮ   ǫǯǳȌǡ    traditional problems in managing the 
uniformed Service, which is again vocalised with assertive autonomy Ȃ ǲǮǯ ust not gonna ǯǳǤǲǳ ǲǳ
explain the ǯǲǳcombination of commissioning and delivery.  
De-autonomisation 
Finally, in lamenting the latter-day loss of HǯǲǳǡBox 
6.7 posits a historic but now lapsed affinity with the agency model.  By extension, this 
differentiates contemporary NOMS from other, still genuine executive agencies. 
Box 6.7ǣǲǳ 
 
I: ǲThe true agency that the Prison Service was had a whole load of things which it 
managed directly, like estates, procurement [etc.].  All of those things are now being 
delivered as a shared service from the department...Ǥ ǡǡ ǯ[old] Prison 
   ǯ       ǡ   
Office....ǳ  HMPS ǲwas able to set [that] up ... ǯ have to seek permission.  
We were an agency.  We decided ... actually that was a way to reduce our costs....  ǯ
now being shared by everybody ... because the arrangements ... were stronger; because the 
agency had got good management arrangements; because it was about delivering, 
whereas, actually, the ethos, inevitably, of a department is about policymaking, not 
deliveryǤǳ (Interview_014) 
 
Reminiscently, Box 6.7 ǲǳodel.  The claim 
of de-     ǡ     ȋǲ
wereǳǢ ǲ decidedǳȌ lamenting former agency benefits and indicating current NOMS-agency 
disassociation.  Simultaneously, the othering   ȋǲ ǳȌ   ǯȂ ǲwe ǯǳ; ǲwe were an agencyǳǢǲwe decidedǳǢǲour ǳ.  Therefore, wǲǳ
agency, NOMS remains distin  ǡ   ǲǳ  ǲǡ not ǳǤ 




6.3.3 Integrating NOMS 
Given the strength of the identity differentiation essayed above, involving high and low politics, 
risks, pride, contestability and lost agency independence, contrasting integrative associations, ǮǯMoJ or Ǯǯother agencies, were limited.  Box 6.8 is one  ǡ       ǲǳǡ  
department-agency equivalence. 
Box 6.8: Briefing ministers 
 
[T: Does NOMS brief ministers?] 
 
I: ǲ; we spend far too much time with ministers, but we just do it in the same room 
nowǤ ǯ meeting and a delivery meeting.... ǯ
 [Justice 
Policy Group] counterpart, and the two of us would be sitting in front of the minister, or 
our equivalent teams would be...Ǥǳ 
 
[T: So the NOMS designation ǯabsolve you?] 
 
I: ǲ ... in theory, the agency should mean you get on and run the agency.  ǯ
ǯ.... [T]he healthy thing about that is, effectively, 
we ... show up as MoJ officials, and ǯ all part of the Ministryǡ  ǯ  ǮMoJ-
officials-advising-our-ǯ .  The fact that, of course, when we walk away we 
wear slightly different badges and ... do a different bit of the system- ǯ
like: ǮThe officials from the department are coming to just brief the mǯ, which is 
Ǥǳ (Interview_024) 
 
Describing again the untenable ǲǳ of de-politicisation, Box 6.8 accompanies this NOMS-
agency disassociation with new NOMS-MoJ sameness.  Contrary to Box 6.7ǯ ǲǳ  in priorities between department and agency, therefore, the emphasis 
here   ȋǲthe ǳǡ ǲthe ǳǡ ǲur ǳǡ  ǲ ǳȌ   ȋǲ ǳǢ ǲǮ-officials-advising-our-ǯ ǳǢ ǲǳ) indicates newfound intra-Ministry sameness. 
Box 6.9 similarly aspires for new corporate oneness, although notes that barriers to full 
integration still exist in culture and HR bureaucracy. 




Box 6.9: Culture and HR 
[i]: 
 













, and we all 
worǤǯǤǳ 
 





I2: ǲǡ ǯ  Ǥ 
HR function, the payment structures Ȃ ǯ as an individual.  So you 









I2: ǲǡ  Ǥ      ǫ  ǡ      ǯ
willingness/ability/flexibility to do that transfer. ǤǤǤǳ 
 
I1: ǲǯa letter saying: ǮǯǯǤ 
 
I2: ǲǮǯǡǨǯǳ[Both laugh] ǲǯǣǮBut-Ǩǯǳ
(Interview_025) 
 
Box 6.9-[i] describes improving but enduring cultural difference between NOMS and MoJ, ǯȂ ǲǮǯ ǯǳǤ  Box 6.9-[ii] continues to advocate this corporate, department-agency equivalence, 




describing the illogicality of formally exiting and then re-entering the Ministry simply to   ǯ Ǥ   ǡ    ȋǲǮ-ǨǯǳȌ  
apparent idiocy of receiving a farewell letter illustrates the extent to which Next Steps ǡ  ǯ (1991) specific call for a differentiated prison identity, are now being 
tacitly subverted, even if HR bureaucracy is lagging behind.  A similar aspiration-practice deficit ǯǡȋBox 6.24). 
6.3.4 Ǯǯ 
Having probed identity differentiation and (limited) integration in NOMS, this final subsection ǮǯǤ 
The promise of de-politicisation 
Given the uncertainty in 1993 around the retention of a post-agencification prisons minister, the 
high-profile appointment and dismissal of the first agency director general, and widespread ǯȋChapter 5), the issue of de-
politicisation was salient in the 1990s.  Indeed, the 1997 Prison Service Review critiqued a ǲǳǯǲ  ǤǤǤ    ǳ (HMPS, 1997, pp.33-34).  Officials continue to 
reference agencification proper in these terms, as testified by the foregoing arguments on 
unrealised agency promise (Box 6.1; Box 6.8).  Illustratively, referring to the Howard-Lewis 
affair, one manager spontaneously ǣ ǲfor a generation ... that was the test of what an  ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ     ǯ rent performance against this 
agreed neo-Next Steps benchmark of operational de-politicisation.  On the one hand, Box 6.10 ǡǲǳǡǤ 
Box 6.10: De-politicisation 
 
I: [T]ǯ  huge caseload going on; ǯ lots of stuff going wrong every day of the 
week.  Agency status means that ministers can almost wash their hands of much of that....  
And I think we find, organisationally, that quite okay, actually,ǳ because ministerial 
involvement ǲalways makes the operational issues more difficult..Ǥǳ[Elaboration] ǲ




one of the tensions ... is the extent to which they are comfortable or uncomfortable leaving 
NOMS to get on with those operational issues.  ...  Some of the newer ministers Ȃ less 
experienced ministers Ȃ are: ǮǫǯǢǮǡǯǡMinister. We 
ǯ; Ǯǫǯ...   
 ǲSo I think the clarity that we have operational responsibility and decision-making, 
and will get on with it Ȃ I think is actually really clear.  And the current situation, in which 
agency status is being eroded ǡǯ to at 
some point...Ǥǳ (Interview_026) 
 
In neo-Next Steps fashion, Box 6.10    ǡ   ǲ ǳǲȏȐǳǤ 
 ȋǲlots of stuff going 
wrong every dayǳȌǡ         ǲ ǳ.  
Furthermore, perpetuating the original idea of managerial empowerment, NOMS also benefits 
from this political dis-involvement Ȃ ǲwe  ǤǤǤ   ǳǢ ǲwe ... will get on  ǳ.  
Indeed, as the vocalised minister-agency dialogue reveals, ministers sometimes have to be 
persuaded of agency-gifted autonomy Ȃ ǲǮY ǯ  ǡ Mǯǳ.  This further Ǯǯ-politicisation promise. 
Box 6.11 offers a similar account regarding the framework document.   
Box 6.11ǣǲǳ 
 
I: ǲǯe times in the last year.ǳ  NOMS is ǲconsistent with 
thisǳǡ ǯ ǲ.ǳ  ǯǣ ȏȐ ǲwhen there were some PQs Ȃ 
parliamentary questions Ȃ about the relationship between the Secretary of State and 
NOMS.  That was when we lost a Cat A prisonerǳ, and an MP tried to ǲin something on 
ȏȐǳ; [ii] ǲjust a couple of times ... in terms of our relationship with MoJ around 
budget allocationsǳ; and [iii] when ǲwriting the business plan. ...  ǲ[W]ǯ     it if wǯ  ǤǤǤǤ   ǯ    
Ǥ        ǤǤǤ ǯ     Ǥǳ  But if 
ǲtenantǳ and ǲlandlordǳ are happy, ǲwhy would you keep referring to the contact?  ... If 
there was a lot of poor interference ...   ǯ    Ǯparagraph.5.1.3ǯ, 
        Ǥ ǤǤǤ ǯ       
relationships with MoJ colleagues ǤǤǤ   ǯ  ǯ   ǯ
actually said: ǮHold on a second, we need to go back to the agency framework 
document...ǯǤǳ [Digression] ǲǯcontract on both sidesǤǤǤǤǳ(Interview_027) 
 




Box 6.11ǯ   ǲ    ǳǡ    ǲǳ  ǲǳǡ 
again notable for its consistency with Next Steps and the accountable management bargain (see 
Chapter 5ȌǤ  ǡ         ǯ 
delegation following an escape; and, speculatively, if ǲ ǳ emerged from ǲMoJ ǳǡ-establish boundaries.   
Against this alleged Next Steps continuity, however, other officials, while also readily measuring Ǯǯ  the promise of de-politicisation, were sceptical that MoJ-NOMS relations met 
this benchmark.  One argued, for example: 
ǲȏǯȐ ǣ Ǯ Ȃ do ministers Ȃ feel 
ǫǯǯǤǯ
     ǯ    ǣ Ǯǯ  ǡ  ǯǤǳ 
(Interview_015) 
Contrary to Box 6.10 and Box 6.11, the suggestion here is of a waning of the ǲ ǡ ǳ, quasi-contractual dualism underpinning Next Steps (and the Howard-Lewis affair).  By 
extension, to blame NOMS is simply to blame the corporate MoJ.  Nonetheless, the spontaneity 
of this benchmarking against ministerial dislocation further evidences the readiness with which Ǯǯsupposedly about de-politicisation.   
Box 6.12 similarly ǲǳǡagain ǲa very challenging political thing to expectǳǤ 
Box 6.12ǣǯǲǳ 
 
[T: So apart from employment arrangements, is NOMS Ǯǯ lengthǯ?] 
 
I: ǲ[T]he theoretical principles ǣǯdevolved accountability, 
for which it can get on and make operational decisions....  The reality is, in the business 
ǯ ǡ        ǯ ....  So, this idea that, 
somehow, the business ǯ
think is always a very challenging political thing to expect of the person accountable for 
it.  We operate very close to Policy and ministers.  So yes, at the moment, the main purpose 
that [agency] function serves is to isolate the terms and conditions....   




ǲBut there is a proper Accounting Officer role as well.ǳ    ǯ
responsibility ǲǮjust another department ǯ.  So, actually, that 
does allow some devolved operational accountability ... and that is important, because the 
business of running prisons, of course, is a big, complicated businessǤǤǤǤǳ  With shared 
services, ǲǯted to the Ministry than ever before....  But when it 
comes down to operational delivery, that agency status is still there: the Accounting 
Oǯstill accountable for those risksǤǤǤǤǯǮǯǯ from 
ministers is just pretending. ...ǳ 
The NHS is a good comparator.  ǲhey have successfully created that separation 
between Department of Health and ministers, and the NHS, and so ǤǤǤǯ
held to account for those operational decisions. ǤǤǤǳ The idea was ǲprisons should have a 
similar status.  But the political reality of what we do ǯ
translated.  ...        ǯ  ǡ  ǡ  the complicated 
politics of crime and justiceǤǳ(Interview_024) 
 
Setting aside HR independence (to be discussed below), Box 6.12 is significant for recreating a 
theory-reality distinction in narrating agency statusǡȋǲǳȌ
explained by political salience.  Thus, whereas Department of   ǲǳ
separated themselves from the NHS, the analogous bid to detach offender management ǲǳis thwarted, and ǲȏȐǳǤ  Still, the chief 
exeǯǲǮ ǯǳǤ     Ǯǯ    Ȃ ǲ accountabilityǳǢǲaccountabilityǳ Ȃ was encountered in Chapter 5ǯ-level analysis of 
the MoJ restructure and the formation of the Legal Aid Agency.  It reappears below in regard to 
public guardianship delivery (see Section 6.5.4). 
Following these more sceptical assessments of de-politicisation, Box 6.13 dismisses the 
framework document as of minimal import. 
Box 6.13: Framework document apathy 
[i]: 
 
[T: What does the framework document represent?] 
 
I: ǲNothing.  ǯ    . ... In my experience, it is a statement of intent that 
becomes quite a hot potato Ȃ a political potato Ȃ     ǡ  ǯ




setting out expectations on both sides.  Do people refer to it regularly?  No, ǯǤǤǤǤ
[D]o we feel like an agency?  Not particularly.  Tǯǡ ǯ ǫ ǯ
where all of this is driving at: Ǯ      ǫǯ   Ǥ  Ǯ




[T: Is the framework important?] 
 
I: ǲOnly occasionally.  There are times when things feel like they get misaligned, and then 
ǯ        ǣ Ǯǯ just try and get our head 
around this.  Is this an Accounting Officer issue that [the chief executive] should be 
 ǫǯ  ǡ  ǡ ǯ not a used-all-the-time ... worried-about-which-
clause [document]....ǳ(Interview_024) 
 
Box 6.13-ȏȐ     ǲǳ   ǲ  ǳǤ    ǡ 
spontaneous self-questioning Ȃ ǲǮǫǯ..ǤǮǫǯǳȂ points again to the theoretical-practical deficit and the readiness with which agency 
status is interpreted as an unfulfilled promise of autonomy.  Box 6.13-[ii] is comparably 
sceptical, ǡǯn about accountability and corporate 
governance (Box 6.12Ȍǡ    ǡ ǲǳǡ   
whether an issue carries Accounting Officer implications. 
HR independence 
Against this narrative of largely   ǡ ǯ  
designation was rationalised more positively in terms of HR independence.  Already mentioned 
in Box 6.12 as ǯ ǲmain purposeǳǡ Box 6.14 expands upon this enduring Ȃ if 
minimalist Ȃ vestige of decentralisation and empowerment. 
Box 6.14: HR independence 
[i]: 
 
[T: In 2003, de-agencification was proposed.] 
 
I: ǲȂ and 
remains so, actually: the reality is that NOMS is an agency because of the Prison Service, 




rather than any other reason Ȃ is because we have been able, as an agency, to form our 
own terms and conditions and arrangements for operational staff, who are obviously very 
different to standard civil servantsǤǡǡǯ
the right to strike ... an ability to be able to operate outside the civil service ... has been 
important...Ǥǳ  Indeed, ǲthe freedoms around recruitment, pay, and terms and conditionsǳ 





I: ǲgency status is the thing which primarily drives the management of, back then, fifty-
odd-thousand employees [in HMPS]....  [A]nd that meant that, when NOMS was recreated 
[in 2008]ǡ      ǡ Ǯ   to contain the terms and 
conditions of those fifty-thousand employees.  Otherwise you would effectively wash that 
volume of people back across the rest of ... the Ministry of JusticeǤǤǤǤǮȀnot 




I: ǲǯ      ǤǤǤǣ  ... NOMS be an agency if there 
ǯ an equal-pay risk should it be part of the department?  We pay our operational 
staff more than we pay civil service staff in the Ministry.  By having an agency, you protect 
  Ǥ      ǡ      Ǥǳ 
(Interview_015) 
 
 ǯ (2003) aspiration for prison-probation integration, the Home Office had  ǯ -agencification (Home Office, 2004, p.15).  However, HMPS retained 
separate classification until 2008, when this transferred to the new NOMS#2 provider-
commissioner (see Chapter 5).  Box 6.14-[i] explains this by the need for individualised ǡǯspecial workforce.  Evoking once more the narrative   ǡ        ǲthe one thing ... the Prison 
Service gained   ȏ ȐǳǤ   ǡ  aspects of agency were 
unattainable in this penal context.  Box 6.14-[ii] similarly recollects the expansion in 2008 as ǲǳ driven by ǲthe terms and conditionsǳǡ      ǯ Ǥ  ǡ  ȏȐ    ǲ  ǳ at proved realisable in a 
wider agency promise, [ii] positions HR independence as the central tenet of agencification Ȃ ǲthe thing which primarily drives the management of ... ǳǤThis suggests considerable 




reinterpretation of the Next Steps concept and its 1990s adoption in the justice sector.  
Similarly, in discussing the 2010 Spending Review, [iii] again identifies HR Ȃ ǡ ǲ
equal-ǳȂ ǯǡǯ
newly minimalist interpretation. 
6.3.5 Summary 
This first organisational analysis has registered NOMS identity differentiation through political 
salience, risk, pride, internal contestability and de-autonomisation.  Identity integration, by 
contrast, was limited to claims of corporate employment.  Against this backdrop, agency status 
has been interpreted both as a (largely unrealised) promise of de-politicisation, and, therein, an 
ongoing guarantor of HR independence.  
6.4 HM Courts and Tribunals Service 
6.4.1 Overview 
Since 2011, HMCTS has administered the criminal and civil courts in England and Wales, the  ǯ  , and the employment tribunals.  Gross spend in 
2011-12 was £2.00bn, with an average (non-judicial) headcount of 19,704 (HMCTS, 2012, pp.58, 
81).  As HM Courts Service before it, HMCTS is a judicial-ǲǳǤ 
the judiciary is party to resourcing decisions, and three judicial members sit on the 
independently-  Ǥ  ǡ   ǣ ǲ            ǳ (Lord Chancellor & Secretary of 
State for Justice, 2011, p.5).  Together, this makes for a complex, constitutionally-unparalleled 
agency. 
HMCTS is pursuing major reform, aiming for staff reductions of 2,980 by 2015 (HMCTS, 2012, 
p.17).  It is rationalising an extensive national estate, centralising middle-office processing 
(Rayner, 2011), outsourcing fine enforcement (Jee, 2013), adopting employment tribunal fees 
(MoJ, 2011b), and implementing digitisation and other measures in the Swift and Sure Justice 




white paper (MoJ, 2012b; see Chapter 8).  Operations are overseen through seven regionally-
based, cross-jurisdictional Delivery Directors, while, in the MoJ main building, alongside a cross-
cutting Strategy and Change team and other corporate units, there are two jurisdiction-specific 
HQ directorates for Crime, and Civil, Family and Tribunals.  As with NOMS, the subsections 
below explore identity differentiation and integration, before considering Ǯǯ ensuring 
constitutional correctness. 
6.4.2 Differentiating HMCTS 
The judicial-executive partnership 
References to constitutional uniqueness abounded in the HMCTS fieldwork.  As one official ǣ ǲHMCTS is just so different to anything else ǤǤǤ ǯ   ǳ
(Interview_035).  Box 6.15 similarly evaluates judicial encroachment since 1995 as gradually ǲǳǤ 
Box 6.15: Changing relations 
 
I: Judicial relations are ǲǳ, having ǲǳ.  Originally, 
the Court Service ǲ Ǯ ǯ very seriously, as in: Ǯǯ  
administration; the judiciary are separate.  So ǡǯ
buildingsǤǤǤǯ. ... Certainly, the judges felt that they should, in principle, be in charge..., but 
ǯ ... manage an enormous business.  ǯ
that officials were in charge of it, so it was quite uneasy.  And the first chief executive ... 
was quite emphatic about that separation, and occasionally some of the judges wanted to 
ǡǤǤǤǤǳ   
The next chief executive ǲ  much more involved Ȃ not on the board, but, 
certainly, any sort of project that   Ǥǳ  
Latterly, ǲ        -ǳ. [Digression] With the 
advent of MoJ, however, ǲǳ was seen as: ǲ
too low, you can then s   Ǥǳ [Digression] This prompted ǲ
revised framework document, which really brought the judiciary right into the 
governance arrangements ... [and]  ǣ Ǯǡ ǯ  Ȃ 
this is now a very odd executive agencyǤǯȂ ǯ
ǯǤǳ  And who 
do court employees work to Ȃ judges or their line manager? ǲI thought that was quite 
oddǤǳ (Interview_009) 
 




Box 6.15 chronicles a departure from former governance clarity, agencification having initially ǲvery seriouslyǳstraightforward judicial-executive separation Ȃ ǲǮyou 
make the decisions, and ǯ run the buildingsǯǳ.  Two differentiations are effected: first, 
between judicial and executive perspectives on rightful administrative ownership of the courts; 
and, second, between former clarity and current confusion, with temporality established   ȋǲmuch more ǳǡ ǲreally    ȏȐǳȌǤ  
combination, modern judicial-executive collaboration in the ǯ running distinguishes ǲǳcontemporary agencies, for which 
there are no such doubts over reporting lines and accountability. 
Box 6.16 also recounts agency de-normalisation since Next Steps, but counterbalances this 
against the countervailing regularising of ministerial responsibilities in 2005.   
Box 6.16ǣ	ǲǳ 
 
I: Prior to the magistrates joining in 2005, and briefly ǡ ǲthe Court Service 
was just a conventional agency.  It had a straightforward obligation ... to ministers.  It was 
like any executive agency of the [Department for Work and Pensions] or anywhere else.  
Only when ... the Lord Chancellor was abolishedǳ did judges argue that ministers could 
no longer fulfil alone the statutory obligation for court resourcing.  While the Lord 
Chancellor headed the judiciary, the resourcing debate could ǲ
that one person....  But as soon as the Justice Secretary became just an ordinary cabinet 
minister, there had to be a mechanism through which the Lord Chief Justice and the 
Secretary of State for Justice could have their debate ... and there had to be some 
governance arrangements in which the head of the judiciary was participant.  Hence the 
new framework document that set out those obligations in a new constitutional positionǤǳ 
(Interview_039) 
 
As previously, Box 6.16 narrates the subversion of an agency norm, the courts having originally 
been ǲjust a conventional ǳ and ǲ any ... anywhereǳǡ but latterly becoming ǲǳǤ ǡǲjust an ordinary cabinet ǳ ? ? ? ?ȋChapter 5).  In combination, this appraisal 




of former agency conventionalism and ministerial individuality, and current agency peculiarity 
but ministerial ordinariness, frames the overall business of court administration as inherently 
specialised, requiring some departure from governing norms Ȃ whether organisational or 
political Ȃ to ensure constitutional correctness. 
Officials readily discoursed on the practical implications of this dual judicial-executive 
ownership, as Box 6.17 illustrates. 
Box 6.17: Partnership challenges 
[i]: 
 
I: ǲȏȐǯ        s placed in a very, very awkward 
situation, because it has two bossesǤǤǤǤǳ  For instance, if the ǲ   
advice on X Ȃ ǣǮWell, this is a little bit close to the margins of 
judicial interest: should I have a chat with them, or am I allowed to have a chat with 
ǫǯǡevery now and then people get caught out, 
and that affects trust.  So we had one not that long ago where a request was put in for 
ȏ ȐǤǳ You then ask yourself: ǲǮDo I tell my judge?  ǡ ǡ Ǥǯǳ  
[Digression]  ǯǲȏȐǤǤǤeverybody gets on being as upfront 
as they can be. ... [I]t makes everybody that much more cautious about ǯ
who.    ǯ         everybody, as the framework 





I: ǲȏȐǯǤǤ.. [Ȑǯally quite a weird thing, actuallyǤǯ
    ǯ      ǤǤǤ ǡ  
white paper, which is a political document (obviously, by its very nature)ǣ ǯ  
servant and so I will write whatever the minister wants me to write, because ǯ
we operateǤǯǡǯ
ǤǯǡǡǯǣǮ
my partnership hat ǡǡǯǢǡǡ
with my civil service hat ǡ      ǯǤ  ǯ    
organisation Ǥǳ (Interview_046) 
 
Through two statement-example cycles, Box 6.17-ȏȐǲǳǯǲǳǤ   day-to-day issues with a 




ȋǲadvice on Xǳ) where a conflicted civil servǣǲǮǤǤǤǤǤǤǫǯǳǤpartnership difficulties, evidenced by 
a specific tale of performance monitoring.  Here, normalisation is evoked by first establishing ȋǲ ǳȌȋǲone ȏȐǳȌǡ
implication being that the example is one among many.  As previously, vocalisation reverts to 
the conflicted first-ȋǲǮǫǯǳȌǡǡstion of a trap ȋǲcaught outǳȌȋǲǳǡǲǳǡǲǯ talking 
to whoǳȌǡǯǤ 
        ȋǲǯ  we ǳȌǡ Box 
6.17-[ii] similarly asserts strong HMCTS differentiation, both at the outset and conclusion Ȃ ǲǯ
actually quite a weird ǳǢ ǲ  interesting organisationǳǤ    ǡ 
statement-example pat   ǯ      
white paper development.  This involved providing conflicting recommendations, signalled by ǲǳǲǳǤǯty, ǲǳ
of HMCTS employees (Interview_039). 
Operational focus ǡǯ
effected through claims for operational focus, as Box 6.18 illustrates. 
Box 6.18: Operational intimacy (i) 
 
I: Policy and operations are ǲcompletely differentǳ roles, given ǲwho yǯǤǤǤ
the way that you operate ... the skills that you need....  [O]n the operational sideǡǯ
true operational (ǯ) ǯǯ
making day-to-day decisions on: Ǯe need a body there; ǯ...ǯǤ ǯ
true  Ǥ  ǡ  ǯ   HQ operational roleǡ ǯ  
Ǥǳ 
 
[T: But ǯ still different from policy?] 
 




I: ǲǯǡǯtaking the policy ǯ
and saying: Ǯkay-ǯ.  You can influence the policy and say: Ǯ, this is what you want to 
achieveǯ.  So we understand the policy aims, we understand the operational business and 
the impact of that, and then we have to bridge that gap and either change the policy so 
that they can still meet their aims, or even, in some circumstances, not meet their aims, 
 ǯ.  Because, ultimately, ǯ it, they could 




intra-agency work distinctions beneath that between HMCTS and the ǲǳ     ǡ     Ǯ-and-ǯ 
between policymakers (ǲtheir ǳǢ ǲthey    ǳȌ    ȋǲwe    ǳǢ ǲwe ǯ ǳǢ ǲwe ǯ ǳȌǤ  ǡ -
frontline sameness is achieved through their grouping under the repeated personal pronoun ǲǳǡas by the distancing ǲǳǡ
but does not itself author. 
Box 6.19 similarly differentiates HMCTS from MoJ by positing ǯ. 
Box 6.19: Operational intimacy (ii) 
 
[T: Does HMCTS do policymaking?] 
 
I: ǲǯcommenting on policy.  ...  [T]ǯ
before is Ǯǯ ... because it points bǤ ǤǤǤȏȐǯ
had is the extent to which we allow   Ǯ  ǯ ... to get involved in 
commenting on government policyǡǡǡǯ
with the day-in, day-Ǥǳ [Elaboration] ǲǡ  ǡ ǡ
ǯ  ... ǯ
talking about.  ... [I]ǯǯ
make sure that the policy being developed by the MoJ actually does make senseǤǳ 
(Interview_035) 
 




Again othering ǲgovernment ǳas something ǲǳ and not HMCTS, Box 
6.19 continues the department-agency distinction.  This differentiation is reinforced by    ȋǲǡ  ǳȌ    ȋǲour managers Ǯ ǯǳȌǤǯȋBox 6.2-[ii], above), this frontline intimacy ǡǲǳǤ  ǯ implied reality-disconnect further differentiates MoJ from the 
conjoined HQ-frontline agency. 
Finally, Box 6.20 further delimits HMCTS by its operational focus, arguing that, despite wider ǡǲǳ
Steps. 
Box 6.20: Operational independence 
 
I: ǲ ǯǡǡ ǡ
operationallyǡǯindependent ǯǤ... [T]he 
framework document says, I think, that neither Lord Chief Justice nor the Justice Secretary 
will interfere in the day-to-day running of the business, ...aǯ.ǳ  
Thereǯ accountability and ǲǳ on performance.  Nonetheless, 
ǲn in the Court Service as the opening executive agency, operationally, HMCTS 
is ... not quite independent, but it has significantly less interference from the corporate 
Ministry in the day-to-day delivery of its business than has ever been the case before.ǳ 
(Interview_039) 
 
Again reflecting the claimed delivery (not policy) focus, Box 6.20 separates MoJ and HMCTS by  ǯ ǡ
Court Service agency, which, under Next Steps, actually enjoyed less day-to-day autonomy.  The 
nature of this operational independence was explained later in the interview, thus:  
ǲȏȐ     -to-day delivery of [the] business, [and nor are there] 
ǯǳ.   
Rather, evoking neo-Next Steps principal-agent contractualism, the annual business plan gives 
the ǲǳǡǲǳ(Interview_039). 




6.4.3 Integrating HMCTS 
Despite the extensive identity differentiation noted above, HMCTS officials, unlike NOMS, also 
essay significant identity integration with both MoJ and other justice agencies, principally in 
tales of the shared response to austerity and economy.  For example, Box 6.21 describes a 
recent trend towards department-ǲǳǤ 
Box 6.21ǣǲǳ 
 
[T: Is HMCTS new to this MoJ building?] 
 
I: Yes, ǲa lot of people ǡǯ
got plenty of space.ǳ  Many organisations ǲargued that their independence might be 
compromisedǳ by co-locating, ǲand HMCS, I think, was one of themǳ, saying: ǲǮust by 
being here, our independence from government is compromisedǯǤǯ




I: ǲ[T]ǯa lot of that sort of Ǯǯǡǯ, going on.  It 
goes on in lots of different areas.  Each of the agencies used to have its own web presence, 
ǡǯall Ǥǳ(Interview_035) 
 ǲǳǡBox 6.21 situates the 2010 Spending 
Review as an epoch-defining moment, prompting new intra- ǲǳǤ  
spontaneity of this evaluation ȋǲ  ǯ  ǳȌǡ the   ȋǲ ǳǡǲǳȌǡ
and de-autonomisation trend.  Therein, despite its constitutional differentiation, HMCTS is ǲǳ-
driven restructuring.   
Describing increased intra-Ministry collegiality, Box 6.22 similarly essays new identity 
integration, now with both compatriot agencies (horizontally) and the core Ministry (vertically). 




Box 6.22: Collegiate financing 
[i]: 
 
[T: Does agency status still mean what it did with Next Steps?] 
 
I: ǲǯ think it does. ... [M]y chief executive ... is a member of the departmental board ... 
an absolute, equitable member of the Ministry of Justice senior management team.  So, 
ǯǤǤǤǳ, an agency chief executive would have 
had ǲbilateral negotiations with the department to say: Ǯ
   ǡ ǯǤ  ǯ       .  Iǯ  
discussion around the departmental tableǡǣ Ǯǡǯ is together.  How 
are we gonna deliver these savings?ǯ  ǯ that 




I: Increasingly, ǲthe senior finance team ... from all the main spending agencies and the 
central finance team ... operate ... as the Ǯthe ǯǤǡ
and take off our agency hats and just look across ... at where the opportunities are, where 
the risks are.  I spend as much of my time worrying about NOMS financial issues as they 
Ǥǳ [Elaboration]  
MoJ Finance have ǲǡǤǤǤȏȐ
end up in a whole series of arguments with individual agencies, who are all arguing their 
ǳto build a court or prison, ǲbeǯǤ
work in a more collegiate, corporate way is kind of taking the heat Ǥǳ 
(Interview_053) 
 
Box 6.22-[i] identifies modified agency practice      ǯ ǲ ǳǡ      -MoJ financing.  Reflecting the 1990s 
justice contractualism narrated in Chapter 5, the official here reports how previous funding   ǲǳ -agent conversations, initiated by chief executives ȋǲǮǤǤǤǯǳȌǤ ǡ
first-person narration and the closing civility.  Post-austerity financing, by contrast, involves 
multi-party, pan-MoJ deliberations, with the new collegiality being evoked through descriptions ȋǲǳǢǲǳȌȋǲthe departmental taǳǢǲthat ǳǢǲthese ǳȌ.  ȏȐǡǲthe 
senior finance teamǳ and ǲthe Ǯthe ǯǳǤǡǲǡ





corporate responsibility across the business areas. 
ǯy sponsorship, Box 6.23 again posits austerity-
prompted corporate oneness. 
Box 6.23: Eliminating duplication 
 
[T: So agencies areǯ sponsored?] 
 
I: ǲ   n army beavering away on analysing performance data and, as 
often seemed to be the case, looking to provide elephant traps ... accountability for HMCTS 
ȏȐǤǳ  Both ministerial and civil-service boards ǲ
on performancǳ. [Elaboration] ǲ     trustǳ that the chief executive 
ǲthe weaknesses as well as the strengths.  If you can accept that Ȃ if you can carry 
that off convincingly Ȃ ǯarmies of people  ... [and HMCTS already has] an 
army of people, as you might imagine, so the idea that the Ministry should also-.   
ǲ	  ǯ  ǡ   our core principles is that we only do 
things once.  We do not Ȃ we cannot afford to Ȃ duplicate things.  And, actually, ǯust 
ǢǯǤcompetitive performance 
analysis ... different sets of figures in the core Ministry and ... the agency....  We ǯ
ǤǤǤǳ (Interview_039) 
 
Citing reduced duplication and increased clarity, Box 6.23 argues in favour of abandoning 
principal-agent contractualism.  Rhetorically, the various invocations of unproductive red-tape ȋǲ ǳǢ ǲǳȌ   Ȃ intersubjectivity Ȃ as indicators of poor governance 
and hence areas   Ǥ  ǡ   ǲ ǳ   ǯ  ? ? ? ?   ȋChapter 5Ȍǡ     ǯ
duplication o ǯ own ǲǳ   ǡ       ǯ shared interest in court and tribunal performance improvement is 
unbefitting of adversarial intra-ministry monitoring.  As such, and epitomising the new identity ǡǯȂ ǲour ǳǢǲwe ǳǢǲwe ǳǢǲwe ǳǤ 




Following the integrative aspiration-practice deficit of culture and HR noted in NOMS (Box 6.9, Ȍǡ ǯ ǡ -prompted corporacy challenged the enduring organisational 
infrastructure of old agency separatism, as Box 6.24 demonstrates in regard to the chief ǯcontinuing Accounting Officer responsibilities but lost corporate service control. 
Box 6.24: Shared services 
 
I: Regarding shared services, ǲtǯ.... I think at one point 
across the MoJ we had nine different payroll systems to cope Ǥǡǯnot a great 
use of the overhead, so things like shared services are a bit of a no-brainer....  [However, it] 
causes some real tensions for us as an agency, in terms of: [the chief executive] as 
Accounting Officer from HMCTS Ȃ a good number of [his/her] essential services are not 
under [his/her] direct remit....ǳ [Elaboration] ǲSo it gets into some interesting tensions 
between the agency Accounting Officer, the agency chief executive, and the department.ǳ  
For example, if the Health and Safety Executive ǲǳ over 
a legionella outbreak in a court, ǲǯǡ
it the Head of Estates in MoJ...?  Question mark!  ...  If the roof blows off a court and we 
ǯ... who do [the Public Accounts Committee] ask for?  Do they ask for the head 
   ǯ   ǡ      -fixing department in 
MoJ ...ǫǯ a real tension...Ǥǳ (Interview_053) 
 
Citing again the commonly-  ǯ    ǡ -MoJ response ȋǲwe had nine different payroll systemsǳȌǡ Box 6.24 initially defends new cross-ministry shared 
corporate services, effecting MoJ-ȋǲweǳȌ   ȋǲ  the ǳȌǤ  ǡ ǡ     
accountability tension that such consolidation measures engender, thereby revoking the 
established intra-Ministry sameness through new HMCTS individualisation Ȃ ǲreal tensions for 
us as an agencyǳǢ ǲ[his/her]  ǳǢ ǲ[his/her]  ǳǤ   
department-agency difference is confirmed in the polarisation of personnel Ȃ ǲǳ  ǲ     ǳǤ  Thus, as in NOMS, the implication is of a 
practical drag on new corporacy stemming from the continuing adherence to outdated agency 
infrastructure Ȃ this time, the Accounting Officer delegation. 




6.4.4 Ǯǯ      ǡ      ǯ 
status directly. 
Constitutional correctness       
ǡ ǯ amework carried unparalleled 
significance, being referenced above in Box 6.15, Box 6.16, Box 6.17 and Box 6.20.  Box 6.25 




[T: Was the 2008 judicial partnership an easy solution?] 
 
I: ǲǡǤǳMoJ was hastily created, ǲnd it was only 
when we started thinkingǣǮǡǡǯ-ǯǳ.  
Then, senior judges and ǲpolicy officials lock[ed] themselves in a room and just [came] up 
   Ǥ      ǯ ǡ ǯ unique; there is no other 
agency relationship that comes close to the framework documentǤ    ǯ 
Ǥǳ[Digression] 
 
[T: But there was a 2005 framework?] 
 
I: ǲ...  ǯ   there was a version beforehand.... That [2005] was the 
relationship between the courts and the DCA, whereas this [2008] became the relationship 
  ǡ   ǡ   Ǥ  ǯ   [old] version, 
actually, but actually ǯ  Ǥ  ǯ     ǡ
actually; ǯǮǯǤǳ (Interview_035) 
 
Box 6.25 individualises HMCTS not simply by its dual ownership, but by the enshrining of this in 
a framework document Ȃ ǲ        the framework Ǥǳ  Constitutional uniqueness and the framework are thus inseparable, the latter 
having no pre- ǡ   ǲǳ ǡ ǲǳ  
government.  Hence, latterly confronted with the 2005 (pre-partnership) framework, the official 




confirms its insignificance: though (surprisingly) sharing the same name, the two versions 
signal quite different delegations. 




[T: The framework document, is it-?] 
 
I: ǲǫǤǳ  Itǯ consulted prior to parliamentary hearings, ǲ
there was gonna be an interesting board meeting where the judiciary- the judiciary would 
Ǥǳ [Digression] ǲ[T]he judiciary would raise paragraph.6.1.1a.subsection.2 
... ǯǤǤǤǤ	document Ȃ when was the last time I looked 
ǫǤǯǤǫǤǳ 
 
[T: Did you have those contractual conversations with MoJ too?] 
 
I: ǲOh good grief, noǤǡǡǤǯ document was ever there for 
the department.  I think the framework document was there for the relationship with the 
ǡǤǳ  When agency headquarters started co-locating with 
MoJǡǲ[Courts Service] Press Office into the MoJ Press 
Office.  Just co-locate them, okay? ... Members of the b ǯ  ǡ  
framework document then came into play...Ǥǳ (Interview_044) 
 
Box 6.26ǯ      ǲȏȐ    ǳ 
with Box 6.25ǯits constitutional rather than managerial role.  Just as that 
official expressed surprise at the existence of a pre-partnership framework, here the 
interviewee reacts with amazement to the suggestion that it might have governed MoJ-HMCTS 
relations Ȃ ǲǡǳǤǡBox 6.26 closes with a story of (aborted) 
plans to co-locate press offices.  Illustrating  ǯ 
framework paragraphs and subsections, they refused permission. 
Extending this constitutionalism, Box 6.27 proceeds to explain ǯ agency designation ǡǯ
remit. 




Box 6.27: Constitutional correctness 
 
I: The Lord Chief Justice could deploy the ǲǳ and end the partnership.  ǲ
would not cause some massive constitutional row....  You could go back to an old Lord 
ǯǤǡǯǡ: Ǯǯ
know, M ǯ    ǡ         ǯǤ
T ǯ ǡ ǤǤǤ ǯ
Ǥǳ [Digression] 
 
[T: So the agency boundary enables judicial involvement in courts specifically, rather 
than the whole MoJ and prisons?] 
 
I: ǲǡ-stroke-administrative 
ǡǤǯo way otherwise you could do 
it...Ǥǳ (Interview_035) 
 
Box 6.27 speculates that, were MoJ to revert to being a courts-only department, the framework 
would become redundant.  This positions agencification as a protective device meeting the post-
MoJ necessity of confining judicial oversight of the courts within the newly multifarious justice 
department.  It was accordingly described earlier in the interview that: 
ǲȏ ǯ ǡ    Ȑ   ȏ 
Ȑǯ
ǳ (Interview_035). 
Since then, partnership agency status allowed for the apportioning-off of the courts from the 
main MoJ, with constitutionally-appropriate judicial representation at this sub-departmental, 
agency level.  By extension, as Box 6.27 continues, were prisons to be once again removed from ǯ responsibilities, leaving a much reduced justice department, agencification would become 
unnecessary, since judges could exercise oversight from this more tightly delimited Ministry 
board. 
Agency apathy ǯ the specialist nature of courts 
administration, this constitutional rationale for agencification is but one interpretation.  Several 




officials reported more neo-Next Steps ideas about businesslike delivery, one identifying   ǲ   ǳ (Interview_048) and another reporting that, given ǯǡǲǯǡǤǤǤǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
Still, as Box 6.28 illustrates, more extended narratives display frank apathy for agencification. 






ǡǯ the view that you, ministers and the permanent secretary have of your 
relative autonomy within the organisation that mattersǤǳ  There are two kinds of agency: 
ǲthe big delivery organisationsǳ, ǲvery specialised agencies ... ǯ
polit ǤǤǤǤǳ [Elaboration] For the former, the ǲ[Next Steps] approach, which is 
that they ought to be run as a business ... stands true.  But in terms of the big delivery 
agenciesǡ        ǡ   ǯ  matter of 





[T: You said agency status makes no difference to frontline staff.  Does it here, in HQ?] 
 





 ǯ    ǡ       ȏirector general] 
structure.  ... [W]eǯ still have our budgets; weǯ still have the work we need to do; weǯ 
Ǥǳ 
 
[T: What about the Accounting Officer role?] 
 
I: ǲȏȐǤǤǤbut, to the majority, I very much question 
Ǥǳ (Interview_044) 
 
Both Box 6.28 narratives are sceptical about the difference brought by agency status.  Though 
again benchmarking the classification against neo-Next Steps business practice, [i] attributes 




ǲrelative autonomy within the organisationǳ to the understanding between ministers, the 
permanent secretary and the chief executive, thereby narrating a question of internal ȋǲǳȌ 
management delegation rather than agency-gifted, external decentralisation.  This is particularly ǲǳǡǤ  ǡ   ǡ    ǲ ǯ sfer 
away risk of cock-upsǳǡ   ǲnot prepared, actually, to release the power to the 
agency and sayǣ Ǯ	ly free my prettiesǤǤǤǯǳ ȋ ?048).  Therein, the original agency-as-
decentralisation interpretation is undermined.   
Box 6.28-[ii] is similarly sceptical, seeing little to differentiate agency and departmental working     ǡ ǡ   Ǥ     ǯǣǲǯǡ ǯǯǡǯǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǡ      
granted the agency classification in the constitutional correctness account, above. 
6.4.5 Summary ǯ
unique and operationally-focused agency, yet one that is both horizontally and vertically 
integrated by its shared corporate responsibility for meeting the current fiscal challenge.  ǡ Ǯǯǡ a business analogy, 
but also, incommensurately, as of little practical consequence compared to regular directorate 
working. 
6.5 Office of the Public Guardian 
6.5.1 Overview 
   ? ? ? ?ǯǡ -funded agency, 
OPG performs regulatory and administrative functions under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (see 




Chapter 5).  This allows certain financial and welfare decisions to be made on behalf of those 
lacking capacity through, for example, injury or dementia (Bartlett, 2008; Hartley-Jones, 2011).  
The Public Guardian Ȃ      
ǯ   Ȃ supervises 
decision-Ǯǯppointed by the Court of Protection.  In addition, Lasting Powers of 
Attorney Ȃ a legal deed which must be registered with OPG before use Ȃ allow capacitated Ǯǯ       ǮǯǤ  ǡ   
safeguarding, major agency tasks include document handling, manual data entry, and 
registration payment processing.    
Since 2007, this work has seen year-on-year growth, with application volumes far exceeding 
initial assumptions (Interview_003).  Media coverage prompted several spikes in demand and 
performance dips (BBC, 2010; Lewis, 2009), and the year to March 2012 saw a further 17 per 
cent rise (OPG, 2012a, p.8).  By virtue of its manual operation, staff numbers have grown to 631 
from a base of 389 (OPG, 2008, p.18; 2013, p.4), necessitating recent relocation from London to 
larger offices in Nottingham and Birmingham.  Given aging IT, however, registration turnaround 
continued to suffer, and, latterly, a Digital Transformation programme has sought a new, 
technology-led operating model (see Chapter 8).   
With the Midlands relocation, 29 headquarters posts moved to the main MoJ building in 
Westminster (Interview_007).  Moreover, following the MoJ Blueprint, policy responsibilities 
centralised into JPG in 2011.  In 2012, the Public Bodies Reforms abolished the Public Guardian 
Board Ȃ 
ǯ statutory advisory and oversight committee Ȃ prompting strengthened 
departmental sponsorship (Interview_029), in contravention of the ǯpost- ? ? ? ?Ǯ-agency-ǯȋChapter 5).  Alongside digitisation, this makes for a considerable change 
agenda, against which the following subsections consider identity differentiation, integration 
and the framing of agencification as a corporate governance solution. 




6.5.2 Differentiating OPG 
Size 
ǯǤ
the Public Bodies Reforms, for instance, Box 6.29 identifies size as pivotal. 
Box 6.29: Size and inconsistency 
 
I: Although agencies were excluded from the Public Bodies Review, they are ǲactually ... 
ǯ-ǳǤǯǡǡǡ
treated so is a ǲslight oddityǳ, in that ǲ depends     ǳ.  There was no 
question of: ǲǮOh, do we need the Courts Service, or the Tribunals Service, or NOMS 
agencies?ǯ  Ǯ
ǫǯǳ  In the ǲǳǡǯǲǯ smaller or it feels ǳ, and that is the ǲǤǤǤȏ
ȐǳǤ  
Therefore, ǲthe department would like to talk about: ǮAh, agenciesǯ, and think about its 




       ǯ     
within the justice-dominated MoJ, Box 6.29 individualises OPG by its comparative slightness.    ȋǲǳǡ ǲǳ  ǲǳȌ     ǣ 
formal classification of agencies as ǯ-length bodies, which the Public Bodies Review Ǣ  ǯ    -ǯ-length agencies, which OPG subverts.  In 
populating this norm-deviant framework, equivalence is imparted between HMCTS and NOMS 
as typical justice agenciǡ      ȋǲorǳ), and then by their ǯǲbig machineryǳǤ
Ȃ the departmental 
deviant Ȃ    ǲǳ   ǯ-length body.  Polarisation is further assured ǣȋǲBut ... Ǯdo we need OPG?ǯǳ); introduction as an afterthought (ǲǮOh,  ǯ 
 as wellǯǳȌǢ        ȋǲǮǯǳǢǲǮOhǯǳȌǤ   ǡ ǡ Box 6.29ǯ      ǯ 
process Ȃ ǲa Ǯ
ǫǯǳǤ ȋǲaǳȌ

and MoJ, the question having been asked about rather than by the agency.  Thereafter, the 




ǲǳǲlike[s] to talk ǳǤǡ
ǡǮǯǤ 

ǯo-agency-sponsorship principle of the 2010 
Blueprint.  As one official explained, ǲ    ǳ, an agency must be sponsored, since its 
chief executive does not attend the departmental board (Interview_007).  Box 6.30 elaborates 
upon this. 
Box 6.30: Size and sponsorship  
 
I: With HMCTSǯǡ disbanded, ǲǤǤǤ

sponsorship of Justice Policy Group, reasserting this quite old Next Steps concept, actually, 
of: Ǯ    ǯ.ǳ  This has the ǲ irony that, actually, the stated 
Operating Model ... ǯǤ
the conception in the Operating Model was: ǮWell, executive agencies are these big things, 
ǯ , like Courts and Tribunals, and Legal Services Commission and NOMSǫǯǳ  
Hence, OPG ǲended up ǳǡbeing ǲneither sponsored with the 
other NDPBs ... nor ... standing withiǳ. (Interview_003) 
 
Box 6.30 effects norm-       ȋǲǮ   ǡ ǯ ǯǳȌ       ȋǲǮ    ǯǳȌǤ
Again ironically, OPG actually follows that traditional model of agency sponsorship, and yet, in 
the MoJ context, is considered deviant for so doing.  Therein, HMCTS ǲǳ NOMS ǲǳ legal aid 
(additive relations Ȃ see Fairclough, 2003) ǲǮbig ǯǳǡ
ǲended 
up ... neitherǳ with the quangos ǲnorǳ being treated like its formal, unsponsored counterparts.  ȋǲother ǳȌǯ
that it is mostly NDPBs that support statutory officeholders (the Public Guardian).  Moreover, in 
Box 6.29ǡ    
ǯ ǲǳ      
future in the Public Bodies Review.  Together, this illustrates how, contra- ǡ ǯ-
length independence is interpreted as a property of quango rather than agency delivery.   





ǯday-to-day challenges.  For example, in Box 6.31, 
slightness is framed as disadvantageous for newly-centralised policymaking. 
Box 6.31: Size as disadvantageous 
[i]: 
 
I: OPG was too small Ǯǯ to policy centralisation.  Conversely, NOMS, as a larger 





I: Given the ǯcentralisation of policymaking, ǲ
by which the department organises its priorities for the year ahead...Ǥǯǯ
       ǡ    ǯ visible from our 
point of view.  I dare say it might have been a lot more formal and structured if you 
happened to be sitting in HMCTS, where they would probably have been an absolutely 




[T: Did OPG benefit from having devolved policymaking?] 
 
I: Yes, because ǲ   ǤǤǤ ǯ a small entity.  In the pecking order of all the 
policy thǡǯǲ
to us eventuallyǳǡbut Ǥǳ  Converselyǡǲwhen we had it ourselves, it was for us 





in [i] size explicitly explains why OPG, unlike NOMS, could not retain its own policy function;   ȏȐǡ      
ǯ   ǲǳ  
HMCTS.  In [iii], without similar references to fellow agencies, size is still cited recurrently, the ǡǲsmall ǳǡǲeventuallyǳ attend to OPG. 
Finally, Box 6.32 argues that slightness is actually advantageous, protecting OPG from the ǯ ǲǳǲǳǤ 




Box 6.32: Size as advantageous 
 
I: Coalition projects are being subject to ǲscrutiny, a lot of governanceǳ.  There is 
the Cabinet Officeǯ ǲ 
ǳ, for which it is ǲǡ
ǡǳǤǡ
ǯexperience this to the same degree.  ǲȏȐ
ǯǳ, possibly ǲ
[its] ǳ. (Interview_009) 
 
Again, Box 6.32 differentiates OPG by its size, this being said to shield the agency against the 
increased scrutiny brought by new central controls. 
Policy sector 
Remit also differentiates OPG, the agency being ǲǡǳ, 
as one official observed (Interview_004).  Accordingly, Box 6.33-[i] contextualises the recent 
policy recentralisation by referencing the wider problem of locating public guardianship within 
government, while [ii] identifies the risks of de-prioritisation within an alternatively-focused 
department. 
Box 6.33: The justice disconnect 
[i]: 
 
I: One reason why OPG formerly had devolved mental capacity policy was ǲyou look 
ǣ Ǯǡ      ǫǯǳ  Thereǯ ǲ  ǳ.  Following 
recentralisation, it now sits alongside 
ǯ  ǡ   
ǯ ǡ ǲ
ǯ  the department ... [to go]: Ǯ ǯ   ; it 
ǯ fit big under the justice backgroundǯǳ.  Neither does it fit particularly under the 
alternatives Ȃ ǲǮWork and Pensions? Well, not really.  Health?  Well, not really.ǯǳ  Indeed, 
ǲwe even got to Education at one pointǳ.  Therefore, ǲǣ ǮWell, the least 




I: After the 2005 legislation, ǲ    ǡ       ǡ
policy ...      ǳ.  Previously, ǲ    a little 
backwater Ȃ    ǯ ǡ   Ȃ somewhere in the Family 
  
ǳǤ  That was ǲ least uncomfortable ǳ.  As such, the devolution 
was ǲǳof co-locating policy and operations, but it also 
reflected ǲ         licy thinking that was 
required...ǳ. The ǲriskǳ of leaving it ǲback at headquartersǳ, was that it ǲ




shrunk down so much ... whereas at least having it over here, it could be a decision within 
the businessǤǤǤǳ. (Interview_005) 
 
  ǲ ǳ ȏȐ  ǲ ǳ ȏȐ   
ǯ 
location, both Box 6.33 extracts narrate identity differentiation on the basis of remit.  In [i], two Ǥǣǲyou ǣǮWell, 
where else would you put itǫǯǳǤǲyouǳ and proceeding with the  ǲǮǯǳǡ  questioning validates the problem of identifying a suitable home.  ǡ  ǡ        ǲǮǯ understand 
mental capacityǯǳǤ on to remove policy to the new, specialist agency in 
2007 (see Chapter 7).  Successive negative descriptions (ǲǯǳǢǲit ǯǳǢǲnot ǳȌ
and disbelief about the extent of discussion ȋǲeven got to Education at one pointǳȌ
ǯ  Ǥ  ǡ    Box 6.31ǯ   
departmental de-prioritisation, Box 6.33-[ii] warns o  ǲǳ  policy marginalisation, 
particularly given previous experience of guardianship policyǯ   ǲ ǳ.  Again, the implication is of MoJ-OPG misaligned by their differing remits. 
The corporate imposition 
OPG officials ǲǳ
the agency.  Unlike for HMCTS, above, however, narration of these newly felt externalities 
retained a differentiating, them-and-us dualism, the new corporacy being imposed rather than 
shared, as Box 6.34 illustrates. 
Box 6.34: Corporate imposition 
[i]: 
 
I: The Tribunals Service had a spare building and staff in Nottingham.  In taking them 
for the Midlands relocation, OPG was ǲ  corporate ... fitting in with other 
ǯǡǮ
ǳ, even if their skill set was not ideal.  In trying to ǲ 
corporateǡ    ǡ    ǯ  ǳ, rather 
than necessarily opting for the best solution for OPG individually, the decision was 




taken not as ǲa chief executiveǳ of the agency but as ǲ ?senior civil servantǳ of 




[T: When was the decision taken to centralise policy?] 
 
I: ǲȏW]e talked through ǳ late in 2010, ǲ
ǯOperating Mǳ.  Then, ǲMoJ [were] saying: Ǯǡǯ to this 
operating model where all policy will be done by Policy Group.   ǯ  
reorganise at [director general] level ... and this is how we see executive agencies fitting 
into thatǯǳ.  So the ǲorganisational imperativeǳ was: ǲǮRight, all policy comes to Policy 




I: ǲȏȐǡbecause you then get to the point where, actually, 
the department wants you to go onto their shared services thing, but what happens if it 
actually   ǫ  Ǯ ǯ    ǡ actually, to move over to 




ǯ  ǡ Box 6.34-ȏȐ  ǲǳ   the 
consideration of pressures and priorities in other MoJ organisations.  The concluding distinction 
between a ǲsenior civil servantǳ    ǲ  ǳ particularly testifies to the 
continuing department-agency differentiation that underpins this new corporacy.  Similarly, 
while Box 6.34-ȏȐ ȋǲwe ǳȌǡ , ǯȋǲǮǡǯmoving... And ǯ gonna..., and this is 
how we ǤǤǤǯǳȌǡ
ǲǳǤ
Thus, regarding austerity-mandated shared services, Box 6.34-[iii] again polarises the Ministry ȋǲthe departmentǳ; ǲtheirǳ; ǲMoJǳȌ
ȋǲyouǳ; ǲǯǳ; ǲusǳȌǡǡ   ǯ  ǡ ǡ    costly.  Again, this    Ǯ  ǯ       ȋ
HMCTSǯ, above). 




6.5.3 Integrating OPG 
As was the case with NOMS, a    ǡ 
ǯ 
was limited, being largely horizontal and confined to recognition of the general de-
autonomisation trend experienced by all executive agencies.  Box 6.35, for example, explains 
both the changing agency approach in MoJ and wider government, and similar trends within 
public guardianship specifically. 
Box 6.35: ǲǳǫ 
[i]: 
 
I: ǲMǳ recent developments against the ǲoriginal purity of Next Steps ... I think 
very much then the idea was: Ǯepartments do policy, agencies do deliveryǯǳ.  For instance, 
the Department of Social Security (DSS) held policymaking in the centre.  Now, by 
contrast, ǲ ǳ there is a return to ǲ purity of Ǯpolicy centre, delivery through 
agenciesǯǳ in ǯnew operating model, ǲbig shift is: Ǯǡ
the department Ȃ the body corporateǯǳ.  With shared services, for example, ǲǯ
the departmental mandate comes outǤ ǤǤǤǮǡǯǢt ǯ this IT, 
ǯ  that HR, ǯ  that procurementǯǳǤ  Previously, agencies could decide 
themselves, ǲǯǡ
spent fifteen million quid using a different IT supplierǤǳ  Hence, in terms of evolution, ǲyou just accept the policy and delivery thing will ping-ǳ from centralisation to 
devolution, ǲ    -ponging ... might be some of the other 
interesting factors Ȃ the shared services question; the procurement and contracts; the 




I: The old Public Guardianship Office (PGO) ǲ   ǯ ǳ, able to 
ǲǡǳ.  However, ǲver time, 
PGO as it was, and now OPG, have become more and more part of the parent departmentǳǤ 
Therein, ǲpurer Next Steps separation of the executive agency Ȃ ǯnarrowed and 
narrowed and narrowedǤǳ (Interview_003) 
 
Both Box 6.35 narratives suggest a departure from Next Steps.  In [i], for example, ǲǳ is opposed by a ǲ ǳ  ǲ  ǳǤ  As such, despite ostensible 
ǯ-centralised policymaking and the original Next Steps model, 
MoJǯ does not represent a 1990s renaissance, since agencies are no 




longer separated.  This de-autonomisation trend is said to extend beyond OPG to both MoJ and 
wider government, thereby identifying this agency with others.  Thereafter, regarding public 
guardianship specifically, Box 6.35-[ii] describes how the ǯ-length separation has ǲǳ since Next Steps, making the 

ǲǳǤ 
Significantly, both Box 6.35 extracts narrate de-autonomisation with implied regret, referencing 
now-unattainable IT savings [i], citing a negative MoJ rebuke ȋǲǮNo, agencies are still part of the ǯǳ) [i], and ǲǳǲǳȏȐ.  Furthermore, 
use of the Ǯpureǯ metaphor is itself skewed towards valorising the past, its antonym (impurity) 
being naturally unfavourable.  Together, this points to a perspectival split between an 
autonomy-enjoying agency and the departmental ǮǯȂ a dualism compounded in 
Box 6.35-[i] ǡǲǳ-
ȋǲǮǯ...ǯǳȌǤǡ
(two-person) interview, when another official vocalises MoJǯ response to an unusual shared 
service request with ǣǲǮǡȏprescribed services onlyȐǯǳǤ
As s/he explains, a ǯ       ǲ ǡ ǡǡǳǡ, under the new corporacy of shared services, it is rejected       ǲ ǯ ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǡ ǡwhile the 
narrative is integrative in its associating of OPG with wider agency trends, simultaneously, 
ǯ -identification with MoJ perpetuates, thus reinf  ǯ vertical 
differentiation. 
6.5.4 Ǯǯ    ǡ     Ǯǯ   
governance solution for the businesslike OPG.  Box 6.36ǯ description of the framework 
document initiates this interpretation.  




Box 6.36: The framework document 
 
[T: Is it important?] 
 
I: ǲȏȐǡbit of processǤǳ  If you create an agency, it has to 
have one.  It is important initially, and is ǲǳ when ǲ  
changes ... but ǡǡǯreference documentǳ.  The business plan and 
annual report are ǲthe key documentsǳ.   
 
[T: Some agencies cǯ supply a framework document.] 
 
I: If a chief executive ǯ, that is a problem, ǲ, actuallyǡǯ
  ǯ Ǥ  ǡ  ǯ    ǡ 
should at least be able to trace a line of     Ǣ   ǯǡ
ǯǤǳ  
 
[T: Someone said the framework can ǯ.  
Does that happen?] 
 
I: It can be used ǲǳ, but thatǯ not always 
helpful.  The ǲǳ for agencies is that ǲ
department.  They are an official of the department, of an executive agency.  So tǯ
    ǯ       
secretary.  But an NDPB ǯǤǳǡ
it ǲ     ... the key principle is: executive agencies Ȃ they 
are part of the parent department, even if the construction creates some other lines of 
boundaries and accountability, not least in terms of defined accounts, the Accounting 
Officer responsibility for those resources, being able to account for that and for the 
ǡǤǳ  (Interview_003) 
 
Box 6.36ǯ three paragraphs each posit a different opposition.  Effected through contrastive 
relation (ǲǳȌǡhe first dismisses the framework document ǲprocessǳ
ǯ ǲ ǳǤ   ǡ   paragraph identifies its necessity for 
determining Accounting Officer responsibilities, the absence of a framework being an affront to 
sound financial governance.  Developing this and the contemporary departmentalisation noted 
in Chapters 4 and 5, the third paragraph departs from the previously established affinity 
between OPG and NDPBs (Box 6.29, Box 6.30) to differentiate agencies by their departmental  ȋǲBut an NDPB...ǳȌǡ   ǲ  ǳ   ǲother lines of ǳǤ truction of agency individuality and concomitant 




ȋǲeven ifǳȌthe     ȋǲ otherǳȌǤ  ǡ    
include not the key Next Steps precepts of decentralisation and independence, but rather ǲǡAccounting Officer responsibilityǳǡreporting. 
This emphasis on corporate governance continues in Box 6.37, where both extracts point to 
accountability mechanisms as the reason for retaining agency status.  
Box 6.37: Governance 
[i]: 
 
I: MoJ is like a multi-company conglomerate.  The question is: ǲǮWell, how do I manage 
it?  Through subsidiaries?ǯǳ  Although ǡ
ǯ suggest 
that it might be better managed as an ǲassociated officeǳ.  This is a real discussion point.  ǡ      Ǥ  ǲOne of the things that drives an 
ǳǤThis establishes the entity on a 
ǲ ǳ, mandating an annual report and accounts, and internal and 
external audit.  If OPG were instead consolidated into the accounts of a larger, 
sponsoring entity, it would be less transparent.  Quasi-commercial governance is 
mandatory for an agency, but only guidance for associated offices.  Therefore, OPG best 




[T: What does agency status mean practicallyǫ  ǯ    
agency and the department?] 
 
I: A lot of people would say ǲǲǳǳ.  Nonetheless, ǲȏȐ
ǯAccounting Officer, so therefore should report 
directly to the permanent secretary.  But then, with some small executive agencies, you 
get tied up in civil serǡǣǮǡǡǯ
at this grade, so he may be an Accounting Officer, he may not, but hǯ
report into someone else within the organisationǯǤ     ǤǤǤǳ. 
(Interview_011) 
 
Box 6.37-[i] frames OPG as a quasi-commercial entity.  Reflecting the uncertainty brought by the 
Public Bodies Review, which did ask questions about the NDPB-like OPG (see Box 6.29, above),           ǲ ǳ
classification because of its man     
ǯ 




credentials.  Similarly, [ii] rationalises agency status on the basis of intra-ministry governance.      ǡ       
ǯ   ǡ
describing how agency reporting lines should ȋȌǡǲbutǳ 
ǯǤ 
6.5.5 Summary 
This section explored 
ǯdifferentiation of size, policy sector, and partial quango affinity.  It 
then considered ongoing horizontal associations with the wider agency population in their 
shared trend towards de-autonomisation.  Finallyǡ Ǯǯ
sound corporate governance. 
6.6 Discussion 
6.6.1 Theoretical reprise 
Inspired by the hermeneutic circle, fieldwork adopting an ethnographic sensibility looks to the 
part-whole relationships by which situated meanings are inferred (see Chapter 3).  As noted 
previously, tǲintegrate sequences of ethnographic observations by relating them to 
a cultural whole: a global reference which encompasses these observations and within which ǳ (Baszanger & Dodier, 2004, p.13).  Practically: 
ǲ[T]ǤǤǤǮǯǡ
work ..., within  Ǯǡ
organizational values, and patterns of wo ǯ.ǳ (Watson, 2011, p.206, 
citing Bryman and Bell)  
Operationalising this model, the foregoing sections explored the situated accomplishment of 
agency status Ȃ ǮǯȂ Ǯǯ
relational and narrative organisational identity (Ashforth & Mael, 1996; Humphreys & Brown, 
2002).  The discussion below summarises and compares this data. 




6.6.2 Synchronic comparison 
The three empirical presentations considered identity differentiation and integration across 
NOMS, HMCTS and OPG, attending particularly to Ǯǯ  Ǯǯ comparisons with 
compatriot agencies and the corporate ǡ   ǲ ǳ (Ashforth & Mael, 
1996, p.24) for each agency.  Table 6.1 summarises the analysis.  
Table 6.1: Comparing agency identities 
  Agency status 
Horizontal and vertical 
differentiation 









Extensive: risk, pride  
 
 
Against (justice) agencies 
Extensive: politics, risk, pride, ǡǮǯ 
With MoJ 
Limited: joint ministerial 
briefings, (aspiration for) one 
culture 













Against (justice) agencies 
Extensive: judicial partnership 
With MoJ 
Extensive: corporate 




With (justice) agencies 











Against (justice) agencies 







With (justice) agencies  
Limited: common loss of agency Ǯǯ 
 
As Table 6.1 indicates, compared against the corporate MoJ and its fellow justice agencies, ǯǤitical salience, risk, 
service pride, internal contestability and lost Ǯǯindependence effected considerable 
individualisation, while departmental integration registered only partially in tales of joint 




ministerial briefings and the aspiration for corporate culture.  Therein, although agencification 
continued to be referenced in terms of operational de-politicisation, this represented more an 
unfulfilled promise than pertinent description of practice.  Aǯ  
was thus minimised as simply protecting HR independence for the distinct Ǯworldǯ of offender 
management, as well as enabling Accounting Officer corporate governance.  
Like NOMS, OPG registered strong horizontal and vertical identity differentiation, this time 
through comparisons of size and policy remit, and claims of corporate imposition.  Moreover, 
integration was limited, confined to inter-agency gathering against a wider trend towards de-
autonomisation and Ǯthe body corporateǯǤ   ǡ  
ǯ  with NOMS and 
HMCTS, and its various quango affinities, agencification simply meant the mandating of a series 
of useful corporate governance arrangements. 
Against these minimalist interpretations, HMCTS offered the most substantive rationale for 
ongoing agencification, although, ironically, some of its officials also expressed outright apathy 
over the classification.  Extensive differentiation was again effected, now through claims to 
operational focus and constitutional specialism.  Unlike both NOMS and OPG, however, vertical 
identity integration was also profound, storied in the ǯ shared corporate responsibility 
for MoJǯ austerity measures.  Therein, while Ǯǯ was still framed as a mode of separation, 
this was for constitutional rather than managerial reasons.  The organisational boundary and 
framework document protect the executive-judicial partnership from political domination and, 
equally, ǯ-only matters.  However, this agency 
infrastructure was explicitly not used for NPM-style department-agency contracting. 
6.6.3 Diachronic comparison 
Next Steps discourse makes for several predictions of contemporary agency identity.  Therefore, 
as well as gauging interpretive evolution by attending to the various affirmative arguments for 
ongoing agencification, evolution can also be traced in benchmarking contemporary identity 
performances against those original Next Steps expectations.  This proceeds below. 





If the elements of meaning that originally comprised the Next Steps idea Ȃ managerialism, 
decentralisation and empowerment (see Chapter 4) Ȃ were to reproduce in contemporary 
organisational identity, the expectation would be of agency differentiation against: (i) the 
governing centre Ȃ that is, the MoJ as sponsoring department; (ii) ministers Ȃ who contractually 
authorise chief executives; (iii) policymaking Ȃ the role of the centre; and (iv) unitary 
bureaucracy Ȃ the antithesis of delegated management.  Regarding (i), as Next Steps predicts, all 
three modern justice agencies narrate extensive differentiation against their MoJ centre, 
invoking risk and service pride (NOMS), operational intimacy (HMCTS), or size, policy sector 
and corporate imposition (OPG).  By contrast, only HMCTS told of strong department 
reassociation in its shared ownership of the MoJ austerity challege, while NOMS narrated 
limited departmental integration in (the aspiration for) corporate employment, and OPG 
registered none (see Table 6.1, above).  In terms of (ii), again affirmatively, no OPG official 
lamented political interference in day-to-day operations, and HMCTS actually claimed increased 
delivery independence since Next Steps.  In the high-profile and risky NOMS, however, aside Ǯǯǡthe promise of de-politicisation was broadly viewed with profound 
scepticicism.  As for (iii), both NOMS and HMCTS asserted their frontline rather than policy 
focus, particularly by claiming agency-gifted delivery realism absent in MoJ.  OPG, by contrast, 
lamented its recent loss of policy remit, given the potential for marginalisation within the 
otherwise-focused MoJ.  Finally, regarding (iv), aside from HR independence, no claim was made 
for agencificationǯ ensuring of autonomous and empowered delivery Ȃ the rhetorical, 
enythmematic core of the Next Steps Report. 
Identity integration 
Turning to the integrative parameter: again, if Next Steps continuity were to be registered here, 
contemporary identity profiles should include association with: (v) the decentralised governing 
periphery Ȃ opposed by the political centre; and (vi) businesses and business methods Ȃ the 
inspiration for the parent-subsidiary, principal-agent model (James, 2001a).  Regarding (v), 




NOMS framed such decentralisation as a historic aspiration and unfulfilled promise, ascribing 
the loss of Ǯtrue agencyǯ  to inevitable political salience.  HMCTS similarly 
narrated homogenisation and new intra-Ministry collegiality, again repositioning the agency to 
the governing centre.  OPG also lamented reduced agency Ǯpurityǯǡ  ǯ   ǯ-length agency norm and narrating a wider, cross-governmental repositioning of 
agencies as within the departmental Ǯbody corporateǯ.  Finally, in terms of (vi), sound business 
management was an aspiration in all three agencies, as it was in the main MoJ Operating Model 
Blueprint and core Justice Policy Group (see Chapters 5 and 8).  Nonetheless, in terms of specific 
agency-business affinities, rather than describing autonomy and innovation, private sector 
references largely pertained to corporate governance: specifically, delegated accountability 
(NOMS), the agency board structure (HMCTS), and the mandating of published accounts and 
internal and external audit (OPG).  Again, therefore, no reference is made to agencification 
allowing a public service solution based on business autonomisation logic. 
Table 6.2 summarises this diachronic comparison of organisational identity. 

















NOMS  Yes No Yes No No Partial 
HMCTS Partial Yes Yes No No Partial 
OPG Yes Yes No No No Partial 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
Having explored macro- and meso-level discourse in Chapters 4 and 5, noting diachronic 
discontinuity with Next Steps but broad intra-episode consistency, this chapter has completed 
the initial trio of analyses by examining micro discourse.  Performing the hermeneutic operation 
of part-whole interpretation by attending to relational organisational identity, its narratives 




     Ǯ ǯ   ǡ      Ǯǯ  that wider cultural whole.  Considerable 
multivocality   Ǥ  ǡ Ǯǯ ns HR independence, constitutional 
correctness and corporate governance.  More critically, however, a denied promise of de-
politicisation and outright apathy were also registered.  Together, this synchronic polyphony 
departs from the inter-episode, macro-meso consistency previously noted between the Public 
Bodies Reforms and contemporaneous MoJ Blueprint restructuring.  This evidences the 
constructivist presupposition of the multi-sited accomplishment of social and policy 
phenomena. 
In terms of diachronic evolution, some evidence of continuing departmentalisation was noted,   ǯ    -ǡ ǯ partial apathy as to the 
benefit of agency status compared to directorate workingǡ  
ǯ ion of its 
independence to NDPB affinities rather than formal agency status.  Nonetheless, the picture is         Ǥ  	 ǡ ǯ   
unfulfilled agency promise of de-politicisation retains Next Steps meaning, if only as an 
aspiration; its HR independence and caseload autonomy recall NPM-style decentralisation, if Ǣ ǯ    Ǯǯ as constitutional protection still signals 
organisational separation, if no longer on managerial grounds; its considerable day-to-day 
operational independence is similarly neo-Next Steps; and, finally,    
ǯ
emphasis on corporate accountability mechanisms also follow something of the managerialist 
public service bargain, if without the concomitant autonomy and empowerment promised by 
Thatcher and the Efficiency Unit.  This latter suggestion of an ǡǮasymmetricǯ departure 
from the accountable management philosophy that originally underpinned agencification is 
explored further in Chapter 9. 




Chapter 7 Ȃ Post-Agencification Policymaking 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In a progressive descent through the macro, meso and micro platforms, the three previous 
chapters explored agency meaning in ideational, sectoral and organisational discourse.  Their 
arguments on diachronic evolution and synchronic variegation are extended in Chapter 9 to 
advance an overall assessment of continuity and change in agencification policy and practice.  
For now, however, while retaining the arrived-at focus on the individual justice agencies, 
attention turns to policymaking.  As Chapter 2 demonstrated, Next Steps is widely credited with 
institutionally separating policy and delivery (Gains, 1999; James, et al., 2011).  Nonetheless, the 
post-agencification policy process received almost no close attention during the 1990s, and nor ǡǯǲfunctional reaggregationǳ (Elston, 
2013).  The remaining two empirical presentations begin to address this lacuna, first by tracing 
changing agency responsibilities since 1993, and then, in Chapter 8, by probing collaboration in 
the delivery of the Coalition Governmentǯ justice policy programme. 
Departing in methodology from existing international and quantitative literature on agency 
autonomy (Bach, 2010; Niklasson & Pierre, 2012; Verhoest, et al., 2010), both chapters interpret 
policy processes as situated, intersubjective negotiations.  Rather than manifesting as separable 
and  ǡ Ǯǯ  Ǯ ǯ  understood as contextually-embedded 
social accomplishments (Colebatch, 2002, 2006).  Similarly, being unavailable for benchmarking 
against fixed, population-wide measures, policy autonomy or interdependence are instead emic 
evaluations made through locally-defined frameworks and discursive institutions.  What follows 
thus continues in the ethnographic sensibility by employing Chapter 6ǯ  y 
profiles to render meaningful the situated policymaking narratives offered in NOMS, HMCTS 
and OPG.   




Anticipating the subsequent storying of Coalition policy development, this chapter describes the 
historic evolution of the department-agency task division in offender management, court and 
tribunal, and public guardianship policymaking, and then considers the impact of the recent MoJ 
Blueprint redesign.  On the latter, Chapter 5 already noted that this austerity-led reorganisation 
consolidated policymaking into a single Justice Policy Group (JPG) which would provide policy 
services to the whole MoJ family through multidisciplinary project teams (Document_28; _33).  
Given the disparate NOMS, HMCTS and OPG histories and identities registered previously, this 
remodelling of the policy process engendered varying degrees of agency restructuring and 
differing evaluations of its opportunities and costs.  Nonetheless, alongside this synchronic 
variation, a shared narrative also emerges on the historic causes of policy failure.  Termed here  Ǯǯǡdecries old policymaking for its lack of operational 
grounding.  Invoking tradition, symbolism and communality, it also represents an instance of 
intersubjective ǲ ǳ (Gabriel, 1991, 2000).  Accordingly, the first section, 
below, expands on the concept and character of folklore, before the following three examine 
each agency successively.  Recounting changing post-agencification policy remits, narrative 
evaluations of this restructuring, and interpretations of the 2010 centralisation, these 
substantive sections enable a closing discussion of evaluative diversity but folkloric consistency 
across MoJ, and prompt the team narratives to be explored in Chapter 8. 
7.2 Organisational folklore 
A consensual definition of the character and practice of folklore has proven elusive to scholars 
of literature and anthropology, although frequent reference is made to its oral transmission, 
antiquity, tradition, collective ownership and authorial anonymity (Ben-Amos, 1971, p.4; Utley, 
1961, p.193)Ǥǡǡǣǲ
categories of creative ideas which have become traditional among the people of any society and        ǳ (taken from Utley, 1961, p.195).  In a 
similar vein, Ben-Amos (1971, p.5) maintains that social context and folklore are inseparable, 




   ǲ       ǳǤ   ǡ ǡǲǳǡǲǯǳǲ ǡ ǡ      ǳ (Ben-Amos, 1971, p.6, citing Burne, 
Sokolov and Boggs). 
Reflecting this emphasis on communality, folkloric analysis has been applied within the wider 
turn to narratology in organisation studies (Gabriel, 1991, 2000; Gabriel & Griffiths, 2004).  ǡǲǳȋǲǳȌǣ  
ǲ[A] range of cultural practices and texts that fulfil three conditions: first, they are richly 
symbolic; secondly, they are not manufactured or legislated, but emerge spontaneously 
through informal interactions among participants; and, thirdly, they are not one-offs, but 
become part of traditions, emulated, reproduced, and re-enacted.ǳ(Gabriel, 2000, p.24) 
The inductive research design, ethnographic sensibility and conversational interviews made 
conditions conducive for relaying such organisational folklore.  Across NOMS and HMCTS, a 
popular tale concerned the historic problem of isolated, operationally-detached policymaking.  
As demonstrated below, this re-enactment and concentration of communal knowledge, being 
symbolic, spontaneous, and based in tradition, endows a notably folkloric character to what 
emerges as a pan-Ǯ ǯǤ 
7.3 Offender management policymaking 
7.3.1 Offender management policymaking, 1993-2010 
The original HM Prison Service (HMPS), which was latterly sponsored by and then integrated 
with the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), was originally rendered unusual by its  ǯ       ǲ  ǳ (HMPS, 
1993, p.6).  The then permanent secretary explained this deviation from the Next Steps norm by 
a particular need for delivery realism:  
ǲȏȐǤǤǤ
we would have seen policy gradually becoming more unrealistic and less soundly based 




            Ǥǳ (Whitmore, 
1994, pp.10-11) ǡǡǲ-sufficiǳ
agency (Interview_026).  Indeed, for the emerging penal contestability agenda, it both ran the 
tendering process and competed for contracts alongside private companies.  Latterly, a review 
considered instilling a formal purchaser-provider split that w  ǯ 
function, although, again, fears over operational detachment precluded centralisation (Home 
Office, 1999).  Nonetheless, by 2003, HMPS did lose its contract-management (see HMPS, 2004, 
p.14).  Thereafter, the first Carter Review proposed increased contestability through 
establishing NOMS, and, across 2004-2005, further responsibilities were centralised, putting ǲǳ(Carter, 2003, p.36). 
In 2008, following the second Carter Review (Lord Carter, 2007), formerly centralised policy 
functions were reunited in an ǲ ǳ    restructured NOMS#2 
commissioner-provider (HMPS, 2008, p.30).  Simultaneously, in the inchoate MoJ, a Criminal 
 ? ?ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ     ǡ        ǲ ǡ
practiceǳ  ǡǡǡ ǲ   ǳǡ     (MoJ, 2008, 
pp.9-10).  This continued to the 2010 Blueprint redesign, when Criminal Justice Group merged 
into the pan-MoJ Justice Policy Group (JPG).  Unlike HMCTS and OPG (discussed below), NOMS 
suffered no significant further centralisation at this point, only losing international prisoner 
transfer policy.  As one official reflected, this was because the policy-delivery balance ǲhad 
already been tested in earlier iterations ȏȐǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
Figure 7.1, overleaf, visualises this post-1993 chronology.  Black ribbons indicate agency-
devolved policymaking. 





Figure 7.1: Offender management policymaking, 1993-2012 
 




7.3.2 Pre-2010 restructuring 
NOMS officials drew on Chapter 6ǯidentity resources Ȃ especially, political salience, risk, pride 
and contestability Ȃ to account for this restructuring of policy responsibilities across 1993-
2010, narrating both a growing strategic-operational division and a clash of expertise and 
competition.  Their evaluations are explored below. 
Strategy versus policy 
The innovation-operations disconnect was first noted  ǯ claimed risk-management 
focus (see Box 6.3, Chapter 6).  It resurfaces in Box 7.1ǯ of the gradual distancing of 
high-level strategy from core penal policymaking. 
Box 7.1: Strategy and policy 
 
I: ǯǲǤǯ
ǯǤǳ  Prior to 1993, HMPS ǲalways had within it some policy groups.ǳ
With agencification, ǲhere was an initial intent on removing these....  TǯǤ
There is a story that the incoming director general ... did not accept that you could run an 
ǤǤǤǤǯǤ
How true that is, I have no idea....ǳ   
So HMPS ǲǤǯ ? ?
ǯ ? ?ǡ....  That then 
went away ... ǯ ǤǤǤ ? ?ǳ that a Home Office team ǲinevitably 
had to think about policy.  Yet the Prison Service still had its own policy function. ... [T]he 
bit at the centre was doing not quite policy, but more strategic thinking about the place of 
the organisation in the system, whereas the Prison Service was doing its hardcore policy 
on categorisation, prisoner voting rights ... Ȃ policy about running prisons.ǳ  NOMS#1 also 
had some probation policy too. 
 Hence, ǲyou had this slightly uneasy split ... between some organisational strategy stuff 
going on about ... what the future should look like, while the Prison Service was left doing 
its operational policy.  That felt unsatisfactory ǤǤǤǯ
[clear]....  The current situation is one in which ... policy people in the MoJ [are] doing the 
high-levelǡǮǫǯ....  Aǯ....  That 
first batch of work Ȃ the ... blue-sky stuff Ȃ is stuff that we would have done normally in 
previous incarnations...Ǥǳ (Interview_026) 
 
With a classically narrative beginning-middle-end structure, Box 7.1ǯ eloquent recounting of 
role reassignment across 1993- ? ? ? ?ǯemic salience in NOMS.  Overall, 




a trend towards increased departmental strategising is identified, but alongside continuing    ǲǳ  Ǥ    ǡ 
narrative thrice distinguishes between high-level, futuristic innovation ȋǲe place ... in the 
systemǳǢǲthe future ǳǢǲblue-sky thinkingǳȌǡ, day-to-day 
matters ȋǲhardcore policy ... about running prisonsǳǢ ǲoperational ǳȌǤ  The terms of this 
contrast are metaphorical, depicting strategy as macro- ȋǲǳǡ ǲǳǡ ǲ-ǳȌǡ ȋǲǳȌǡ ȋǲǳȌǡ ǯ ǲǳ    ȋǲǳǡ ǲ ǳȌ   ȋǲǡ
prisoner voting ǳȌ.  Moreover, it is the modification of this ordinary prison business that ǲǳǡǯǲǡǳǤ 
ǯȂ but not strategy Ȃ responsibilities are exercised though its Operational 
Policy Group (see NOMS, 2011b).  This cabinet of senior officials convenes monthly to review 
and issue formal instructions to headquarters and frontline staff on matters as diverse as cell      Ǥ  ǲ ǳ  ǲ ǳǡ 
throughout NOMS headquarters, are responsible for instruction maintenance, business case 
development, internal consultation, and briefing the Operational Policy Group (Interview_021).       ǡ  
  ǲ   ǤǤǤ   
stands up, what that would mean in practice for an establishment.  ...  ǮWould the policy be ǫ          ǯ   ǫǯǳ
(Interview_021).  The instruction is then issued or returned for modifications.   
In terms of this internal, operational policymaking, most instructions adjust business-as-usual 
practices following legal challenges or iǤ  ǡ ǲǳǡ  ǲǳǡ as Box 7.2 explains. 




Box 7.2: From strategy to policy 
 
[T: So a new instruction could follow legislation?] 
 
I: ǲǡ  occasionally something starts off in Justice Policy Group as a strategy 
piece of work, if you like, but at the end of the day it has to be deliveredǡǯ
would transfer over to us.  NOMS is about delivering, so we would have to find a policy 
team within NOMS to take on that work.  The National Operational Services drives most Ȃ 
not all Ȃ of the policy within NOMSǤǳ (Interview_021) 
 
Box 7.2 again ǯǲǳǯǲǳǤ-
external polarisation is enforced by the contention that, ǲut at the end of the day it has to be ǳǤǡȋǲǳȌȋǲǳȌǯǯǡǲǳǤ 
Turning to externally-developed strategy, Box 7.3 offers the first exposition of the pan-MoJ 
bureaulore, narrating historic policy failure as a product of policymaker isolation. 
Box 7.3ǣȋȌǣǲǳ 
 
[T: Prior to 2010, how would MoJ handover policy?] 
 
I: ǲIn some cases Ȃ in the worst examples Ȃ you would have people in [Criminal Justice 
Group] ... work on a whole new strategy for, ǯǡ  national prisoners or 
some bit of the system, and then present it to NOMS.  And I can remember some examples 
  ǣ Ǯ  well thought through Ȃ ǯgreat bit of 
thinking Ȃ ǯ-ǯ Ǯǯ.  It could 
ǯ ǤǤǤ ... ǡǯ make those sorts of changes.  
So the worst examples of that were people working in isolation Ȃ doing good work, you 
know, hiring external, bright strategy consultants to think through some new way of 
running the system.  I remember someone did a reconfiguration of some bit of the system, 




thinkingǳǢ ǲbright  ǳȌ  ǯ on-the-ground, prison-landing realism 




ȋǲoperationallyǡǯǤǤǤǳ), Box 7.3 perpetuates former distinctions between departmental ǡǲǳǡǯhardcore, tangible delivery.  Again, 
therefore, penal policymaking proper is interpreted as business-led work beneath these high-
level strategy interventions (see Box 7.1, above).  Regarding the pan-MoJ bureaulore, its core 
contention is that, historically, the distance between strategy and operations caused repeat 
policy failure.  In Box 7.3ǡǲǳǡ
narrative Ȃ ǲfinally ǤǤǤǳǤ	
indication of collective knowledge ȋǲ ǯ ǡ   ǳǢ ǲwhatever the ǮǯǳȌ and traditional recurrence ȋǲǳǢǲǳȌ.  These stylistic 
traits reappear below. 




I: ǲD  ǡǯiew of the pros 
and cons [of centralised strategy].  ... I think one of the pros is ... we have to spend, 
sometimes, a little less time with ministers ... because we can concentrate on getting the 
business right....  The con is, of course, we still have to do that, because what we cannot do 
is to allow [policymakers] over there, who might be flitting between ... different issues, to ... 
be influencing and decision-making on issues that we know inside out.  ... [I]ǯ 
difficult i ǯ   remote from the business to have a really good 
ǯǡǯǡ
ǯ Ǥ ǤǤǤ  [W] ǯ    ǯ  [involved], then the 
policies that come out can be not right. 
ǲ ǯ            Ǥ  
everything that ministers want to happen can happen or is the right thing to happen.  If 
ǯǡǤǤǤ, you wanna say Ǯyesǯ to your 
minister ...  ǯ  ǯ ǡ   Ǥ     ǯ  
weight of evidence, or the ǡ   Ǯǯ,  ǯ   .  And 
ǯǯ bit of the business to say to ministers: 
Ǯǡ ... ǯǡǯ ? ?
  ǯǤ   ǯ         
that operational weight of evidence and clout Ǥǡǯ
policymakers alone to have those conversations ... because they do need the operational 
          ǣ Ǯ  daftǢ ǯ   ǯǤ 
(Interview_026) 




Box 7.4 contrasts the advantages and disadvantages of centralised strategic and ministerial 
responsibilities.  Theoretically, in neo-Next Steps logic, this should enable NOMS to ǲ 
on getting the business rightǳǤǡǡǡ     ǲǳ    ǲ ǳ means that agency 
disengagement is unrealistic.  This argumentation again rests upon opposing knowledge-rich 
agenc ǡ    ǲ ǤǤǤ  ǳǡ   ǡ   ǲ
from the businessǳ ǡ  ǡ  ǲ     ǳ.  This 
operationally-gifted expertise Ȃ familiar from the ǯ claim to delivery-realism noted in 
Chapter 6 (Box 6.2) Ȃ is explored further below.   
Contestability meets expertise 
Previously, Box 7.4 argued ǡ  ǲ  ǳǡ   ǡǲ ǮǯǳǤ 
attachment of expertise to the experience ǲǳhe 
post-2004 contestability-prompted reorganisations.  For example, it is on this basis that Box 7.5 
decries the associated loss of HMPS functions to the information-poor NOMS#1 commissioner. 
Box 7.5ǣǲǳ 
 
[T: NOMS#1 centralised policymaking, ensuring HMPS was on  Ǯ  ǯ 
with competitors.] 
 
I: ǲThe danger with that was that you ended up having, to some degree, to duplicate, 
because people were setting up policy  ǯ ǡ ǡ  operational 
knowledge, and ... we [in HMPS] needed people then who had to turn the policy into 
something that would actually work operationallyǤǯpotential cost....   
ǲOne of the areas that went [to NOMS#1] Ȃ in my view, a mistake Ȃ was population 
Ǥǳ  This ǲǳ  ǲlong-term thinkingǳ and ǲoperational, tactical 
management  ǯ    day-to-day basis with numbers coming 
through the courts.  The people who did it were primarily operational people ... seconded 
across to the main bit of NOMS.  The rationale ǣǮǯȏȐ
ǯǯǤdisadvantage ǯdislocating it from those 
who understand the business and know how to do the business.  That was the level-
playing-field argument!ǳ (Interview_014)  
 




  ǲǳǡ ǲ ǳ  ǲǳ     ǲ-
playing-ǳǡBox 7.5 ǯ ? ? ? ?
its informational advantage over the new NOMS#1 commissioner.  Dualisms are thereby 
constructed between: HMPS Ȃ ǲǳǡǡts need 
for workable policy; and NOMS#1 Ȃ its policy people, its lack of understanding, and its 
potentially unworkable policies.  This information asymmetry is evidenced ǡ ǡ ǯǲǳǯ ǲturn the policy into something that would 
actually workǳǤ  Intertextually, the reference to duplication reinforces the negative evaluation,        ǯ current, post-austerity Blueprint.  
Secondly, the example of population management Ȃ described by another official as the  ǲȏȐ everything in the prison systemǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ Ȃ illustrates more 
specifically the illogicality of a purchaser-provider design.  In particular, reference to the 
uncontrollability of couǲ-ǳǲ-to-ǳǡǲǳǡ-reliant activity, for which officials ǲunderstand the business and know ǳ.  On this basis, the removal of 
population management to the information-poor NOMS#1 is rendered nonsensical, despite its 
conformity with purchaser-provider logic. 
In 2008, NOMS#1 and HMPS merged into NOMS#2 Ȃ a combined commissioner-provider.  Box 
7.6 once more accounts for this change by the informational advantage of operational 
experience. 
Box 7.6: Business intimacy 
 
I: NOMS#1 was ǲan attempt of a much cleaner purchaser-provider splitǳ and was 
ineffective. ǲȏȐǯǮǯ with the 
services it was trying to commission.  The purchaser-provider split had created too much 
space from the theoretical commissioning of offender services to the actual reality of 
ǯ.  So the new ... more 
operationally-focused NOMS[#2] board just allowed a bit more of that business intimacy.ǳ  
(Interview_024) 
 




 ǲ intimacyǳ  ǲtheoretical ǳ, and thereby denouncing the 
formerly separate penal ǯ -realism ȋǲactual realityǳȌǡBox 7.6 
again differentiates HMPS and NOMS#1 by their differing experiential and intellectual 
knowledge.  This theory-practice, strategy- ǲǳ   ? ?ǯ ǲǳǡdecentralised commissioning now enabling ǲǳivery. 
7.3.3 Post-Blueprint policymaking 
Having explored historic accounts of offender management policymaking, this subsection turns 
to post-2010 developments.  In particular, following the themes traced above, these accounts 
anticipate a repositioning of knowledge exchange within MoJ-led strategy development, 
correcting the historic bureaulore of failure by isolation.  For example, drawing again on ideas of 
opposing intellectualism and operational expertise, Box 7.7 explains new MoJ-NOMS 
engagement by contrasting this with the traditional, dysfunctional relations. 
Box 7.7: Bureaulore (ii): the new ideal  
 
I: The Blueprint ǲdrives at a single policy team made up of policy brains and operational 
people ..., and you flex the levels of people, policy brains being much more necessary at the 
ministerial stage....  What policy people ǯ[delivery]; and 
implementation people ǯculty of policy.  And so, unless you create 
the single team with the learning on both sides, you just go through the same thing every 
time.  What we end up doing is we create policy, and then we have a formal handover 
point to the agency to implement it; wǯǯǢwe have this 
standoff; and ... we just fight about itǤǳ 
 
[T: So how should it work now?] 
 
I: ǲǯ ... yǯpolicy brain; ǯǤ ǤǤǤ
with a team....  I understand what ministers want, I start to work with you about things 
that will be sensible in implementation world....  Then ǯȂ you 
and I Ȃ agree ǯǤ We get our chief exec to sign up to it along the way.  
And then, at some point, it falls into an implementation phase....  Your team reduces ... my 
team increases....  You see all the challenges I face in implementing it.  You go back round, 
pick up your next policy....  ǯ... implementation this time 
round, so ǯ         ǯ 
ǤǤǤǤ  ǡǡǯ my world and say: Ǯ ǤǤǤ




ǯon. ... ǯ ... he now understands.  I 
feel I understand the challenges he faces ǯǤǡ
see...?  You get better policy.  At least, you get policy that can be implemented! 
 
[T: Compared with before?] 
 
I: ǲǯǤYou work all the policy up.  You might come and talk to the 
director general....  S/he might say: ǮǯǯǤ  You go: Ǯǡǯ.  You go 
back to your ministers; you write the policy.  You then ... goǣǮǡǤǤǤ here 
it is Ȃ ǯǤ: Ǯǯǡǡǡǯ.  We 
then fight for about three to six months....  In the end, it gets so watȏȐǯ
not recognisable....  Ministers have got this rather inflated expectation....  And then we go 
round that circle again for the next one.  Slightly simplistic, Thomas, but you get the point 
ǯǤǳ (Interview_015) 
 
Box 7.7 depicts the 2010 Blueprint as modifying interdisciplinary relations between 
policymaking MoJ and operational NOMS, with the traditional, entrenched mode of policy failure Ȃ the bureaulore Ȃ prompting the redesign.  Thus, with their different professional knowledges, ǲǳǲǳȋǲǳȌ
collaborate Ȃ ǲǤǤǤǳ.  Again, the disciplinary division is   ȋǲ ǳȌ  - ȋǲ  ǳȌǡ   rrence of the offender management ǲǳ  from Chapter 6 
reinforcing the distance of policymaking from prison landings.  This initial folkloric frequency ȋǲǳǢǲǤǤǤǳǢǲ ǤǤǤǳȌ
fuller bureaulore presentation in paragraph three (see below).  Thus, with the new Blueprint in 
2010, the aspiration is for team singularity (ǲǯ work together and we Ȃ you and I Ȃ agreeǳȌ
and new learning across this professional divide (ǲYou see all the challenges I ǤǤǤǳ), thereby 
preventing against traditional ǲcrazy suggestionsǳǡǲǤǤǤcan be 
implementedǳǤ 
Reminiscent of the NOMS-MoJ bureau-politics identified in Chapter 6, and confirming the ǯ -to-integration aspiration, Box 7.7ǯ  paragraph offers a 
particularly strong articulation of the bureaulore, narrating traditional MoJ isolation through 




uncooperative task assignment (ǲYou     ǳǢ ǲyou  ǳǢ ǲyou ǳȌǡ
separate ownership ȋǲǮ ǯ ǯǳǢ ǲyour ǳȌ, and vocal polarisation and 
miscommunication (ǲǮǯǯ ǤǤǤ Ǯǡǯǳ).  This isolation is confirmed in the 
story of a poorly-received policy presentation to NOMS Ȃ ǲǮǯǤǤǤǮǯǯǳ.  
Again, stylistically, the narrative is folkloric, evoking tradition through generalisation (ǲǮǡǡǯǳǢǲ ǳȌ and claims of cyclicity ȋǲcircle again for the next 
oneǳȌ.  Moreover, the casting of the interviewee and interviewer in the roles of operational    ȋǲǮ   ǯǳȌ makes for further generalisation and 
folkloric symbolism. 
Thus conceived, to NOMS, the 2010 Blueprint redesign signals a new era of effective knowledge 
exchange, as Box 7.8 confirms. 
Box 7.8: Multidisciplinary teams 
 
I: ǲȏȐecause the new MoJ Operating Model is designed in a much leaner and more 
integrated way, effectively we just create a multidisciplinary team to do policy now.  And 
so, in the same team, you would have the policy person; you would have the delivery 
ǡǯǤǳ  Itǯ ǯ
ǲjob to bring the operational expertise ... but in the same room you would have the finance 
person, the analyst, you may have the procurement person....  So, instead of having this big 
divide between the centre of the department and the agency, we just effectively create a 
multidisciplinary team and ... what happens is the centre of gravity just shifts from being 
policy-led to being operationally-Ǥǳ(Interview_027) 
 
ǲǳǲ    ǳǡ Box 7.8 confirms Box 7.7ǯ    
towards more collaborative strategising through team singularity.  Hence, as one among the 
various disciplinary contributors for policymakingǡ ǯ ǲǳ   ǲ  
expertiseǳǡǲǳǡ ǲǳǡǲǳǡand ǲǳ each bring their own professional contributions.  Somewhat countering the traditional, 
generalist view of the Whitehall civil servant (see Campbell & Wilson, 1995; Page, 2010), this 




new policy-process disciplinarity was the basis of many accounts of justice policymaking, and is 
explored again below and subsequently in Chapter 8. 
Despite this optimism that the new knowledge exchange enabled by the 2010 Blueprint will 
finally consign to history the bureaulore of failure by isolation, the political salience of offender 
management Ȃ a key identity differential from Chapter 6 Ȃ remains a conditioning force on the 
exercise of operational expertise, as Box 7.9 illustrates. 
Box 7.9: Politics: still inescapable 
 
I: ǲPolicy into operation Ȃ in any world Ȃ there is to some degree a grey area, and in this 
world, is a decision about what incentive levels you offer to prisoners an operational issue 
or a policy issue that ministers would want to be bothered about?  The reality is that, 
    ǯ primarily operational, because of the public-interest 
argument in it, you can have significant interest from ministers.  So, for example, when we 
wanted to increase the basic rate of pay for unemployed prisoners from £2.50 a week, 
ǯ ? ? ? ?ǡthat became a political issue, even though, actually, I 
would argue very strongly that should be something that was in ȏǯȐ remit.... £2.50 a 
week, you would think, would not merit      ǡ  ǯ
ǡ  ǯ    media-interested bit of the worldǡ    Ǥǳ
(Interview_014)  
 
Thrice r   ǲǳ ǡ Box 7.9 describes how, in the ǲ-ǳ 
NOMS, ǲǳ ministerial (and departmental) interest can extend to any aspect of 
prison regimesǡ       ǲ ǳǤ  
comes from the attempt to make a long-overdue increase in prisoner unemployment benefit.  
Reflecting the macro-strategy, micro-operations metaphorical division noted above (Box 7.1),   ǡ       ǡ ǡ ǲ  ǳ, the triviality of this ǲǳǡand ǲǳǤ
such, even while the Blueprint ostensibly recognises agency expertise and its proper 
contribution to multidisciplinary policymaking, the inescapability of political salience can still 
undermine agency autonomy. 





Drawing particularly on the identity differentials of politics, delivery-realism, and contestability, 
this section explored the restructuring of offender management policymaking since 1993, and 
evaluations of the recent Blueprint alterations.  While making for distinct tales of post-Next 
Steps reform in terms of policy-strategy dislocation and a clash of expertise and contestability, 
the two main presentations of the bureaulore (Box 7.3, Box 7.7) have notable continuity with 
HM Courts and Tribunals Service narratives, as the next section illustrates. 
7.4 Court and tribunal policymaking 
7.4.1 Court and tribunal policymaking, 1995-2010     ǡ ǯ        ǯ
Department and the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA).  Unlike HMPS, the 1995 Court 
Service agency had a pure delivery remit.  A decade later, the inchoate DCA devolved policy 
responsibilities to the replacement HM Courts Service (HMCS), as well as the new Tribunals 
Service and outgoing Public Guardianship Office (discussed later), the aim being to ensure that ǲ[policy] proposals are evidence-ǳ(Civil Service Capability Reviews, 2006, 
p.6).  As the then permanent secretary explained, for courts: 
ǲThe main element ... was avoiding the duplication of having a separate criminal justice 
unit within the Department ... so that [instead] both the policy and operational advice 
comes from the same source....ǳ (Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2006, question 1) 
Retrospectively, the irony of this restructuring is that, in 2010, recentralisation was similarly ǯcation. 
Despite the purposefulness of the ǯ mid-2000s devolution, only vague references to 
agency-led policymaking appear in the HMCS (2005) and Tribunals Service (2006) framework 
documents.  Indeed, in Chapter 2ǯ   ǡ   e was 
classed in the lowest of the three categories of formal agency policy remits.  F ǯ
creation and the 2008 judicial-ǡǲǳ




which actually signalled diminishing agency responsibility.   ǣ ǲ        ǳǡ    ǲ  ǳ(HMCS, 2008, p.21)Ǥ ǲǳ
matters, this revoked the original DCA devolution, with policy responsibilities transferring to 
Access to Justice Group in MoJ (Interview_048).  The 2010 Blueprint recentralisation therefore 
involved updating job descriptions rather than further substantial restructure (Interview_039).   
After 2006, the Tribunals Service experienced no similar change of governance to the HMCS 
partnership.  It thus retained its devolved responsibilities until the Justice Policy Group (JPG) 
consolidation, whereupon administrative justice policy was centralised (Interview_041).  
Overall, this makes for a staged courts-tribunals restructure, with the newly merged HMCTS in 
2011 having no formal policy remit, as its framework document confirms: 
ǲȏȐǤ
Ministry will consult the chief executive on the operational impact of policy changes....  
The chief executive and board wiǤǳ(Lord 
Chancellor & Secretary of State for Justice, 2011, p.12) 
Figure 7.2, overleaf, graphs this centralised-devolved-(re)centralised trajectory.  The following        ǯ     intimacy, 
constitutional uniqueness and corporate responsibility (see Chapter 6).  
 





Figure 7.2: Court, tribunal and public guardianship policymaking, 1994-2012 
 
 




7.4.2 Pre-2010 restructuring 
Operational focus meets corporate responsibility 
In Chapter 6, vertical MoJ-HMCTS differentiation and integration were simultaneously noted in  ǯ     but shared ownership of, and corporate 
responsibility for, the wider austerity challenge.  Overall, this made for closer department-
agency identification than in either NOMS or OPG, which also readily disassociated with MoJ but 
without similar counterpoise.  Box 7.10ǯ
HMCTS, describing two organisational tensions: the requirement for agency-informed answers 
to policy questions (differentiation); and the dangers of agency-led policy development for 
intra-Ministry coordination (integration). 
Box 7.10: Bureaulore (iii): the evolution of Next Steps 
 
I: ǲȏȐNext Steps ... it was very clear that the original proposition was ... to focus on 
delivery.  ... [T]he idea was that, historically, policymakers had made policy, often 
polishing it to the point at which they believed it was ready for delivery, and then lobbed it 
over the wall at those who would have to do delivery, which traditionally was the point at 
which all the weaknesses and problems on deliverability began to emerge.  So the idea ... 
was that agencies would have a more powerful voice.  ...  [T]hey would be more assertive, 
more flexible, would have more freedom, and consequently would be in a different 
bargaining position....ǳ  Initially, ǲǯ     Ǥ  ... [T]he Court Service 
was exclusively focused on delivery.  It did assert itself in the development of policy that 
affected the delivery.... 
 ǲAnd then ... the boundaries started to get blurred. ... [A]ll sorts of policy capability 
developed in the agency.ǳ  For example, ǲǯǤǤǤgeneral policy capability on criminal 
justice was in HMCS.  So all of the big criminal justice issues, essentially, were being 
ǤǤǤǤǳ 
 
[T: Quite different to Next Steps.] 
 
I: ǲ[T]he practical realities of life Ȃ even simply who knows what about what Ȃ mean that 
you ask people to do things on the basis of who they are and what they know, not 
necessarily where the organisational boundary is.   
ǲThe other thing is: ǯy capability 
in an agency and a policy capability in the corporate Ministry, the boundary between 
those two things is so porous that you find, at least at the margins, both teams of people 
working on the same stuff, and ... on some occasions ... working in opposition.  So you 
develop a competitive situation, where the policy capability in the agency is at least partly 
focused on protecting the agency from policy change.... 





together [in 2011], we thought ... we needed to get back much closer to the division of 
responsibility that Next Steps had envisaged.  And we needed to make sure we understood 
... the distinction between, if you like, Ǯ ǯ, which is designed to deliver 
efficiency, is designed to work out how you deliver policy, and the Ǯǯ ǯ
done in support of ministerial aspirationsǤ ǯǤ
ǯǤǳ (Interview_039) 
 
Box 7.10 represents a paragon of narrative form, clearly articulating a beginning (the Next Steps ǲǳ of delivery purity), middle (its gradual subversion), and end (its reinstatement).  
This parallels the centralised-devolved-(re)centralised trajectory graphed in Figure 7.2, above.  
The five-paragraph division in Box 7.10 highlights the different identity resources informing 
this progressive argumentation, with the opening three effecting differentiation through claims 
to agency-specific operational knowledge, and the final two positing integration by observing 
the risk of devolution to pan-MoJ coordination.  Thus, overall, the contention of the first three 
paragraphs is that the need for operational knowledge Ȃ ǲ    ǳ Ȃ 
prompts the commissioning of policy advice   ǲ  ǳǡ  ǲ ǳǤ 
ǯ focus, this 
made for the devolution  ǯ ǲ     ǳ  the 
knowledge-rich HMCS, subverting the original Next Steps intent of delivery purity.  (Indeed, as 
another officǡ ǯ actually extended well 
beyond its own delivery activities (Interview_009).) However, though solving one problem, this ǲǳǡragraph 
four describes.  In terms of identity, then, this corporate concern with the detrimental impact of 
agency protectionism is integrative, re-associating HMCS and MoJ by their shared concern for 
intra-MoJ coordination.  As the fifth paragraph describes, it is this that prompted the latter-day 
recentralisation.  
Box 7.10 also articulates the Ǯbureaulore of failure by isolationǯ first encountered in NOMS.  This 
rendering is significant for its framing as a problem which agencification was designed to 




resolve, rather than as a post-Next Steps consequence of agency fragmentation.  Still, in both 
defining policy failure as poor workability (ǲǳ) and attributing this to 
policymaker isolation (ǲpolishing it to the point ... they believed it was readyǳȌǡ the 
argumentation is consistent with previous, NOMS versions of the pan-MoJ lore.  Moreover, 
stylistically, there are similar folkloric references to  ȋǲ ǳȌ  ȋǲisǳǡ ǲǳȌǤ  	ǡ  policy-projectile metaphor of successive initiatives  ǲlobbed ... over the wallǳ         
(somewhat scathingly) the problematic isolation at the heart of the bureaulore (see Box 7.12 
and Box 7.14-[ii], below).   
Recounting changed organisational priorities between the former DCA and replacement MoJ, 
Box 7.11 ǯ focus yet corporate ǡ       ǯ  ȋ Ȍ
against the requirement of departmental coordination (paragraph two). 




I: ǲ[W]e took the view at the time that policy and operations were together [in terms of 
corporate synergies], and therefore the agencies should be responsible for both advising 
Ǥǳ  In that system, ǲ
have to deliver the policy are the ones that are advising ministers on it, which means that 
ǯdeliverable.  Ministers Ȃ like all people, they want to have their cake 
ǡǯǯ
navigating through Parliament, and ǯ  ....ǳ  ǯ   ǡ  ǲall kinds of examples of failed implementationsǳ including the 
Rural Payments Agency, for which many National Audit Office reports say the policy 
ǲtoo complex to be delivered.  But if you simplify it, it means compromising political 
objectives, frequently.  So the idea of having the policy and the operations together was to 
avoid that, and was to create that tension within the team.  So instead of giving ministers 
    ǯ undeliverable, you actually give something ministers want Ȃ as 
close to what they want as possible Ȃ ǯdeliverable.ǳ[Digression]  
 ǲǡorthodoxy at the time DCA was running, and it worked quite well....  
ǳǡthe department grew enormously, ǲ
taken that, with such a bigger policy responsibility, it was more important to look across 
the policy responsibilities and have the connections across the organisation than it was to 




have the connections down through the organiǤǯǡ
Ǯtry and solve a set of problemsǳǡ
but, in so doing, others are exposed.  ǲSo, effectively, we went through the cycle of 
bringing all the policy teams into the centre and managing those much more acrossǤǳ 
(Interview_041) 
 
Box 7.11    ǯ       ȋȌ  ǲǳ, before then recounting ǯsubsequent recentralisation as a changed 
aspiration for horizontal rather than vertical coordination.  In this manner, the narrative again 
essays simultaneous identity differentiation and integration, first positing a need for agency-
specific operational expertise, but then empathising with the wider, corporate requirement for 
coordination.  In particular, joint department-agency ownership of this latter-day change of ǲǳ      ȋǲ a set  ǳȌ  
co ȋǲ    ǳȌǤ       
paragraph, which posits department-       ǯ Ǥ  ǡ    ǯ      inevitable 
tension ǲǯǳand ǲǯǳ at the frontline.  
This further rendering of the bureaulore again problematises policymaker isolation, this time   ȋǲǳǢ ǲǳǢ ǲǳȌ      ȋǲtoo complex   ǳȌǡ      ǲǳǲȏȐǳǤ	  ǲall kinds of ex   ǳ and the reference to the ǯ(see Gains, 1999). 
Thus far, Box 7.10 and Box 7.11 have conjoined diametric identity claims of differentiation and 
integration by storying high-level changes in the priorities informing organisational design in 
DCA and MoJ.  By contrast, Box 7.12ǯ drilldown to organisational practice prior to [i] 
and following ȏȐǯǤǡ-to-day 
agency business the emphasis is on securing operationally-informed policymaking, thus making 




for further vertical differentiation on the basis of frontline, operational focus, but without the 
integrative counterpoise noted above. 




Victoria Street, and there was the Court Service ... on the other side ... [and] we always 
used to say: Ǯǡǡǯ.  And 
that is how it was viewed.  It was never seen that we were, you know, all part of the same 
team; it was two completely separate bodies, and we would view them with distain, and 
they would view us with equal distainǡ Ǯǯǡ





I: When the DCA devolved policy, ǲhe idea [was] that the people developing the strategy 
understand ǯ    ǡ  ǯ     
ǯ       experts are saying to them: Ǯctually, mm, that 
might not wash; this might not fly; we need to look into that; the evidence is a bit 
different-ǯǤ   ǡ        ǡ ǯ  reasonably road-
testedǤ ǡǯǡ
ǮRight, Agency: now implement this!ǯ ǯǡǮOh yesǡǯ
a bad ideaǯ.  And youǯupfrontǤǳ (Interview_009) 
 
Box 7.12-[i] analogises the professional Ǯ-and-ǯy and operational officials 
with the former physical separation    ǯ   ourt Service 
across Victoria Street in Westminster.  The   ǲ     ǳ
recalls the projectile metaphor from Box 7.10, above.  In terms of the bureaulore, this 
objectifying of Ǯǯsomething thrown from one organisation and unexpectedly received in 
another ȋǲǮǡ    ǯǳȌ, makes for a particularly rhetorical and symbolic depiction of 
department-agency isolation.  In comparison, Box 7.12-[ii]ǯthe bureaulore is more 
implicit, with this narrative describing the post-devolution benefits to policy-delivery 
collaboration.  Again, the narrator divides between policymaking (ǲ  
strategyǳȌ ȋǲǯǳȌǡ  




and information asymmetry through vocal polarisation Ȃ ǲǮǡǣǯǢǮǯǳ.  Hence, paralleling Box 7.11ǯ policy-delivery tensionǯ 
to the single agency ǡ     ǲǳ    
policies were ǲ-ǳǲǳǤ 
Constitutional correctness 
As well as operational focus and corporate responsibility, HMCTSǯ s on 
the uniqueness of its judicial-executive partnership (see Chapter 6).  On this basis, Box 7.13 
further accounts for the loss of agency policy responsibilities after 2008. 
Box 7.13: The constitutional necessity 
[i]: 
 
I: With the creation of MoJ, ǲ-writing of the framework document....  And 
that gave the judges more of an active role in the governance of HMCS and, of course, the 
judges are not part of the executive, so it also became appropriate for policy 
responsibilities to be taken out of HMCS.... [T]he framework documents of HMCS and 
[Tribunals Service] became different at that stage, and because, effectively, the judges 





I: In terms of policymaking, ǲshuffling deckchairs. ... In many 
circumstancesǡǯǯǯ
the core department, as loǯǤǤǤ.  When we created HMCTS, one 
of the reasons that the policy responsibilities all had to be removed was that HMCTS 
ǯ    Ǥ     the judiciary as well. ... So  ǯ
necessarily a straightforward prescription ... for all agencies, but there is for this one, 
ǯǤPeople who 
work in this organisation are accountable to him, as they are [to ministers], so it would 
ǡǯ ǫ 
about the governance ǤǤǤǡ    ȏǯȐ      
development of policy, and the board is a mixture of judges and independent people and 
administrators, the judges, every time there was a policy proposition ... would have to 
excuse themselves and say: Ǯǯǯ.  So the logic of that is that HMCTS has to 
stand slightly aside from other stuffǤǳ (Interview_039) 




Box 7.13-[i] describes how, with the re-writing of the HMCS framework in 2008, it ǲbecame ǳpolicymaking to the executive-only MoJ in order to ensure that judges 
were not involved in providing ministerial advice.  As such, while HMCS and the Tribunal 
Service enjoyed comparable policy devolution under the DCA, they diverged under MoJ.  
Similarly, Box 7.13-[ii] describes how, with the merger in 2011, the still-devolved 
administrative justice responsibilities were removed, again to ensure constitutional correctness.  
Echoing the identity differentiation essayed in Chapter 6, this again distinguishes between the    ȋǲ ǳǢ ǲ ǳǢ ǲ ǳȌǡ  ǡ
contra-Next Steps, ǲ ǯ     ȏ Ȑǳǡ
and the inherently specialised HMCTS ȋǲbut ǤǤǤǳȌ.   
7.4.3 Post-Blueprint policymaking 
Coordination 
As described previously, for HMCTS, the Blueprint completed a process of progressive ǯ-2000s.  Given the ǯ
dual concern over incidence of the bureaulore and assuring department-wide coordination, the 
new system of integrated policymaking after 2010 was greeted with cautious optimism.  For 
example, Box 7.14 identifies benefits for intra-MoJ coordination and transparency. 




 Ǥ  ǯ   ǡ      ǯ ǡ   ... is the 
governance arrangements that we have within the Ministry ensure that operational 
people are engaged in policy development, and policy people are engaged in the 
development of operational policy...Ǥǯtransparency across both agendas, 
ǡǯ





job it is to work up policy, working for ministers in doing that.  They have to do it in 




conjunction with us, because  ǯ  Ȃ it will come out being the wrong 
answerǤǯicy, 
because the risk of that is it ǯ     ǯ   
another bit of the Ministry.  So, having a coordinated Policy Plan, which ǯ got now, 
and a coordinated way of doing [things], makes sense to me.  In reality, the danger is that 
 ǯ  us early enough, or at all, and then they   ǯ 
and then they throw it over the fence in the way that had been done for many yearsǤǳ
(Interview_046) 
 
Both Box 7.14 narratives interpret the 2010 reforms as enhancing intra-MoJ coordination.  For 
[i], this means ǲ   [MoJ and agency] ǳǡ an end to mutual 
suspicion,     ǲ ǳ  ǲ ǳ   ǲǳǲǳǡ as per the NOMS account above (see Box 7.7).  Similarly,  ȏȐǡ   ǲ   ǳ  ǲ   ȏȐǳǡǲǳǲǯǳǤ
Still, [ii] remains cautious that sensible knowledge utilisation should continue to prevent against     ǣ ǲ ǯ  Ȃ it will come out being the wrong ǳ.  As suchǡ ǲ ǳ of centralisation is newly delayed or minimised HMCTS 
involvement, and hence recurrence of policies being ǲ[n] ...   ǳ.  This third 
incidence of the policy-projectile metaphor (see Box 7.10 and Box 7.12, above) again renders a 
folkloric quality to the bureaulore by its symbolism, lack of specificity and rooting in tradition ȋǲfor many yearsǳȌǤ 
Policy as agreement 
In terms of the post-centralisation agency role, Box 7.14-ȏȐǲǳǲǳǡHMCTS.  Box 7.10 
already elaborated on this, defining ǲ ǳ   ǲdone in support of ministerial ǳǡǲǳǲǳǲhow 
you deliver policyǳ.  Analogous distinctions were made by other officials (Interview_046; _048; 
_051; _054), although often with the qualification that absolute definitions were unattainable.  




In a similar manner, Box 7.15 narrates the means by which work is apportioned between 
HMCTS and MoJ. 
Box 7.15: Policy as agreement 
 
[T: How do you know when work is for HMCTS?] 
 
I: ǲǯ ǡǡ because [JPG officials] and I often have debates 
ǯǤ ǣǯ
policy which has already been agreedǡ Ǥ ǡǯ
Ǣǯtaking thǯ
agreed by ministers, and putting that into practice.  Whereas the JPG teams are actively 
looking at where we might want to change how we do business and the policies around 
ǡ    ǯ   ǡ  ǯ  ǡ
ǡǤǡǡǯ
ǯǤǡ
see need for a change, and there would be a dialogue, I think, with JPG....  So a policy idea 
could come from us, but then it would go to JPG for them to develop it if everyone thought 
it was a sensible policy to be pursuing. (Interview_042) 
 
Box 7.15 identifies ǯǤǯǡ
constraints that both MoJ and HMCTS presently face, the official first establishes that the precise 
division of labour is an ongoing  ȋǲ   ǳȌǤ  ǡ an opposition is 
constructed between JPG as the scoping and legislating body that ǲǳ
for change, and HMCTSǡ  ǲȏȐ   ǯ    agreed by ǡȏȐǳǤPrimarily focused on delivery, therefore, HMCTS could 
still make a proposal, but this ǲ

a sensible policy to be pursuingǳ.  This confirmǯȂ operational 
policy Ȃ only begins once ǲǤǤǤǳǤ 
ǯ-centralisation role.  As Box 
7.16 illustrates, several officials saw their job as persuading JPG to attend to a business-critical 




issue on behalf of the agency.  By extension, securing agreement for policy work is no longer ǯǤ 
Box 7.16: Persuading 
[i]: 
 
I: Centralisation was necessary to avoid MoJ-agency duplication.  ǲǣ
how do we, as an executive agency, influence the Policy Plan?  How do we get the things 
that a  ǡ  ǯ     -  ǯ  
   ? ?       ǤǤǤǳ[Elaboration] ǲ ǯ  
discussion with [JPG] ǣ Ǯǯ    Ǩǯ  ǡ ǡ   ǯ
having in a minute is to say: ... Ǯ ǯ           
priorities, but ǯǤǯ ... That will probably make them look at it a 
bit quicker is my thinking. There are certain other things like that as well where we are 





[T: Since centralisationǡǮǯǫȐ 
 
I: ǲǤǤǤ [Q]uite a lot of it is actually working with policy colleagues either to help deliver 
their new ideas or to persuade them that they ought to have ideas that will help us to 
deliver more efficientlyǤǡǤǳ 
 
[T: Is centralisation a challenge?] 
 
I: ǲǯ  
teams to the benefit to the organisation of being able to manage that resource across the 
whole remit of justice policy.  Sometimes that will seem slightly less of a benefit to me if, 
 ǡ   ȏ
Ȑ     ǯ  
important thing...Ǥǡǯ
administrative justice ... [is] the most important thing to do.  So, there is a trade-off....  But 
ǯbeing part of a large organisation; you have to accept that.  And part of my job is to 
   ǯ    for doing something in [this] territory...Ǥǳ
(Interview_041) 
 
Reflecting new, post- ? ? ? ?
ǯǡ-MoJ nature, both Box 
7.16   ǯ      central policymakers to attend to 
agency priorities.  Specifically, [i] anticipates a forthcoming meeting where financial pressure 
will be put on MoJ ǲȏȐǳǤ  Similarly, [ii] suggests 




that a significant part of his/her role is tǲȏ
] that they ought to have ideas    ǳ.  This linking of policy development to pressing business need Ȃ a central 
theme for OPG, below Ȃ illustrates the de-autonomisation that ǯ centralisation is 
seen to have engendered.  As Box 7.16-[ii] ǡ    ǯ 
integration-differentiation identity, ǯ ǲǳ is its loss of ǲ ǳǡ   ǲ   ǳ Ȃ that is, the whole MoJ Ȃ is its 
management of ǲǳǤǲ-ǳǲbeing part of ǳ, but necessitates agency efforts to ǲe people that ǯǳ for certain work streams. 
In addition to this persuading role, the new policymaking process and multidisciplinary teams 
generate central requests for support from HMCTS.  In a time of mutual resource constrain, one ǲthe pain that the team feelǳ
ǯs of ǲǮǯ
this, and weǯǯǳ (Interview_043).  Box 7.17 elaborates this problem of 
responding to policymakers. 
Box 7.17: Responding to JPG 
 
I: ǲ ǡ ǡ      smaller Policy function, because what actually 
happens is, with a big Policy function- They have slimmed down a lot from where they 
ǡǯ: at Band A level, which are senior people ǤǤǤǯ-
odd of them. ... Now, with a hundred ... senior people, and twenty more senior [deputy 
directors]ǡǡ ǯa lot of brainpower there that is trying to come up 
with things that impact on us.  So I spend a lot of my time ... speaking to those policy 
people who are interested in [courts] to    ǯ  ǯ ǡ
operationally speakingǤǳ (Intervew_046) 
 
Invoking the characterisation of departmental intellectualism, seen most frequently in NOMS, 
Box 7.17 contends 
ǲǤǤǤ ȏȐǳǤ ǡG to 
attend to critical business issues, it is also the agencyǯ  to remain aware of that work, ǲǯǯǡǳǤǡǲ




ǳ        ǡ entially, less risk of bureaulore 
recurrence Ȃ ǡǡǲǳǡǲǳǤ 
7.4.4 Summary 
This section considered identity-informed evaluations of the centralised-devolved-
(re)centralised trajectory of court and tribunal policymaking since 1995.  Simultaneous identity 
association and disassociation with MoJ, largely unique to HMCTS, engendered dual aspirations 
for dispelling poorly-informed policymaking but assuring pan-MoJ coordination.  Therein, 
though differing in context, four additional presentations of the bureaulore of failure by 
isolation have perpetuated argumentation and folkloric style first encountered in NOMS (Box 
7.10, Box 7.11, Box 7.12-[i]-[ii]). 
7.5 Public guardianship policymaking 
7.5.1 Public guardianship policymaking, 1994-2010 
As with court and tribunal responsibilities, public guardianship was formerly overseen by the  ǯ Ǥ  his created the original Public Trust Office agency in 1994, 
which became the Public Guardianship Office in 2001, and was under DCA jurisdiction after 
2003.  Having securing the Mental Capacity Act, the DCA oversaw preparations for its rollout 
across 2005-2007.  Following its restructuring for agency-led policymaking (Section 7.4.1, 
above), the outgoing Public Guardianship Office took policy responsibility in April 2007 (see 
Gearty, 2007)ǡ              
ǯǡǯ (OPG, 2007).  
Thereafter, at the 2010 Blueprint redesign, two policy officials transferred to JPG, leaving OPG 
with a purely operational remit (Interview_003; _006).   
This lineage was depicted alongside HMCTSǯ in Figure 7.2 (page 201, above).  Drawing on 
Chapter 6ǯ       ǡ     n the 
established manner to evaluate the centralised-devolved-(re)centralised movement. 




7.5.2 Pre-2010 restructuring 
Business change 
In Chapter 6ǡ      
ǯ     
remit.  Stressing the need for business-led policymaking Ȃ a central theme in OPG narratives Ȃ 
both Box 7.18        ǯ  
responsibilities across 2007-2011. 
Box 7.18: Business critical change 
[i]: 
 
[T: Practically, what did devolved policymaking mean?] 
 
I: ǲǡǤǤǤȏȐ business, we were able to look at the law, and look at 
the regulations, and the policy, and go: Ǯǡǡǯcustomers 
Ȃ ǯǡǯǡnot working for us or 
our customers.ǯ  So we were more able to bring together that question of: ǮRight, is the 
policy wrong?  Do we need to change the legislation...?ǯǳ  You had to manage the ǲ
ǳ between policy and operations Ȃ ǲ ǯ  -nilly go: Ǯǯ  ǡ
change that.ǯ ǤǤǤ ȏȐo even if the policy responsibility is [with OPG] ..., in making changes, 
ǯǤǳ  ǲparticularly in this area, where the stakeholder 
   ǡ    ǯ     
Ministry of Justice stakeholder environment, for me, ǯ
in saying: Ǯave policy and delivery closeǯǤǳ  The ǲnormal stakeholder baseǳ for ǲ

ǳ is ǲǡǡȏȐǳ.  Over there, ǲ




I: After the first OPG-led public consultation on fees, forms and supervision, ǲthe next 
ǳ second consultation.  In there, Part 1 ǲ
number of procedural changes just to make it easier for us to do our job.ǳ [Elaboration] 
Then, in Part 2, ǲǲ longer term ... do you think 
   ǫǳǳ  So that consultation combined ǲ  procedural things, and 
then ǲfor-the-futureǳǳǤ (Interview_005) 
 
Box 7.18 frames agency-led policymaking as facilitating necessary business adjustment across 
2007-2011 for the still inchoate OPG and Mental Capacity Act.  In the case of [i], devolution is 
characterised as empowering management to respond to emergent, on-the-ground challenges.  




Positive framing is assured through the couching of this agency-ȋǲwe ǳǢǲusǳȌhin a broader contention on promoting consumerism, it being difficult 
to challenge the desirability of 
ǯǤǡ
ǯ        ǯ   ȋ ǲare ǳȌ   Ǥ  ǲnormal  ǳ    ǲǳ     
ǯ
specialised ǲǳ, bolstering the contention of devolution-gifted empowerment.  Box 
7.18-[ii] confirms this attachment of policy change to business need, describing how one of 
several public consultations run by OPG itself sought both to ǲe it easier for us to do our ǳ, and to      ǡ ǲ-the-ǳ Ǥ  ǡ 
characterisation is of a proactive and autonomous OPG seeking to improve its own services 
without necessary recourse to the otherwise-focused MoJ. 
This association of policy change with continual business improvement was made by several  ǡ       
ǯ former devolved policy remit as 
essential to agency operations.  For instance, one ǲǯ
get into the habit of collecting these things up and, on an annual basis, having [some secondary 
legislation]ǳ (Interview_005).  Another similarly spoke of how: ǲ  
[consultations] a yearǳǡǲin September, say ... and ... in tǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤSuch 
normalisation continues into Box 7.19, where the narrative distinguishes this regular, business-
led policymaking from more unusual (and distracting) international policy work which the 
agency was obliged to perform during its tenure as lead on mental incapacity issues.  
Box 7.19ǣ
ǯǡ ? ? ? ?-2011 
 
[T: What was on the agenda after 2007?] 
 
I: ǲThe first big thing was a bit of a r ǳ concerning the Mental Health Act 
2007.  ǲ       ǡ      ȏ 
Health] policy ... our input was peripheral. ... We also needed to pick up fairly quickly 
doing a consultation: one, on changing our fees a little bit; secondly, because it became 




apparent that ȏȐ ȏȐǳǤ  That was done ǲpretty quickly, 
and then we also consulted on changing our supervision ǳ.  ǲȏO]ther things going 
onǳ included work on ratifying the Hague convention on protecting vulnerable adults.  
That involved ǲscoping what that might mean Ȃ ǤǤǤǳ  
There was also ǲsome work around the UN convention on the rights of people with 
disabilities ... where we had to do some thinking....ǳ   
Other international work included the Council of Europe.  ǲȏ
Ȑended up 
ǤǤǤǯǯǤǤǤǤǤǤǤǡǡ ?
mental capacity issues, and to negotiate wording around the recommendation. But you're 
also carrying out with you briefing from all the other policy areas that are also on the 
agenda for discussion, which is slightly odd, because the meeting takes the better part of a 
week and some of the items ... were whether there should be a recommendation on 
missing persons, and whether they can be declared dead ..., which is ... something that's 
completely outside any jurisdiction of the Public Guardian. But with ... a policy official hat 
on, you pick that up in the same way as if you were a policy official in the centre...Ǥǳ 
 Latterly, an official became committee vice-chair, which involved ǲ 
back here to say: ... ǮDoes the Department have any issues [with OPG taking this role]ǫǯǳ  It ǯǡǲǡn, it was a policy chunk of work that we had on that really was the type 
of thing a policy official should be doing, but it was nothing to do with our role as an 
agencyǤǳ  A committee   ǲ ǤǤǤ     ȏ
Ȑǳ.  It was 
ǲslightly odd, because ... increasingly not only is it the subject area which is nothing to do 
with [OPG]ǡǯnot even part of [his/her] remit ... as a UK policy official.ǳ(Interview_005) 
 
Chronicling 
ǯ     ? ? ? ?ǡBox 7.19 divides into three paragraphs.  The first 
includes early business priorities; principally, fee changes and the redesign of the Lasting Power 
of Attorney Ǥ          Ǯǯ 
their     ǡ  ǲǳ      
paragraphs.  Locally, moreover, normalisation is enhanced through the implied size of the   ȋǲ   ǳȌǡ    
ǯ  ȋǲwe  ǳǢǲour ǳȌǡ    Ȃ again Ȃ of policymaking to pressing operational ȋǲbecame apparentǳǢǲWe also needed to pick up fairly quicklyǳǢǲquicklyǳ).  
Alongside this main, business-critical work, the international agenda is initially narrated as  ȋǲ   ǳǢ ǲǳǢ ǲ ǳȌǤ  ǡ   ǡ         ǲǳ     
ǯ ǲǳǤ ȋǲǳȌǡ
the overcoming of an experiential knowledge impairment ȋǲBut with ... a policy official hat on, 




ǳȌ.  The third paragraph furthers this de-normalisation of non-business-critical 
work.  For example, given that MoJ permission was sought before OPG took the international 
vice-chairmanship, the situation is storied as strange for the otherwise relatively detached, 
NDPB-like agency.  In addition, abnormality is implicated through biȋǲǳǢǲǳǢǲǳȌȋǲbut it was nothing to do with our role ǳ).  Overall, this makes for a long-range opposition between normal, business-led 
policymaking on key public guardianship issues, and the ǲǳ which 
the agency also performed before the 2010 Blueprint. 
7.5.3 Post-Blueprint policymaking          
ǯ  ǡ this section 
explores narratives of the recentralisation as engendering new external dependencies for the 
agency.  Firstly, Box 7.20 weighs the (dis)benefits of centralisation in terms of securing future 
expeditious policy change.   
Box 7.20: Centralisation: the opportunities and risks 
 
[T: What was your reaction to the policy centralisation?] 
 
I: ǲ[T]Ǥǳ  On the ǲopportunity ǳ, it was a chance to 
ǲǳ, which, especially the ǲ-
ǳǡǲstarting to just 
be a bit of an intellectual drain ... The risks around it, from my perspective, were obviously 
the lack of control ... and whether or not: ǡǯto 
do what we needed to do; ǡ ǡ  ǯ        
without a huge amount of interferenceǤǳ   
Since centralisation, the ǲ  ǤǤǤ         ǯ
thinking: Ǯǡ ǡ     challenge backǯǤ      
embedded policy official of so long, you do start to go native and ... look at things too 
readily from the operational perspective, as opposed to taking that step back and saying: 
Ǯǡǡstrategic ǫǯǡǮ
ǫǯadvantageǤǳ   
However, ǲǡflip side of that is that ... they are, obviously, much closer to 
ministerial expectations and desires, and less close to operational realities.  So there is 
 ǯǤǳ  In the agency, ǲǯ ǤǤǤ  -tuned with the actual realities of how 
quickly you can make changes, what the impact of suddenly doing things in a different 
 ǡ  ǯ    as well with policy colleagues who are like: 
ǮǡǡǨǯǳ (Interview_005) 




Box 7.20 recounts several positives and negatives associated with recentralisation, successively 
evaluating: an ǲopportunityǳ to focus on business priorities; a ǲriskǳ in terms of losing control;  ǲǳ       new  ǲ backǳ from JPG 
(paragraph two); and a problem in    ǲ ǳ ǲ ǳ (paragraph three).  
ǯ      
references to the old ǲǳǡǲǳǯ, 
and the simultaneous concern with now securing necesǲǳ without ǲǳ.  Moreover, information asymmetry is a potential problem, there 
being distance between the opposing agency ȋǲǳȌ and corporate ȋǲǳȌ
perspectives, with ǲ ǳ      ǲ  ǳ of 
public guardianship delivery.  Similar claims to delivery-realism were encountered in both 
HMCTS and NOMS, above.   
Extending this narrative of post-Blueprint de-autonomisation, Box 7.21ǯ interprets the 
recentralisation as a challenge to the agency model itself, given the expectation of continual 
business improvement.  
Box 7.21: ǲ-ǳ 
 
[T: Is it unusual for agencies to do policy work?] 
 
I: This is ǲ.  If you're gonna have an agency, have an agency.  
Don't have a half-hearted agency, which is almost the situation we've got now, where you 
have an agency that is responsible for delivering something, but that's it!  They're not 
responsible for deciding what they deliver, or, to a certain extent, how it gets delivered.  
They are literally, purely a delivery body, and I'm not sure that's right, because I'm not 
sure how you can continuously improve things and continuously change things if you're 
not actually in control of the mechanisms for doing that. Especially, as I say, if you're 
small, you're really, really down the pecking order.  
 
[T: Is there a danger that, given the main MoJ focus, OPG will fall off the radar?] 
 
I: ǲǡǤǡǯ
legal aid and stuff at the moment, you are still down here somewhere, which means, as an 
ǡ ǯ  hamstrung, because you want to change your policy because you 
ǡǡǯ




not important.  Whereas, when you owned it yourself, and you could deal with it yourself, 
it made sure things got doneǤǤǤǤǯ-ǯ
Ǥ ǯǡ
ǤǤǤǤǳ  Otherwise, ǲǯǨǳ 
(Interview_011) 
 
Predicated again on the intimate association between business change and policymaking, as 
well as the OPG identity differentials of size and remit, Box 7.21 distinguishes between proper ǲ-ǳ, arguing that recentralisation ǲǳǤ Suggesting marginalisation within MoJ, the official laments the new loss of control: ǲ   [policy] yourself ...      ǳǤ  Moreover, strongly the 
evoking the accountable management bargain by which justice agencification was originally 
narrated (see Chapter 5), the official opinesǣǲǯǳ if ǲǳǤ Here, agency status is taken as bestowing an expectation for 
ongoing improvement, and yet, by virtue of the 2010 Blueprint, OPG is now denied its means of 
bettermentǤǡǮǯdefined as business improvement measures. 
These evaluations suggest new OPG-MoJ interdependencies, the agency necessarily procuring 
Ǥ ǡǲ ǤǤǤ Ǯǯǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤnew commodification Ȃ Ǯǯ object to 
be traded between interdependent parties Ȃ was recurrent.  For example, 
ǯǲa certain amount of policy and legal deliverablesǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ.  In a      ǯ ing, Box 7.22 expands upon this new 
process of policy procurement. 
Box 7.22: The policy shared service (i) 
 
I: ǲIf ǯpolicy people [in MoJȐǡǯeparate policy people in the OPG, 
does it make sense to have policy people here, there and everywhere, or does it make sense 
just to have one group of policy people that will be able to go out to places and deliver 
policy for them, rather than just having lots and lots of different people, not knowing each 
ǡǡǫǳ 
 












on that.  ... [O]ne person may take HMCTS work, another one may take OPG work, but they 
will, essentially, all be one gr ǯ    Ǯǯǡ   Ǥǳ 
(Interview_008) 
 
In describing JPG as a pan-MoJ service Ȃ ǲǤǤǤǳ Ȃ Box 7.22 again Ǯǯt of a specialised 
endeavour, to be optimised ǲǳ
and their consolidation into a single professional group.  This objectified policy will be ǲȏȐǳǲǳǡ essentially, a shared corporate service, as Box 
7.23 confirms. 




ǡise with stakeholders?] 
 
I: ǲǳ teams are ǲ ǤǤǤ 
always need to be the case, because, while you can have a back-office group writing 
consultation documents, the stakeholder management has got to be the face of the 
ǡǯǤǳ 
 
[T: Is consultation writing a back-office function in the same sense as HR?  A shared 
service?] 
 
I: ǲǡ  ǯȂ ǤǤǡ ǯǡ [JPG]  
will sit on the same floor and write documents for different organisationsǡ  ǯ - 
well, it depends how you view it.  I meanǡǡǮeah, it is a shared 
serviceǯǡǯǡǡǤǳ (Interview_008) 
 
Box 7.23 argues that whereas ǲǳ is a generic professional task to 
be delivered to ǲ ǳǡ keholder engagement is business-specific.  While 




the former is amenable to centralisation, the latter is not.  Thus, again, policy is commodified as 
an output deliverable to multiple organisations as, essentially, a generic, back-office service. 
7.5.4 Summary 
This section recounted structural change in public guardianship policymaking since 1994,    ǯ -devolved-(re)centralised trajectory, given both ǯ  .  N    
ǯ   of size and 
remit to depict devolved capacity as normal for an agency delivering pressing business change 
in the still-inchoate mental capacity agenda.  Hence, with the post-Blueprint de-autonomisation, 
OPG is now engaged in new interdependencies with MoJ, being obliged procure a policy 
commodity from JPG. 
7.6 Discussion 
7.6.1 Synchronic variation 
Having explored justice policymaking since Next Steps, this section considers inter-agency 
variations in both the definition of Ǯǯthe opportunities and costs of its centralised or 
devolved creation (as summarised in Table 7.1, overleaf).  The next section then turns to the 
shared bureaulore. 




Table 7.1: Comparing agency policymaking 
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Challenges 
Ensuring knowledge 
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OPG  Differentiation: 











through policy change 
Challenges 
Resource loss, interference, 
stakeholder engagement  
Opportunities 
Operational focus, new JPG 
challenge 
*See Chapter 6, Table 6.1 (page 179). 
Ǯǯ 
Reflecting their different operational remits and identity profiles, officials from the three 
agencies offered varying   ǮǯǤ    complex, high-risk penal 
servicǲǳ(Goffman, 1991), and thereby working in ǲǳ
other areas of public policy (Interview_014; _015), the NOMS focus was on day-to-day, 
instruction-guided operations in the national prison and probation system.  For tǲǳ
policymaking (Box 7.1), ǲǳ ǲ
ǳȋBox 
7.2), independent of any intellectual, futuristic or abstract strategising in MoJ.  Thus, as Figure 
7.1 illustrated, despite the post-Next Steps loss of strategic responsibilities, core penal 
policymaking remains firmly in the agencyǯ remit, albeit with occasional media-prompted 
political and departmental interest.   




For HMCTS officialsǡ ǲ ǳ     ministers in options appraisal and 
agreement (Box 7.10, Box 7.15ȌǤǯǡ
this work has been       
ǯ Ǥ  
HMCTS must be involved to ensure effectiveness, it has neither the resource nor, necessarily, 
the skills-set to be conducting this work itself (Interview_046; _043), and, in any case, is part-
owned by the judiciary, who must not be involved in providing ministerial advice (Box 7.13).  
Thus, the agency develop ǲ ǳ Ȃ that is, efficiency measures and pure-policy 
translation (Box 7.10, Box 7.14). 
Finally, for OPG officials, its devolved policy role ǯ ? ? ? ?
to the Blueprint redesign in 2010-11, thereby covering the formative years of the Mental 
Capacity Act.  Delivering these new yet high-demand safeguarding and empowerment services, 
many of which are closely prescribed in secondary statute (for example, the LPA Ȍǡ
ǯ
policy autonomy within the otherwise-focused MoJ environment made for rapid response to 
emerging business need, as well as better appreciation of client speciality (Box 7.18).  Policy is 
thus a tradable commodity that enables business-change, and is now delivered from one 
organisation to another on a provider-client basis. 
Pre-Blueprint challenges and opportunities 
Through frequent incidence of the bureaulore, policymaker isolation was narrated as a historic 
challenge in both NOMS and HMCTS.  This is considered further below.  In addition, reflecting ǯ composite identity profile, its officials also narrated a challenge to departmental 
coordination in the old dispersal of policymaking responsibilities (Box 7.10, Box 7.14).  For OPG, 
by contrast, its devolved policy remit across 2007-2011 meant that isolation was never a 
concern.  Rather, it was the distraction of international and peripheral policy issues that proved 
challenging (Box 7.19).   
Regarding pre-Blueprint opportunities, NOMS simply registered a slight lessening of ministerial 
engagement following the loss of strategy responsibilities.  HMCTS, however, enjoyed policy-




delivery proximity, particularly in the lengthier devolution of administrative justice (Box 7.11, 
Box 7.12-[ii]).  Finally, for OPG, its pre-Blueprint devolution was the key enabler of business-led 
change during the formative years of the agency and its underpinning legislation (Box 7.18, Box 
7.21). 
Post-Blueprint challenges and opportunities 
To both NOMS and HMCTS, the Blueprint represents an opportunity for finally dispelling the 
bureaulore of failure by isolation (Box 7.7, Box 7.8, Box 7.14).  For HMCTS, moreover, it makes 
for constitutional correctness with this part-judicial agency, as well as better intra-MoJ 
coordination (Box 7.13, Box 7.14).  The OPGǯ benefit was its removal of international 
distractions      ǲǳ   potentially ǲǳ 
(Box 7.20).  As for problems, NOMS narrated its continuing and inescapable political salience 
(Box 7.9); HMCTS told of the need to ensure agency involvement and influence, while not being 
distracted by central requests for support (Box 7.16, Box 7.17); and, for the small and less-Ǯǯ 
ǡ   ns over prioritisation, resourcing, interference and 
stakeholder engagement (Box 7.20, Box 7.21). 
7.6.2 Synchronic consistency Ȃ the bureaulore of failure by isolation 
Despite the synchronic variation across Ǯpolicyǯ and the challenges and opportunities 
of different divisions of labour, the retelling of the bureaulore across both NOMS and HMCTS 
marks notable inter-agency consistency.  This subsection explores the unifying argumentation 
and style of this pan-MoJ folkloric, attending to communality, tradition and symbolism. 
Communality 
Folklore is partly defined by its concentration of communal knowledge (see Section 7.2, above).  
Indeed, Boggǯ    ǲ ǡ ǡ      ǳ (cited in 
Ben-Amos, 1971, p.6).  This intersubjectivity reflects in Box 7.24ǯ   ǯǡȂ Ǯǯ
[#24a] Ȃ is the latent component of an enthymeme.  According to the general analytic 




framework derived in Chapter 3, this manner of argumentative structure accounts for some of  ǯ rhetorical persuasion, given the diminished opportunity for substantive 
refutation (Jasinski, 2001).  It also points to the commonplaceness of this story within the 
particular interpretive community (Feldman, et al., 2004). 
Box 7.24: The bureaulore of failure by isolation 
Truncated syllogism (enthymeme): 
 
[#24a] For success, policy must be deliverable.* [#24b] Traditionally, policymaker 




As well as enthymeme, folkloric communality was evoked in the vagueness with which 
bureaulore events were narrated; for instance, in Box 7.3ǯ careless introduction of examples Ȃ ǲ ǯ ǡ   ǳǢ ǲwhatever  ǮǯǳǤ  This off-the-cuff narration 
points to an assumption of unnecessary elaboration: the events clearly illustrate the 
intersubjectively agreed elements of bureaulore, and thus require only half-referencing for their 
meaning to be understood.  Again, therefore, the bureaulore is a product of communal 
knowledge. 
Tradition 
Folklore ǲǳ(Utley, 1961)ǡǲǳǡǲ-offs, but ... emulated, reproduced and re-ǳ(Gabriel, 2000, p.24).  On the second 
count, the bureaulore adheres by its incidence across the NOMS and HMCTS data, being retold 
freely by officials of varying grades and lengths of service.  Moreover, on the first count, all 
bureaulore presentations chronicle historic episodes of policy failure.  Box 7.3, for instance, 
described ǲǳ-Blueprint policymaking; Box 7.10 employed words such ǲǳǡǲǳǲǳǢBox 7.12-ȏȐǲǤǤǤǳǢ
and Box 7.14-[ii] introduced the policy-    ǲ    




done for many yearsǳǤȂ the bureauloreǯ 
recurrent and endemic nature, prior to the ǯ structural redesign of MoJ and new 
recognition of operational expertise.  Box 7.7ǡ  ǡ   ǲ        ǳǡ  Box 7.11  ǲ     ǳǤ  	ǡ     ǡ as if multiple 
incidences of the bureaulore allow for succinct summary of their key characteristics.  In this 
regard, Box 7.7  ǲ    ǳ  -MoJ wrangling over a new 
policy, and suggests ǲǡǡǳfor its non-implementation.  Further, Box 7.11 employed 
the con ǡ ǲ ǤǤǤ want   ǳǡ  similarly invoke 
tradition by generalisation. 
Symbolism    
ǯ (2000, p.24) three defining traits of organisational folklore is that it is ǲǳǤ NOMS symbolism was in Box 7.7ǯ of the interviewer as a ǲǳǲǳǡallowing a role-play built on 
hypothetical, post-Blueprint interactions between the two professions (ǲǮe working with 
Thomas ... he now understandsǯǳ).  In HMCTS, moreover, folkloric symbolism was in the three 
examples of the policy-projectile metaphor, where the traditional mode of policy arrival is 
depicted as an ǯ unguided and unexpected traversing ǲǳǡǲǳǲǳ
(Box 7.10, Box 7.12, Box 7.14).  These metaphorical barriers, which are themselves deeply 
symbolic, reflect the wider tendency towards disciplinary or professional identities across the 
MoJ. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Developing out of the previous focus on macro, meso and micro meaning, this chapter turned 
more squarely to agency practice.  Against the (supposed) Next Steps separation of policy and 
delivery work, it has identified early digression in HMPS, major departure in the mid-2000s DCA 
agencies, and then a return to formal division   ǯ  ? ? ? ? Blueprint, albeit with wide 




recognition of the proper and necessary operational contribution in Ǯmultidisciplinaryǯ projects.  
Considerable interpretive differences were registered across NOMS, HMCTS and OPG in terms of ǮǯȋȌlised 
policymaking.  This multivocality, accounted for by the contingencies of history and identity, 
confirms the great caution needed in collapsing complex governing processes into operable 
variables suitable for large-N system analysis.  Nonetheless, the emergent emphasis on policy 
disciplines Ȃ analysis, finance, procurement, policy, operations Ȃ was significant across all three 
agencies, and is explored further in Chapter 8.  In addition, synchronic consistency also came in 
the shared NOMS-HMCTS bureaulore Ȃ an intersubjective account of historic policy failure that 
formed the basis of reform arguments in the two largest agencies.  Of particular interest is its 
predication on a firm division of labour between policy and delivery, the bureaulore serving to 
warn of the consequences of failed disciplinary collaboration.  This institutional preservation of 
dichotomous work categories, familiar from the third Next Steps enthymeme (Box 4.3, Chapter 
4), but in fact long predating that report, is considered further in Chapter 9. 
 




Chapter 8 Ȃ Delivering Justice Policy 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous analysis of justice policymaking was largely historic and conceptual in orientation, 
recounting emic evaluations of structural change in offender management, courts and tribunals 
and public guardianship through previously-  Ǥ  Ǯǯ Ǯǯ across the three agencies, with NOMS describing 
its still devolved, non-Ǣǯ
securing of ministerial agreement; and OPG citing its lost levers of business improvement (see 
Chapter 7).  In now turning to ongoing governing processes, this final empirical chapter adds to 
the emergent case study literature on post-agencification policymaking (Verschuere, 2009; 
Verschuere & Bach, 2012)Ǥ   Ǯǯ        ǡ
albeit from a second-order, field-researcher perspective, five policies unfolding during the eight-
month fieldwork engagement are recounted and their constructions of the department-agency 
division of labour examined. 
The chapter begins by defining team narratives in relation to the individual stories explored 
previously.  It then details the inception of Justice Policy Group and its reconfiguring of policy Ǯǯ    - and discipline-based endeavour.  The next sections proceed 
through the NOMS, HMCTS and OPG examples, drawing on the agency identity profiles, before 
the closing discussion undertakes further comparison of the division of labour and its narration. 
8.2 From individual to team narratives 
In exploring organisational identity and post-agencification policymaking, the two previous 
chapters drew upon individual storytelling that was largely unguided in its subject matter.  Thus 
describing a multitude of events, from prison bread buying to changing judicial collaboration, it 
was only in analysis that these separate narratives were probed for intersubjective constructs, 




be they shared identities, definitions or evaluations.  However, stories are not simply a product 
of individual volition, but a potentially collaborative and co-productive mode of sensemaking.  
The incidence of the enthymematic and folkloric bureaulore within and between agencies aptly 
illustrates this narrative communality (see Chapter 7).  As Boyce (1995, p.109) suggests, it is by ǲǳǲ
purpose a   ǳǤ  ǡ      
evaluative, but actionable, as Pentland (1999, p.717) explains: 
ǲȏȐ cance of narrative data lies not just in their richness and near universal 
availability, but in the fact that they are the same kind of data that organizational 
members use to plan, enact, interpret, and evaluate their own actions and those of Ǥǳ  
On ǡǯǡ
of organisational identity and historic contingency, policymaking project teams forge group 
understandings of their work and that of others through the (re)telling of shared storylines.   
    Ǯǯ ǡ      
from the previous, story-by-ǤǮǯ
to probe the dialectic between storied content and underlying form (see Chapter 3), multiple 
accounts are interwoven into larger, collective narratives.  Though synthetic in themselves, 
being the field-ǯmulti-authored data, the aspiration for preserving and 
triangulating emic ideas, distinctions and evaluations told within project teams, and situating 
these within the interpretive contexts registered in previous chapters, ensures continued ǲǳ(Pader, 2006). 
The five examples of unfolding policymaking are: in NOMS, Payment by Results commissioning 
and Working Prisons; in HMCTS, the Criminal Justice System Efficiency Programme and 
Enforcement Services outsourcing; and in OPG, the Digital Transformation of its public-facing 
services.  These initiatives were selected by agency managers as salient areas of work at the 
time of the fieldwork, and this was confirmed by the departmental business plan (MoJ, 2011a).  




Individual and group interviews were scheduled with relevant agency staff and MoJ policy 
officials (when available), and a variety of internal and published documentation was collected.  
Accounts were analysed according to organisation and initiative, and second-order narratives 
produced through iterative synthesis.  Before proceeding to the stories, the next section 
provides more background to the JPG perspectives retold below. 
8.3 Justice Policy Group 
As Chapter 5 ǡ    ǯ -prompted restructuring was its 
consolidation of formerly dispersed policy activity into a single Justice Policy Group (JPG).  
Following the wider Blueprint aspiration for grouping and sharing services, this merged the 
Access to Justice, Criminal Justice, and Law, Rights and International groups with previously 
devolved agency responsibilities.  Voluntary departure schemes and an assessment centre 
competition exercise also downsized the emerging JPG from 600 to 438 FTE, after which its own ǲǳ       -MoJ policy services under the new 
resource constraint (Document_033).  Based on project methodology, generic job descriptions, ǡǯǲǳ
policy work (Interview_049). 
The JPG Blueprint emphasises the need for prioritised policy activities according to a clearly-
defined ministerial programme; discontinued ancillary or speculative endeavours; and an ǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǲ  ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ        ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ ǲǳǡǡǯ
projects are each assigned a review date, even if the work is likely to retain salience indefinitely ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ         ǲ ǳ Ȃ a consultancy-like approach by which generic professionals move between 
work according to evolving business need (Interview_045).  In this manner, the aim is for a 




      ǡ     
ǯ
central activities produce externalities for other parts of the department Ȃ the agencies, MoJ 
Legal, Analytical Services or Finance. 
This reconditioned policymaking rests upon disciplinary rather than subject specialism.  As one 
official ǣǲ   verybody in the policy profession should have a ǡǡǯǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
Another similarly remarked, ǲǯ Ǯa policy professionalǯ, rather than Ǯa 
criminal just  ǯǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ.  This follows the cross-Whitehall 
Professional Skills for Government agenda, which aligns officials with defined professions Ȃ 
including policy, operational delivery and social research Ȃ in order to encourage workforce 
development (Civil Service, 2010)Ǥ      
ǯ    
multidisciplinary policymaking process, which, as Chapter 7 recounted, now brings together 
policy, legal, analytical, financial and operational professionals from across MoJ to deliver ǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
8.4 NOMS and the Rehabilitation Revolution 
The Coalition Agreement commits to sparking a ǲrehabilitation revolutionǳ   
(HM Government, 2010, p.23)Ǥǯ Working Prisons initiatives are ǲǳin this agenda (Interview_037), and are explored below. 
8.4.1 Payment by Results 
Overview 
Following wider government commitments to results-based outsourcing (HM Government, 
2011), most notably in welfare-to-work provision (see DWP, 2011), NOMS is undertaking a 
series of Payment by Results (PbR) pilots whereby public, private or third sector providers are 
financially rewarded for securing benchmarked reductions in offender recidivism.  The aim is to 
achieve a step-ǯ Ǯǯǡ
by de-regulating the frontline, promoting local partnerships, incentivising proven interventions 




and stimulating market innovation (MoJ, 2010a).  The pilot programme is testing a variety of 
models across custodial and community provision, and the expectation is that the approach will 
expand nationally after 2015.  ǯ

team perspectives. 
JPG Team Narrative 
Previously, there was emerging MoJ capacity on results-based commissioning (Interview_030; 
_031).  Localised incentive payment systems had been included in the ten Transforming Justice 
programmes in 2009 (see Chapter 5), and senior officials commissioned a briefing paper on the 
implications of the Opposition proposals contained in Prisons with a Purpose (Conservative 
Party, 2008).  Thereafter, in its pre-election preparation, MoJ undertook further scoping work 
on finǡǡǯǡ-level meetings with the 
new ministerial team defined the aspiration still further (Interview_030).  Analysts began 
constructing an economic model by which options and system externalities could be tested 
under various scenarios, and, over the summer, JPG made its proposition to ministers for a PbR 
pilot programme, with potential national rollout after 2015 (Interview_030). 
Simultaneously, work initiated on a wider consultation paper, Breaking the Cycle (MoJ, 2010a).  
NOMS was involved in both green paper and PbR discussions, but, on the latter, contributions 
were from the agency board only (Interview_025; _030).  Unlike the Working Prisons initiative, 
which also featured in Breaking the Cycle and built u    ǯ 
Industries (discussed Ȍǡǲ [PbR]ǳ, 
because outcome-based commissioning was ǲ ...  Ǯǯ 
modelǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ.   
ǡ
ǯǤǲǡ
expect [JPG] to stop at that point, [and] hand that over to NOMS [to deliver]ǳǡ  the agency ǲǯǡǤǤǤ  ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
     ǡ




the newness of PbR, and the impending launch of the existing local incentive programmes (now 
couched within a PbR narrative), JPG retained pilot responsibility while NOMS established the 
structures to assume full responsibility later (Interview_030).  To aid implementation, a prison     
 ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ     ǲ ǳ Ȃ one in JPG and one in NOMS (Interview_036).  Moreover, the aspiration was for a 
project team jointly staffed by JPG and the emergent NOMS capability, but this culture was only 
partly achieved (Interview_025;  ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǡ ǲbuy-in was difficult [because] NOMS think 
that MoJ sit over there dǮ-ǯǯany operational realityǳ, ǲǡǳ (Interview_025).  As such, although agency management were ǡǲǯǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
Equally, JPG officials were reluctant to devolve a now established programme to the new NOMS 
team   ǲopenly admitting to you they're not absolutely sure that they get all of the 
detailǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
For a time, ministers were distracted with securing other legislation.  When attention returned, 
there was concern at progress and a desire to expand the pilotsǯ  (Interview_030).  ǲǯ 
ǡǯ  ǤǤǤ ȏȐǡǮ ǡ ǯǡǯǡǡ  
elsewhere sayǡ Ǯǡ   ǡ   ǯǳ ȋ ? ? ?ȌǤ    ǡ  a number of 
nec ǲǳǣ ǲ  ǡ   ǡ     pprovals ǡǤǤǤǳ, ǲ: Ǯl, make sure 
this is measurableǯ; Ǯe ǫǯ; Ǯǫǯ; Ǯǫǯǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ.   That is all necessaryǡǲ is needed ... is trust of the 
different groups Ȃ ǡ          ǯ Ǣ         ǯ   ǯǳ
(Interview_028). 




Within the PbR ǡǲ
ǳǯ
Major Projects Authority (Interview_025).  This was critical of the joint JPG-NOMS pilot  ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ   ǲ ǳ     would 
gradually revert to NOMS.  The already-live local incentive pilots transferred first, followed by 
otherǲǡǯ
weǯ    ǳ (Interview_030).  To smooth the change, some JPG staff 
transferred to NOMS temporarily or permanently (Interview_028; _036), and the central team ǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
ǡ
ǲvery stuff than might normally be the responsibility of ǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǲ ǳ 
about designing and procuring services and liaising with bidders (Interview_030).  The concern 
was thaǡ     ǲ ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ            Ǥ   ǡ 
ǯ   ǡǲolicy support for the 
pilots ... to ensure that, as we go through the process of negotiating contracts and developing ǡ ǤǤǤ ǯǡ Ǯ ǤǤǤǯǳ
(Interview_031). 
NOMS Team Narrative ǡ  ǲǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǯǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡǲ  ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ    urity Work Programme, for ǡǡǲǤǤǤǯǡǯȂ we   ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ         ǡ  ǲ 
very challenging for the marketǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
ǡ ǡǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ







ǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤmme had joint NOMS-JPG Senior Responsible 
Owners, but the Gateway Review was critical of that and now the divide is cleanly between ǯ   ǯ  ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ ǡ    ǲ ǤǤǤǳǡ 
 ǲ  ǡǡǡ ǯ        ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ      ǡ    ǲ   ǳǡ   
(Interview_025). 
ǲ     ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ    - ǲǳǡǲǡǯǳ
(Interview_033).  And even after that, PbR is not integrated with the main NOMS operation.  The ǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡǲǳǡǲǳ
(Interview_023).   
Four pilotǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǲ-ǳǲǳ  Ǣ ǡ  ǲǯ ǡ ȏȐ    ǳ  tition, contract    ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ   ǯ     ǲ ǳǡǲǯǳǡ 
ǯ ǲ    ǳ    place (Interview_025).   Post-transition, 
there remains close working, with regular informal collaboration  ǲa number of formal     ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ   ǲǳ   ǡ  ǲǳ ǡ ǲǡ ǡ      




 ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ    ǲ  ǳ  ǡ   ǲǳȂ ǡǡǡǲǤǤǤ
to ǮǨǯǡǡǡǫǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
ǡ
Ǣǡǲǯ
a lot ... about making ourselves more visible to ministers, and them seeing us as being ǡ
ǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǲǮǯǳǲǮǯǳȋǲǯǮǯǳȌ  ǡ  er delivery (Interview_023).  These are ǲǮ-minute catch-ǯǳto ensure that ǲǳdelivery (Interview_023).  The danger, however, is that too ǲǳǤ 
	  ǡ    ǲ ǳ       ǡǲǳǡǲǳǡǲnt ǳǡǲ ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  Ǯǯǯ 
their different professional units, but each member is on email and attends dialogue meetings 
with bidders.  There are also secondees from frontline prison aǲ-ǳ
operational aspects, ǲ     ǳ, and boost credibility in supplier 
negotiations (Interview_033).  	ǡǡǲǮǯǳ  ǲ   ǳ   ǯ -ahead (Interview_028).  The first MoJ ǲǡǡǡǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǯ	
wilǲke commentsǳǡ ǲ	ǳ   ǲ   ǳ (Interview_028).  NOMS cannot approve the 
tendering on its ownǡǲ, prior to Treasury engagement, 
about whether they can handle the financial riskǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǲǳ




is required not by the financial size of the projects, which is  ǯ ǡ ǲǮǯǳ(Interview_028).   
8.4.2 Working Prisons 
Overview ǯǡPrisons with a 
Purpose (Conservative Party, 2008), is the aspiration for increased purposeful activity in prisons 
through expanded commercial involvement (MoJ, 2010a).      Ǯǯ, again beginning with the JPG perspective. 
JPG Team Narrative         ǡ   ǲǳǲsomething that is productive and meaningfulǳǡ
working week (Interview_038).  To achieve this without further investment, the idea is to seek 
more private businesses contracts.  Historically, Prison Industries had negative connotations, 
busiǡǡǡǲȏȐǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǡ         Ȃ 
One3One Solutions, named after the 131 prison establishments Ȃ the aim is to strike a balance           ǲfounded in 
experienceǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǤ 
For Breaking the Cycle (MoJ, 2010a), NOMS-MoJ collaboration was much greater on Working 
Prisons than PbR (Interview_025ȌǤ  ǲhere's an established functionǳ  
employment in NOMS (Interview_030), and the agenc ǲhad much more input ... because we 
were delivering Prison Industries in NOMS anyway, and they haǳ
(Interview_025).  For instance, JPG would frequently check on operational points by phoning 
NOMS (Interview_036), and, althoug   ǲǳ   ǡ 
 ǲǳ   ǲ   ǳ      (Interview_025).  
Moreover, because Breaking the Cycle ǡǲǡ




officials went to all of the meetings in order that everyone had a similar understanding of what ǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
There was an external report commissioned to identify potential means of commercial growth 
(Deloitte, 2011)ǡǲ
ǳ, chaired by a senior JPG 
official, but including leaders from industry and NOMS (Interview_038).  The JPG Team had a 
deputy governor seconded to assist with policy development (Interview_031), particularly in ǲǳ testing ideas in establishments (Interview_038).  
Throughout, direct collaboration with NOMS was crucial, and ranged from joint work on ǲǳǡ ?
HQ (Interview_038).  In terǡǲǯ    ȏǯȐ ǳǡ   ǲ ǯ ǳǡ  ǲǯǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
too; the teams just agree who does what, even just on the basis of who has capacity at that  ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǲften, submissions to ministers go up jointlyǳ 
JPG and NOMS, and, in those situations Ȃ ǲǳȂ ǲharing [and] commenting on ǳǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
Latterly, the big priority has been to officially launch One3One Solutions at an event in Downing 
Street.  Business leaders were invited, and there was a joint presentation by public and private 
prison governors (Interview_037).  Now that the launch has happened and responsibility is ǲ ǳ  ǡ    ǲexactly what do we think we need for policy 
maintenance for this piece of work going forward?ǳ         
ǯ
Policy Resourcing Team become involved (Interview_038). 
NOMS Team Narrative Ǥǲǳǲ   ǳǡ    ǲǳ  ǲ  ǳ
(Interview_020).  More recently, the emphasis was on offender skills, and work became part of a 




ǲbroader regimeǳȂ ǲǳȂ ǲwasn't the be-all and 
end-allǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ ǲg to up-ǳǡ    ǲ-ǳ    ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǡ
Industries produced goods for the internal MoJ market Ȃ furniture, printing and so forth Ȃ and 
did some e    ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǡǲ ǯ  ǤǤǤ ȏȐ ǡǮǯǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡ ǲǯ         ease the working 
week Ȃ  ǯ  ǡ  ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǡ ǲhat ministers are 
saying is: Ǯe want more work in prisons, but, actually, it's got to wash its own face; it can't cost 
us any more moneyǯǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  , the aim is to commercialise Prison Industries ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǲǳǲ-ǳǲ-ǳ
(Interview_020). 
ǡ
ǡǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
was the Breaking the Cycle consultation and response, some analysis on current Prison Industry 
work, an externally- ǡ  ǲ     ǤǤǤ    ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ     ǡ nd thus NOMS was ǲǳ
ǡǲǤǤǤǯǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ	ǡǡǲǮ
appoint a chief executive; we will appoint a ch ǯǳǡ    ǲ      ǳ    ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ   ǡǲǳǡ
launch (Interview_020ȌǤ    ǲ ǳ    ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡǡǡ
ǲǳ      ǲǳ to communications and branding 
(Interview_020).  Tǡ    ǲ   ǳ    ǲǳǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡ ǲǡ     ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  ǲǯ   that 




 ǤǤǤ           ǯ      ǳ
(Interview_020).  Unlike PbR, there is no formal transition planǡ ǲ   ȏ
Ȑǯ        Ȃ ǯ  really been doing our businessǳǡ
whereas, for PbR, the pilots were actually being managed from the central policy group 
(Interview_025).  
        ǡ ǲ   
responsibility is to check that we remain ǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡ
ǲthat downward trajectory of responsibilityǳǡǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
Securing new business is going ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǲǳ      ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ        ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ ?ǲǳǲǯǢǯǢǢǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǲǳȂ ǲǯǡǳǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
8.4.3 Delivering offender management policy 
Full discussion of these narratives is delayed to the comparison, below, but it is apposite for an 
interim conclusion to elaborate on points resurfacing from previous chapters.  Firstly, there is ǯ     ȋǮǯǡ ǮǯȌ  - ȋǮǯ  Ǯ- ǯǡ Ǯ ǯȌǤ  ǡ     Ǯ-ǯǡǯǮǯ
as non-strategic offender management interventions (see Chapter 7) and here resurfaces in ǯǡhat innovative 
pilot programme, and its contrastingly heavy engagement in the Working Prisons initiative.  
Thirdly, there is the concern with politicisation: that ministerial interest in these high-profile 
areas might distract from their delivery.  Finally, there is the recurrence of the disciplinarity by 




which policymaking is negotiated through professional identities.  For example, there were the  Ǯǯ n PbRǯ ǡ     ǡ  Ǯǯ   ǡ   multidisciplinary Ǯǯ    Ǥ
Reflecting the Blueprint reforms which underpinned 
ǯ ǡ   it of 
professional reference continues below. 
8.5 HMCTS, efficiency and enforcement 
Two policies were traced in HMCTS.  The first originated in JPG, but was far into implementation 
by the fieldwork; the second was entirely agency led.  The focus below is thus on agency team 
narratives. 
8.5.1 CJS Efficiency Programme 
Overview 
To meet MoJǯ Spending Review settlement, its business plan commits to pursuing a range of 
measures that will ǲincrease ǳ(MoJ, 2011a, p.13).  As 
one partner in this, HMCTS is collaborating with the 
ǯ
on the Criminal Justice System (CJS) Efficiency Programme (MoJ, 2011e, 2012b).  This includes 
an effort to better integrate the stages of criminal case administration performed sequentially 
by different organisations, improving the quality and the timeliness of preparation and 
progression (MoJ, 2011e; Document_023).  Electronic case files will be passed between police, 
prosecutors, defence practitioners and HMCTS via secure email (see Baksi, 2011; MacGregor, 
2012), reducing data re-entry and manual working, and enabling criminal justice organisations ǲ        ǳ (MoJ, 2011e, p.1).  This 
complements other modernisation efforts, including increased video technology across the CJS 
(Document_023).  Latterly, it also featured in a white paper, Swift and Sure Justice (MoJ, 2012b). 
HMCTS Team Narrative 
A key prompt for the CJS Efficiency Programme was the 2010 Spending Review.  By historical 
circumstance, the disparate CJS partners each have their own individual budgets and separate 




IT systems, meaning that efficiencies were traditionally sought within individual criminal justice 
organisations, rather than collaboratively (Interview_043).  During the Spending Review ǡǲsuspicious of the Ministry of Justiceǳǡǲwere clearly of 
the view that there was massive money wasted in the join-up between the departmentsǳ
(Interview_053).  Each CJS partner ǲcommitted to what we could do in the siloǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ
but there was a need to look to the interorganisationaǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
Digitisation was already underway in the Crown Prosecution Service (Interview_054), and there ǡǲ-ǡǳǡǲǳ
were required between arrest ǡ ǲ ?Ǥ ?ǳȋ ? ? ?ȌǤǲlooking 
for modern ways of workingǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡǲgravitated towardsǳ 

initiate that process of options appraisal (Interview_054).  Hence, the CJS Efficiency Programme ǲǳǡǲǣǮǢ      ǯǳ ȋ ? ?  ?ȌǤ    ǲ  ǤǤǤ ȏȐ  
ǡ  ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǡǲǳǡǲǡ
be owned by HMCTS [and other Ȑǳǡ
ǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ ǲǤǤǤǯǳǡ ǲǯ
[Ȑǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǲǳǡǲȏȐǳȂ HMCTS, the police and ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ ǡǲ ǳ 
ǡǲǤǤǤǤǤǤǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
ǲǳǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ǣ
_047).  JPG are represented in those goverǡǯ Ǥ  ǡ           ǲǳǡ




involving officials not only from MoJ, but also the Home Office and other departments 
(Interview_039).  The    ǲ       ǯ   ȏ 
Ȑǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ ǡ 
   ǲǤǤǤǯǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
After the transition, JPG initiated the Swift and Sure Justice white paper (MoJ, 2012b).  The CJS 
Efficiency Programme features within this broader portfolio, but it ǲ     ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ   ǲ  ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǡǲǤǤǤ
ǳǡ   ǲ  ǳ  ǲ  ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ   
months, there has been significant JPG-HMCTS email traffic and meetings.  JPG established ǲǳ   ,  ǲ ǳ  ǲ ǳǡ   
officials attend and contribute to these (Interview_046).  The agency has commented on drafts 
and represented judicial views; for example, when it was proposed that the white paper could 
launch from a court, HMCTS vetoed this, on behalf of the judiciary, since these buildings are 
independent of the executive. 
8.5.2 Enforcement contracting 
Overview ǲ    ǳǡ
including criminal fines and confiscation orders (HMCTS, 2013b, p.8).  It also works with other 
CJS partners to process out-of-court financial penalties.  In 2010-2011, 900,000 offenders were ǯǡ ? ? ? ?(HMCTS, 2013a, p.2).  
Assuring compliance is challenging, given incomplete information and avoidance efforts by 
offenders (Interview_044).  MoJ has been criticised for its levels of outstanding debt (Committee 
of Public Accounts, 2011), and various cross-governmental initiatives have sought to improve ǡ        ȋ ǮǯȌ ǡ 




personalised text messages are sent to debtors (Haynes et al., 2013).  Furthermore, as part of a ǯǲǳ(HMCTS, 2011, p.7), and following a departmental   ǲ        ǳ in 
enforcement activity (MoJ, 2011a, p.14), the agency is looking to work with a private sector 
provider.  Given that national distribution and manual processes are particularly restricting 
improvements and creating overheads ǲǳto fine receipts (Document_031), it is 
anticipated that this partnering will bring new ǲ ǡ    ǳ (HMCTS, 2013b, p.8).  Thus, as with NOMS PbR, Enforcement 
contracting advances the ǯ  tsourcing and punishment agendas 
(Document_031). 
HMCTS Team Narrative 
Despite ongoing work to centralise administrative processes into national business centres, 
criminal enforcement is still undertaken by some 1,700 staff in courts around the country 
(Interview_044; Document_031).  Although there is a small team  ǯ  
Directorate overseeing this day-to- ǡ  ǯ -cutting Strategy and        ȋ ? ? ? ?Ǣ  ? ? ? ?ȌǤ   ǲǳ
form, the idea had been mooted in HMCTS for some time ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡǲa piece 
of change which is facilitated by the Coalition agendaǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǲ-developed private sector collection industry which is very 
effective, which has higher levels of technology than we could afford, and is significantly better ǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǲǯȏȐ       ǯ  Ȃ just the way that we do it  ǳǡ        ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ    
submissions to MoJ subcommittees and the main departmental board (Interview_048); for ǡ ǲthe funding requests ... have to run through TJ [Transforming  Ȑǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǡ     
ǡ    ǲ  ǤǤǤ




     ǯ         ǯ ȏȐǳ
(Interview_039). 
 ǲ ǳ   
(Interview_048; Document_031).  It is collaborating with support services in the central MoJ, Ǥǡǡǲto facilitate the best use of this 
contrǳǡ        ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ   
imposition of a collection and pursuit levy on debtors, and also clarifies that enforcement duties 
are non-judicial, thereby reducing risk of legal challenge to any outsourcing (Document_039).  
ǡǲǳǡǡfor 
the MoJ-wide ǡǲwe gave them the words, but they made the bid on our 
behalfǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ   f then conducted the Cabinet Office negotiations, and is  ǲsupporting the bill processǳ  ǲsend[ing] people to the various stages of  ǳ
(Interview_048).  The bill is not owned by the MoJ, and the enforcement aspects are just an 
addendum.  Still, contrary to the official MoJ Blueprint, HMCTS is undertaking this policy-like 
activity (Interview_048).  The danger of insisting that JPG resourced it instead is that they would ǲȏȐprocess to tell you if it's important enough to do it at allǳǡ
might be delay or even disagreement (Interview_048).  Furthermore, as it stands, although 
HMCTS formally relinquished all of its enforcement policy capacity when the agency underwent 
its merger and downsizing, JPG have yet to assign it a space on the Policy Plan (Interview_044).  ǲSo the work shifted but the resources didn'tǳǡ  ǡ  ǡ -outsourcing ǡǲǡǮǯǡǡ
ǯǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǡǲǯ ǡ Ǯȏ 
ȐǫǯǢǯǡ Ǯǡ
ǯǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
8.5.3 Delivering criminal court policy 
Several previous HMCTS themes re-emerged in these two narratives.  In particular, the division ǮǯǮǯǡǡ




latter being operational translation and efficiency design (see Chapter 7), reflects in: the account 
ǯ of the CJS Efficiency Programme; its speedy transition to the three CJS 
partners, once post-agreement delivery became the focus; and the leadership of enforcement 
contracting Ȃ an operational change Ȃ by the agency itself.  Moreover, judicial representation is   ǯ    Swift and Sure  ǡ   ǯ
corporate responsibility is evoked in discussion of MoJ subcommittee integration.  Policymaking 
disciplines are also referenced. 
8.6 OPG and Digital Transformation 
8.6.1 Digital Transformation 
Overview 
OPG is modernising its public guardianship services, exploiting digital technology to enhance 
the accessibility and efficiency of Lasting Power of Attorney (LPA) registration (MoJ, 2012c; 
OPG, 2012b).  Largely a response to ongoing IT failure and growing demand, OPG instigated the 
programme while it still had devolved responsibility for policymaking, but ministers have ǯǲTransforming 
Justiceǳ portfolio (Interview_009).  It also ǯ broader agenda for digital 
public services. Coordinated from the Cabinet Officeǯ new Government Digital Service (GDS), 
this has consolidated departmental websites on a single government domain and articulated an 
aspiration for ǲdigital-by-defaultǳ citizen transactions, for which OPG is to be a pilot (GDS, 2012; 
Lane Fox, 2010).  Ultimately, the aim is to establish a completely digital LPA registration.  An 
intermediate step is to develop a part-digital, part-paper system, where clients prepare and 
submit applications online before printing and signing the paper form and posting this to OPG 
(MoJ, 2012c)Ǥ        ǯ        
demand management ǡ  ǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍs the high error 
rate of wholly paper-based applications.  The OPG and JPG team narratives are retold below. 




OPG Team Narrative     
ǯ        
demand and aging IT infrastructure.  LPA applications have grown dramatically since 2007, 
encouraged by several episodes of high-profile media coverage (BBC, 2010; Lewis, 2009).  OPG 
struggled to cope with this influx, which was well beyond predictions, and agency performance    Ǥ   ǲ-   
ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ     ǡ   ǲǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ ǲ   ǳ   
(Interview_005), and are ǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ.  Better IT would mean that OPG could ǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ ǲget on the front footǳǲǳ   ǲǳ  ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǡ given demographic 
change and need to avoid costly and complex Court of Protection action, the LPA ǲis the product 
that we're trying to make the normǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǲa lot of lawyers 
market this at peopleǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ   ǡ  
ǯ   ǡǲǳ
ǯ   ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ they are concerned that registration is 
bureaucratic (Interview_005; _008). 
The partnership between OPG and GDS was fortuitous.  The agency hoped to digitise anyway, ǲbut ... would have had to do it independentlyǳǡǡǲit would have really been 
on the never-neverǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǡ  t new Cabinet Office embargos on IT ǲǳǡǲpeople here 
found ... really frustratingǳ given the urgency of the change and its obvious service benefits 
(Interview_009).  Thus, OPG ǲmade the connections with GDSǳ    ? ? ? ?Ȃ ǲnot ǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡ
-by-default had ǡǲOPG as being on the, sort 
of, vanguardǳǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 





ǡǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ
he relationship with GDS ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǲ
of things that we wanted and needed to do in support of our Transformation, and they now are ǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ ǡǲtwo big policy 
issues around identity assurance and wet signaturesǳǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ   
ǲlooking into that on our behalfǳ
(Inte ? ? ? ?ȌǤ ǡ 
ǲbasically tell[s] them 
what our policy intention is, what we want to be able to do, and then we work together to get 
that into the consultationǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǡ -centralisatioǡ  ǯ  ǲhappen to the pace that we need [them] toǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  
ǲhave a timetable of what they need to deliver us, and when they need to deliver it ǳ
  ǲdo what we need to doǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ      ǲ about 
holding them to account on thatǳǡ as it must with GDS and the other contractors ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡǲ
ǳǡǲmade a contribution to 
the policy resource costsǳǡnce this guards against de-prioritisation (Interview_005).  Also, the 
  ǲǡ               ǳ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ   ǡ ǡ   
guardianship issues will receive attention in MoJ post-Transformation (Interview_005). 
JPG Team Narrative  
ǯǡ ǡ ǲǳǡentially more problematic than the ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  

ǡǲǮ   ǫ Ǩǯǳǡǡǲ
support their digital progrǳǡǲǳǲǳ
whole (Interview_021).   




The recent centralisation of policy has not been easy for OPG (Interview_045) and, although an  ǡ        ǯ ǲȏȐǯǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
have to come together to make it work, including policy, finance, procurement, and analysis, so ǲ            ǳǡ  
overload them with commissions when there is so much else going on in MoJ (Interview_021).  
Thus, while 
ǲǳǡǲǳ




need to theǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
be produced, but there are some big legal questions around electronic signatures and witnessed 
signatures, and what existing primary legislation will allow for.  Before the consultation can go 
ahead, therefore, it needs to be confirmed that digitisation is possible, legally (Interview_021).  
The agency has drafted a commission to MoJ Legal asking for clarification, and JPG has added to 
that so that just one coordinated subǤǲǡǮǡ  ǤǤǤǯǡ      ǡ     ǡ        ǤǤǤ  ǡ Ǯǡ   ǯ ǡ   ǯ    too ǯǳȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǲ 
to involve, and that could be challenging in terms of whether OPG get what they want right ǳǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤg months, therefore, deadlines 
and priorities may have to be flexible. 
8.6.2 Delivering public guardianship policy 
Again, the OPG policy narrative reflects previous identity traits and evaluations.  In particular,    Ǯǯ    ablers resurfaces here in descriptions of ǯoperating model.  Moreover, the post-Blueprint commodification of 
policy as a tradable object (see Chapter 7Ȍ
ǯ
ǯclient-






involved in the project, and the need to ensure coordinated commissions that reflect wider MoJ 
priorities. 
8.7 Discussion ǡǡǯ
diverse responsibilities.  Individually and collectively, they elaborate identities and evaluations 
from previous chapters, and offer some insight into the lived realities of contemporary 
policymaking in a large, politically-ȋǮǯȌǤ
Moreover, in comparison, they shed light on the narrative construction of key policy events in 
the post-Blueprint delivery of justice policies.  These constructions are explored below. 
8.7.1 Constructing team narratives 
Agency as recipient, collaborator and initiator 
The policy roles of NOMS, HMCTS and OPG vary between recipient, collaborator and initiator.  
For PbR, NOMS was the recipient of a complex and innovative strategy, designed, developed and 
initially piloted in MoJ.  Having neither the experience of outcome-based commissioning nor a 
ready home for this work, ǯ-level engagement, and, even ǡ
ǯǮǯ   Ǯ ǯǤ    ǡ  ǡ ǯ  
Industries function and wealth of experience in offender regimes made for more active and Ǯ-ǯǤǡcollaborator.  Similarly, in HMCTS, the        
    Ǯ  ǯǤ
Moreover, in all three cases, JPG continue to sit on programme delivery boards after formal 
transition to operational responsibility.  Finally, there is the agency-as-initiator Ǥ  
ǯ
Digital Transformation epitomises this, the agencǯ
various providers contributing to its operating model transformation, including JPG and GDS.  




ǡ ǯ      Ǯ ǯǡ  
production of efficiencies rather than a change in the law or policy of enforcement.  Like OPG, 
the agency relied on other MoJ specialisms to deliver some project elements, and was subject to  Ǯǯǡ it remained the driver for the project, even in terms of securing a small 
legislative change. 
Collaboration 
Collaboration took a variety of forms.  In PbR, it was initially confined to senior discussions, but    Ǯ-ǯ ǡ        
single team, with a transition plan, document library, and temporary and permanent staff 
transfers.  This level of coordination reflected the extent to which JPG had departed from its 
regular policymaking role into PbR procurement and commissioning functions that, properly,  Ǯǯ matters for an agency.  For both Working Prisons and the CJS Efficiency 
Programme, there was extensive collaboration throughout.  Joint ministerial submissions, joint 
pieces of work, and negotiated task divisions were important in developing One3One Solutions, 
and the Swift and Sure Justice white paper engagement was similarly close.  Collaboration in 
ǯ          Ǯǯǡ  

havin  Ǯǯ   and OPG holding the Policy Group to account for their Ǥ   Ǯǯ       ǡ   
wider MoJ committees and specialisms, rather than JPG.  Finally, all five case studies were told 
with some reference to policy process disciplinarity Ȃ analysts, procurement, finance, ǮǯǤǡ
the MoJ Blueprint, ensures sound policymaking (see Chapter 7). 
Transition 
The PbR transition to NOMS was planned but contested.  The JPG team were concerned about 
agency readiness, as were some NOMS officials.  However, i   ǯ Ǯǯ ǡ     
-NOMS Senior Responsible Owners, and the wish of 




agency management that prompted the transition.  In HMCTS, similarly, transfer of the CJS 
Efficiency Programme was prompted by recognition of its delivery focus, although this decision 
was not contested.  The other three initiatives differ from this policy-transition-delivery 
schema, largely by virtue of their ongoing operational nature.  NOMS was already delivering 
Prison Industries, and the Downing Street launch simply signalled a diminishing role for JPG.  
The Enforcement programme is simply an enabler of business process change.  And, finally, the    
ǯ   Ȃ the resolution of the legal question, a public 
consultation and any changes to regulations Ȃ represent just one aspect of the wider change 
programme that will establish a new operating model for the agency.   
Table 8.1, overleaf, summarises these three policy narrative constructs Ȃ role, collaboration and 
transition Ȃ and their association with previous identity profiles and policy definitions. 




Table 8.1: Comparing team narratives 
 NOMS HMCTS OPG 
Identity profile  
Differentiation: 
Politics, risks, delivery realism, contestability 
Differentiation: 








ǮǯȋǮǯȌ MoJ options for ministerial ǮagreementǯȋǮǯȌ MoJ business improvement mechanisms 





JPG led scoping and design of 
PbR in ǮBreaking the Cycleǯ 
white paper, as well as 
initial delivery of the pilot 
programme 
Agency as recipient 
contributed at a senior level 
to PbR design, and has 
assumed delivery of the 
pilot programme 
JPG led ǮBreaking the Cycleǯ 
white paper work, and 
some aspects of policy 
design 
Agency as collaborator is 
already delivering prisoner 
work through Prison 
Industries, and contributed 
to white paper and policy 
development 
JPG led scoping of options and 
agreement of objectives, and 
remains on Delivery Board; 
JPG led ǮSwift and Sureǯ 
white paper development 
Agency as collaborator is 
delivering agreed work with 
partners; agency 
represented judiciary in 
white paper discussions 
Agency as initiator envisaged 
project, developed proposal 
by liaising with MoJ 
professional services and 
committees, and is 
supporting some bill work 
 
Agency as initiator envisaged 
digitisation, contacted GDS, 
and is managing the project 
JPG providing the policy 
enablers to digitisation, but 
within the wider context of 
MoJ priorities and with 
concerns about risk and 
wider impact 
Collaboration JPG provided extensive 
support in pilot handover 
process, and is still involved 
in piloting 
JPG involved in delivery 
discussions and Working 
Prisons Board 
Agency attended ministerial 
briefings and contributed to 
joint submissions, both at a Ǯorking-ǯ 
JPG still represented on CJS 
Delivery Board 
Agency included in JPG 
governance for ǮSwift and 
Sureǯ white paper 
JPG approved the request for 
bill work, and made the bid ǯǮǯ JPG and agency produce joint submission to MoJ Legal on aspects requiring 
clarification 
Transition Contested Ȃ prompted by 
delivery status of pilots, but 
working-level concern in 
both agency and JPG at 
transitioning complex 
programme to agency 
None Ȃ Working Prisons 
amends business-as-usual, 
and, after the Downing 
Street launch, JPG 
responsibility diminished 
Negotiated Ȃ once agreed, the 
policy objectives were 
operational and required 
speedy delivery 
None Ȃ an agency-run 
initiative 
Unlikely Ȃ JPG providing Ǯǯ
larger Transformation 
programme that is being 
project-managed from the 
agency 
 





This chapter has completed the empirical presentation.  Following the macro, meso and micro 
analyses of identity and history in the previous chapters, it was concerned with ongoing public 
governance in the MoJ and its three agencies.  The attention to JPG perspectives, the focus on 
team rather than individual narratives, and the newly overt researcher role in their production 
also differentiates this chapter from those preceding, and yet the material illustrates similar   ǯ ǡ      Ǣ ǯ ǮǯǢ
ǯ-prioritisation 
and interdependence.  The policy process disciplinarity identified in Chapter 7 also resurfaced, 
in both MoJ and agency accounts.  Overall, then, the chapter has demonstrated the intimate and 
integrated working relationships involved in delivering Coalition justice policy, including the 
strength of agency engagement as policy receivers, collaborators or initiators.  In this manner,  ? ? ? ?ǯ supposed division of 
departmental policymaking and agency delivery, from which all the justice agencies had Ȃ at 








Chapter 9 Ȃ Reinterpreting Agencies: On Meaning, 
Motive and Policymaking 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The five previous chapters have assembled and interpreted a large volume of qualitative data, 
descending progressively through macro, meso and micro public management discourse.  ǡ      Ǯ ǯǣ ǡ    
constructions of the core political idea; then, in specific reforms to criminal and civil justice in 
the 1990s and 2010s; and finally, amongst the relational organisational identities of current MoJ 
agencies.  Thereafter, attention turned to post-agencification policymaking.  Contextualised by 
foregoing chapters, and especially the identity profiles established for NOMS, HMCTS and OPG, 
emic evaluations were recounted of former and current restructuring to the justice 
policymaking process, before five unfolding initiatives were storied   Ǯǯ.  Together, the empirical presentations provide diverse narrative data, which this 
concluding chapter now synthesises.  In so doing, three main purposes are served.  First, after 
reprising the discursive institutionalist framework from Chapter 3, the research questions on 
agency longevity, post-agencification policymaking, and paradigmatic testament are addressed 
directly.  Second, in light of the epistemology advanced across the thesis, and the substantive 
arguments which this enables, the previously noted methodological tendencies in international 
agency literature are reconsidered.  And finally, the closing discussion anticipates a future 
research agenda, both in the UK and more widely. 
9.2 (Meta-)theoretical reprise 
As explained in Chapter 3, discursive institutionalism combines established post-empiricist 
meta-theory purporting the human and communicative accomplishment of social phenomena, 
with an institutionalist concern for understanding actions through mid-level cultural and 




collective frameworks.  No longer conceived as ontologically static and immutable, discursive 
institutions are dynamic and intangible, manifesting as intersubjective structures of meaning 
that are inherited, maintained and changed through continual symbolic performance (Campbell 
& Pedersen, 2001; Schmidt, 2008, 2010).  In modelling these mechanisms of institutional 
production, preservation and change, Schmidt (2008, p.314) distinguishes between ǲ  ǳǡ        ǡǲǳ
persuasive discourse.  In rendering this foreground-background heuristic operable for tracing 
the evolution of public management, Chapter 3 followed Miller (2012) in looking to institutional 
performance via the semantic connections forged in meaningful narrative, here in the 
combination of argumentation, narrative voice and discursive differentiation.  The ensuing 
empirical pre         ǲǳ
meanings (Wagenaar, 2011, p.18) and their contextually-contingent synchronic and diachronic 
transformation in macro, meso and micro discourse.  The following sections draw together 
these findings under the three research questions. 
9.3 Reinterpreting agencies: on meaning 
From data analysed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, this section attends to the first component of the 
research agenda: 
Research Question 1: What doeǮǯ
the UK, and has this changed over time? 
As Chapter 2 explained, this attention to agency longevity was motivated by several concerns.  
Firstly, there is the tension between the overall maintenance of agency employment figures but 
decline in organisational prevalence.  Reflecting the post-Next Steps trend towards mergers and 
diminished task-specificity, this renders existing literature somewhat dated.  Secondly, given 
this paucity of sustained research interest, a concern with longevity also stems from current 
disagreement on the state of agencification in the UK.  Specifically, while Talbot and Johnson 




(2007, p.55) ǲǳ   ? ? ? ǡ Ǥ(2011, pp.62, 
67) posit the underlying preservation of key agency tenets.  Thirdly, inspiration is drawn from        ǡ  ǯ Ǯ-up ǯ  (Cabinet Office, 1999a, 1999b; Office of Public Services Reform, 2002).  
Again, little attention has been paid to the impact of these latter-day reforms on agencies, which 
includes ǲǳ(Elston, 2013) and a refocusing on the 
departmental entity (Schick, 2002)Ǥǡǯ
suitability for recovering these complex dynamics of continuity and change Ȃ a methodological 
point which is addressed separately below (see Section 9.6). 
Mandated thus, the initial empirical chapters traced continuity and change in the meanings by 
which agencification policy and practice is continually accomplished.  Reporting on their results, 
the first subsection below aǮǯoverning narratives told in macro, meso and  Ǣ      Ǯǯ    
invoke, preserve and transform; and the third offers an overall assessment of institutional 
continuity and change. 
9.3.1 Foreground governing narratives 
Macro discourse   ǯ (2011) model of the composite political idea, Chapter 4 registered 
his     Ǯǯ  -administrative discourse from 
parliament and the core executive.  In terms of the institutionalist framework, its recounting of 
the bipartisan story underpinning the recent Public Bodies Reforms represents the discursive ǲǳǲǳǲ       ǳ (Schmidt, 2008, p.314).  Positing the 
constitutional propriety of departmental rather than delegated governance, the reform ǯ Ǯǯ 
governance, informed by doctrine and only subverted in exceptional circumstances that require 




technical decision-making or political impartiality.  Co-authored by multiple parliamentarians ǯ
of quangos (Box 4.4), this rhetorical story was high-profile during the early years of the 
Coalition Government (Committee of Public Accounts, 2012; NAO, 2012; Public Administration 
Select Committee, 2010), and was retold by MoJ officials. 
Meso discourse 
After situating the MoJ and its responsibilities against their diverse historical contexts, Chapter 
5 descended to meso-level discourse and advanced a second diachronic comparison of historic 
and contemporary agency reform.  Involving a larger but much rationalised justice landscape 
compared with the Next Steps era, the MoJ story reproduces the wider tale of unaccountable   ǯ-length governance, thus essaying a synchronic Ȃ that is, coexistent Ȃ 
elaboration of the core execǯ    Ǥ  ǡ 
with severe financial pressure and the specific underperformance and poor transparency of the 
costly Legal Services Commission, major organisational redesign, redundancies, and cross-
departmental consolidations were instituted, including mandatory shared corporate services 
and centralised policymaking.  Executive agency sponsorship has been discontinued (except in 
the case of the quango-like OPG), and the Legal Aid Agency was established, with both 
developments signalling the singularity and collegiality with which the post-austerit ǮǯǤ 
Micro discourse 
Proceeding from the hermeneutic assumption of relational meaning-making through part-whole 
dialectics (Torfing, 2005; Wagenaar, 2011), Chapter 6 probed micro-level agency discourse for 
relational organisational identities in NOMS, HMCTS and OPG, aiming to register their situated   ǮǯǤ  	       ǮǯǮǯ




core MoJ, these ǲǳ(Ashforth & Mael, 1996, p.24) invoked in identity 
production. 
ǯce, risk, pride, internal contestability and lost ǯǡ
tribulations and restructures.  Most saliently, the de-politicisation promised by agency status in 
the 1990s Ȃ ǯ(1991) review Ȃ was soon to be tested in the then ǯ-agencification crisis.  Two decades later, this historic episode 
of sustained public scrutiny holds continuing significance for NOMS officials.  Though ǡǮǯ
with the risk-laden and media-interested offender ma Ǯǯǯ-ȋǮǯȌǤ

promise, and the increasing departmental integration felt in MoJ shared services and corporacy, 
NOMS lacks many of tǮǯǮǯǡthe 
corporate governance and HR independence for its uniformed prison officers.  
ǯ     ism makes for a governing narrative 
similar    Ǥ       ǯ  
2003, the dismantling of the ancient office of Lord Chancellor in 2005, and the subsequent Ǯǯ ? ? ? ?ive episodes of 
increasingly public disquiet amongst the senior judiciary (see Constitutional Affairs Committee, 
2007; Crook, 2013; Le Sueur, 2004).         ? ? ? ? Ǯǯ
and then in the 2008 revisions to the governance arrangements for HMCS (now HMCTS), by ǯǡ
Chief Justice became party to court resourcing decisions, and all judges gained the loyalty of 
agency officials, who have dual answerability to both constitutional branches of government.  
This renders courts and tribunals delivery an inherently specialised enterprise.  




OPG is differentiated by its size and unusual remit within this wider MoJ context of large, 
politically-salient agencies.  The passing of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 made for increased 
public guardianship activity, with growing interest in, and demand for, Lasting Powers of 
Attorney.  OPG was largely self-reliant in establishing and promoting this important field of 
public policy, as well as in responding to the unanticipated demand, periodic media coverage, 
and associated performance challenges.  The quango-like agency is now operating increasingly     Ǯǯ   ǡ  ǡ   Ǯ
reǯǤ 
9.3.2 Background agency ideas       ǯ (2008) foreground-background model at 
the three levels of discourse, this subsection turns to the more latent elements of institutional 
creation and preservation Ȃ that is, the interpretive resources invoked in the ongoing ǮǯǤ 
Next Steps institutions  ?ǡǯ
diag ǯ poor management capability and a perfect syllogism prescribing 
agencies as remedy (Box 4.1, Box 4.2).  Rhetorically, this positioned managerialism as a ǲǳ      ǯ (2011) model.  Reinforcing this, 
vocally, the Next Steps narrative was one of empowerment, the report being presented as if a 
self-authored thesis of desires and frustrations by the civil service, thereby casting the ǯ agencification response as emancipatory.  In addition, discursive differentiation 
constructed agencies as a decentralised mode of governance, distanced from ministers and 
departments at the governing periphery, and akin in character (if not legally) to public bodies, 
nationalised industries and local authorities.  As Hood (1991, p.6) confirms, the Next Steps ǲǳǲǮ-ǯǳǤ 




  ?ǯ       then diffuse justice sector 
similarly identified managerialist argumentation in rationales for disaggregating HMPS, the 
Court Service and the Public Trust Office.  According to Lygo (1991), prison underperformance 
was partly the   ǯ         
operational matters, despite previous recommendations so to do.  Therein, the ǲǳ ǲǳove 
transformative, should ministers finally heed this warning (Lygo, 1991, pp.9, 11).  Similarly, in ǯǡncy autonomy would advance the 
emerging consumerist agenda through de-regulation and managerial enterprise.  Accordingly, 
in the framework documents of all three agencies, narrative voice effected de-politicisation by 
polarising ministerial forewords and contractual or first-person agency perspectives.  Indeed, in 
HMPS, such was the extent of the anticipated delegation that continuing need for a prisons 
minister was for a time contested (Home Affairs Committee, 1993; Lewis, 1997, p.14).  Finally,    ǯ     hrough the new politico-
bureaucratic bargain constructed in framework documents, whereby chief executive 
empowerment was explicitly traded for performance improvements and personal 
accountability (see Hood, 2001).     
Beyond Next Steps? 
Alternatively, the recent Public Bodies Reforms frame agencification as a constitutionally-
appropriate, politically-proximate and departmental mode of governance.  Replacing the 
managerialist argumentation on the necessity of political and organisational detachment, the 
underpinning enthymeme now centres on the doctrinal primacy of departmentalism.  To similar 
effect, vocally, the post-2010 agencification (for example, in the Department for Education) was 
actioned at the behest of ministers.  There was no suggestion of managerial empowerment, but 
rather an aspiration for ministerial authority commensurate with public perceptions of their 
responsibility for NDPBs.  Thus, without any change of legal status, agencies were relocated to 




the governing centre through discursive differentiation, to sit in opposition to the ǯ-length periphery.   
A similar argument was made in rationalising the new Legal Aid Agency in Chapter 5.  Perceived 
unresponsive and uncontrollable, yet co     ǯ budget,  ǯ
recasting as an agency was again narrated as a centralising and consolidating solution that 
rendered new accountability to a previously wayward enterprise.  The reform was empowering 
to both ministers and departmental officials, and was constructed not as a public service 
bargain between politicians and the agency chief executive, but as an intra-MoJ delegation 
between senior civil servants.  As in the wider Public Bodies Reforms, therefore, agencification 
is a conduit for removing executive activity into the departmental centre.  And it was not only in 
comparison to quangos that agency departmentalisation occurred in meso-level MoJ discourse.  
Within the wider Blueprint redesign, agency sponsorship was abandoned for representing a    Ǯ ǯ  MoJ could ill afford, and which in any case 
poorly reflected the collegiality and common purpose between department and agency in 
assuring performance improvement and transparency in justice services. 
At the micro level, ǯ organisational narrative of prior failure and ongoing political 
salience  Ǯǯ  
unattainable promise that merely enabled HR autonomy and Accounting Officer delegation.  
More affirmatively, in HMCTS, the history of fraught judicial-executive relations and its 
prompting of a  Ǯǯ rendered a new interpretation of agency status and the 
framework document as signalling the constitutional correctness of judicial delimitation from ǯ ǡ -dominated activities.  Finally, in OPG, its individuality of size and 
remit, as well as its statutory officeholder and other NDPB-like characteristics, followed NOMS 
in transforming the agency concept into a minimalist interpretation of corporate governance.  




Given this institutional creation, narration and transformation, Table 9.1 lists the historic and 
contemporary background agency ideas, and the foreground stories that interpolate and latterly 
enable them. 
Table 9.1: Ǯǯ in macro, meso and micro discourse 

































The near-impossibility of 
de-politicising the risky 
and complex offender Ǯǯ 





The historic confrontation 
of the judicial and 
executive branches, and 
constitutional uniqueness 
of their new partnership 
Constitutional correctness 
in delimiting judicial 
interests within the MoJ 
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The individuality of the 






9.3.3 Institutional change: ǮǯǮǯǫ  
As Table 9.1 indicates, if comparing contemporary fieldwork discourse with former meso and 
macro precepts, diachronic reinterpretation has proceeded across all three discursive levels.  In 
other words, having been synchronically elaborated in the 1990s justice reforms, the key tenets 
of managerialism, empowerment and decentralisation all but disappear from contemporary   Ǯǯ in ideational, sectoral and organisational discourse.  According to 
discursive institutionalism and its founding in constructivist meta-theory, these 
transformations arise at least in part from the ontology of social phenomena as continual re-
accomplishments of symbolic performance (Berger & Luckmann, 1971; Miller, 2012).  This 





the operation of the part-whole hermeneutic circle, reconfigure agency sensemaking.  Thus, 
stories including constitutional propriety, departmental reform and consolidation, political 
salience, constitutional uniqueness and de-prioritisation have together allowed for agencies to 
be talked about in different ways, forging new semantic relations and collapsing old ones.  These 
are, of course, but a snapshot of the complex and extended governing dialogue essayed in the ǮǯǤ   entury, (trans)national concern with 
the problems of state fragmentation and its decoupling of policy systems provided narrative 
resources from which, along similar lines, transformation of former separatist agency logic 
could perhaps be traced (for example, Cabinet Office, 1999a; Cabinet Office, 1999b; Office of 
Public Services Reform, 2002; OECD, 2005).  As Chapter 2 explained, Schick (2002, p.51) noted  ǯ      ǲdepartmental subdivisions, not independent 
entitiesǳǡ
(2003b, p.14) ǡǡǲreined back into 
departmentsǳǤ     e present thesis is not, therefore, that agency 
reinterpretation has been dramatic and reactionary after 2010, but rather that shifting 
administrative priorities, new political events and challenges, and their narration with varying 
levels of specificity in ideational, sectoral and organisational discourse has gradually amended 
the interpretive    Ǯǯ   ǡ ǡ  
meaning(s). 
Doctrinally, the Next Steps programme was not a radical departure in 1988, but an extension of  Ǯaccountable managementǯ philosophy underpinning much of the Thatcher 
ǯ
civil service reforms (see Chapter 2).  This combines ex-ante de-regulation with ex-post 
responsibility (Gray & Jenkins, 1986, 1993), and can operate at multiple organisational and 
interorganisational levels, from within-team delegations to externalised principal-agent 
contracting.  While the interpretive departures essayed above indicate regression from the Ǯǯ   the Ǯ ǯ bargain, the affirmative contemporary 
understandings  Ǯǯ in Table 9.1 indicate a strengthening of its accountability function.  




At the macro level, agency was latterly interpreted as enabling political accountability over 
bureaucracy; at the meso-level, agency meant improving inter-departmental transparency and 
securing proper corporate governance; and finally, at the micro-level, agency was similarly cited 
in terms of the Accounting Officer delegation, financial accounting and open audit requirements 
in both NOMS and OPG, while it imparts constitutional correctness and clarity over remit in 
HMCTS.  In this manner, if agency status was originally taken to epitomise accountable 
management in government (Drewry & Giddings, 1995; Gray & Jenkins, 1993; Hyndman & Eden, 
2001; TCSC, 1988b), the contemporary interpretation tends towards a depiction of agencies as Ǯ  ǯǤ  The irony of this asymmetric departure is, perhaps, that the agency 
development was initially received with scepticism about the future assurance of proper public 
and parliamentary accountability for the newly devolved executive functions (for example, 
Evans, 1995).  This only heightens the degree to which modern politico-administrative 
discourse transgresses from early Next Steps precepts. 
9.4 Reinterpreting agencies: on policymaking 
Turning to Chapters 7 and 8, this section addresses the second part of the research agenda: 
Research Question 2: What position do agencies occupy within the policymaking process, and 
has this changed over time? 
In the UK as internationally, agencification is frequently cited as a reform intended to decouple 
policymaking and operations (Hogwood, 1995; James, et al., 2011; Verhoest, et al., 2010).  ǡǲǳǲǳ(Osborne & 
Gaebler, 1992, p.34), achieving greater organisational role purity (Christensen & Lægreid, 
2006a, p.12), reasserting political primacy over bureaucracy (Aucoin, 1990) and limiting the 
provider capture predicted by public choice theory (Dollery, 2009).  Although, as demonstrated 
in Chapter 2, some commentators have long been sceptical about the extent to which Next Steps 
achieved its decoupling aims in Whitehall (Greer, 1994; Hogwood, et al., 2001; Pyper, 1995), 
these analyses were confined to framework document reviews during the initial rollout of 




ǡ ǡ ǡ    ǯ     
fragmentation (Cabinet Office, 1999b).  Furthermore, the two existing but otherwise-focused 
theoretical accounts of Next Steps, which draw upon bureau-shaping theory (James, 2003) and 
policy network theory (Gains, 1999, 2003a), offer contradictory expectations of ǯ likely 
policy role.  On this basis, the thesis has explored changing constructions of the department-
agency task division since the mid-1990s.  The following subsections attend to the policy-
delivery distinction as an enduring civil service institution; its false translation as an 
organisational divide; and the character of austerity-era policymaking in MoJ. 
9.4.1 An enduring institution 
Chapter 4 identified rhetorical enthymeme not only in the   ǯ diagnosis of ǯ  ǡ        -agencification division of 
labour.  While the document was overt both in distinguishing policy and management as 
separate civil service tasks, and in prescribing  ǯ   agencies, the 
notion of the policy-less agency is an implicit inference from these given premises (Box 4.3).  
According to the general analytic framework, the co-productive sensemaking required of an 
enthymeme makes for a rhetorical presentation (Jasinski, 2001; Morrell & Hewison, 2013), as 
well as one that rests on the intersubjective understanding of an interpretive community 
(Feldman & Sköldberg, 2002; Feldman, et al., 2004).  The suggestion is thus that the distinction 
of policy and management as separate civil service tasks is institutionalised, even if not readily 
articulated.  Indeed, since at least the nineteenth-century Northcote-Trevelyan Report and its   ǲǳ  ǲǳ ǡ      
division of labour between policy and its delivery (see Cline, 2008), and the present inductive 
return to Whitehall agencification points to the institutional preservation and enhancement of 
this, unlike the evolution claimed for the core Ǯǯinterpretations, above.  In particular, this 
continuity is achieved through the pan-    Ǯǯ, and the disciplinary 
identities with which justice policymaking is narrated. 




The bureaulore of failure by isolation 
Chapter 7 drew on ideas  ǲ ǳ (Gabriel, 1991, 2000) to interpret a 
common tale of policy failure across NOMS and HMCTS.  The intersubjectivity of this account, 
and its institutional preservation of the policy-delivery dichotomy, came in its argumentation 
and folkloric manner.  Thus, it was by  Ǯǯ
policy that historic failure was explained, again signalling a rhetorical and intersubjective basis 
for the dualist policy-delivery classification of tasks (Box 7.24).  Moreover, given that folklore is 
partly defined as an expression of group knowledge (Ben-Amos, 1971), the communality, 
tradition and symbolism of the bureaulore, epitomised, perhaps, by the policy-projectile 
metaphor, again points to the intersubjectivity of its underpinning dichotomy of policy and 
delivery tasks. 
The disciplinarity of policymaking 
Across Chapters 7 and 8, tales of historic and contemporary policymaking made frequent 
reference to policy disciplines.  This reflects the cross-government professionalisation of the 
civil service, which has included    Ǯ ǯ  (see Civil 
Service, 2010)ǤǮǯǮǯ
include analysts, procurement specialistsǡ  Ǯǯ   ǡ  
continued to be narrated as central to the knowledge exchange envisaged in ǯ post-ǡ ǮǯǤ  Moreover, within Chapter 8ǯ team accounts, the 
transition of policy into delivery was a key narrative event.  For example, it was storied as 
unusual for JPG to undertake the initial pilots for Payment by Results once the consultation 
exercise was complete, this being a delivery rather than policy task.  Similarly, in HMCTS, it was 
department-agency agreement on the operational nature of the CJS Efficiency Programme that 
prompted its transition to the partner CJS agencies. 





Invoking the discursive institutionalist framework, Table 9.2 now explains the preservation of 
dichotomous work categories as a background idea (the policy-management dichotomy) 
achieved through ongoing foreground narrative (the bureaulore and disciplinary policymaking).  
In contrast to the agency institution, therefore, contemporary governance narratives offer 
resources by which the task division remains salient.  As such, this intersubjective heuristic has 
outlived its Next Steps rendering (as it equally predated it). 
Table 9.2: Preserving the dichotomy 
Historic ideas Foreground narratives Contemporary ideas 
Policy and management 
as separate civil service 
functions 
The bureaulore of failure 
by isolation; the 
disciplinary narration of 
the policy process 
Policy and operational 
delivery as separate civil 
service functions, 
supplemented by other 
disciplines 
 
9.4.2 Narrating the task division 
In recounting different evaluations of the post-Next Steps task division, Chapter 7 described the 
programme of purposeful decentralisation pursued in the former Department for Constitutional 
Affairs.   ǯ   ǡ which extended to transport, 
home affairs and trade and industry during the 2000s (see Chapter 2), this reorganisation 
removed policy responsibilities to HM Courts Service, the Tribunals Service, and the outgoing 
Public Guardianship Office, which thereafter engaged in ministerial advice, primary and 
secondary leǡ  ǡ    Ǯolicy ǯǤ    ǡ       ǲǳ  
policy is centralised within departments (Jenkins & Gold, 2011, p.14).  However, if, as Section 
9.3 argued, the interpretive reconstruction of the departmental boundary predates the Coalition 
Government and was partly enabled  ǯ Ǯ- ǯ ǡ 
reunification policy and delivery within agencies is much less dramatic, representing more of a 
work reassignment between co-directorates than a mode of principal-agent decentralisation.  




Indeed, one official described this manner of reorganisation a  ǮǯȋBox 
7.13).  Moreover, such functional reaggregation might itself reinforce departmentalisation, 
engendering new interdependencies between ministerial departments and conjoined policy-
delivery agencies.  On this point, it will be recalled from Chapter 2 that Elder and Page (2000) 
envisaged that agency maturity might engender new frontline dependencies if operational 
expertise in departments declined.  Chapter 7 adds substance to that prediction. 
In addition to charting Next Stepsǯicy-delivery digression, Chapter 7 drew on agency identity    Ǯǯ  Ǯ ǯ    (Colebatch, 2002, 2006).  
Alongside the bureaulore, common narrative devices registered across the three agencies, 
including the polarisation of MoJ intellectualism and delivery-realism.  Nonetheless, overall, the 
analysis pointed to considerable synchronic variation    Ǯǯ  
challenges and opportunities of its making.  In NOMS, policy was constructed in terms of the ǯ still-    ǡ   ǯ
intellectual and system- Ǯǯ; in HMCTS, its role involved the post-agreement  Ǯǯǡ    Ǯǯ
the need to preserve the constitutional separation of powers; and in OPG, reflecting the 
statutory basis of public guardianship services which require consultation and secondary 
legislation for even simple amendmentsǡ Ǯǯ represents its recently lost mechanisms for 
effecting business improvement.  Recognition of the diversity of work types receiving emic ǮǯǢǡ(2005) have already 
pointed to the many types of work performed by departmental policy officials.  Moreover, there 
is growing international evidence of the important policymaking role played by supposedly 
managerialist public agencies (Bach, et al., 2012; Verhoest, et al., 2010; Verschuere & Bach, 
2012).  However, the irrational complexities and contingencies described above point to the 
danger of collapsing disorderly governance processes into the reified concepts necessary for 
large-N population methodology (see below).  Moreover, this international literature focuses       ǯ   emits (Niklasson & 




Pierre, 2012, p.201)ǡ   
  ǯ    
extended considerably beyond their own operational jurisdictions.  Finally, this degree of post-
Next Steps transgression from the original decoupling intention has yet to be recognised in the 
UK literature. 
9.4.3 Austerity-era policymaking in the MoJ 
Departing from the main thesis, the final empirical presentation in Chapter 8 storied five 
ongoing justice policy programmes, noting continuity and elaboration of foregoing identity 
profiles and disciplinarity, as well as considerable agency involvement in policy formulation and 
development.  Indeed, contrary to the neo-Next Steps centralisation implied  ǯ  ? ? ? ?
Blueprint redesign, NOMS, HMCTS and OPG were characterised as policy initiators and 
collaborators as well as receivers in the delivery of 
ǯ 
programme.  Undermining the purchaser-provider logic of NPM-style policy-delivery 
decoupling, this again supports claims of ǯ departmentalisation, the MoJ having 
instigated a corporate response to its political redirection after May 2010.   
Policy disciplinarity was also central to Chapter 8ǯ team stories, being narrated, for example, in 
regard to ǮǯǡǮǯǡǮǯ.  This centrality of professional 
affiliation bolsters recent claims for reduced generalism in the civil service (Greer & Jarman, 
2010), but the area remains under-researched.  In particular, further work is needed to 
understand the advantages and challenges of project-management methodology in governance 
organisations, and the consequences of replacing subject knowledge with technical disciplinary 
specialism. 
9.5 Agencies: on motive 
Having explored both empirical questions posed in Chapter 2, this section draws on the whole 
data presentation to consider the final, conceptual aspect of the research agenda: 
Research Question 3: What does an understanding of the evolving meaning and policymaking 
role of executive agencies suggest about the stability of managerialism in Whitehall? 




As Chapter 2 explained, this concern with the paradigmatic testament of contemporary agency 
policy and practice develops, firstlyǡǯre NPM precepts, and 
the empirical interest in tracing continuity and change against that original model.  In addition, 
since the elevation      ǲ  ǳ in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Pollitt, 2006, p.301), there has been growing interest in the longer-term fate of agencification 
as an expression of public management doctrine (MacCarthaigh & Roness, 2012; Verhoest, et al., 
2011), yet little or no attention to this in the UK.  This section duly explores paradigmatic 
continuity and change, drawing comparisons against the ideal-Ǯǯ described in 
Chapter 2. 
9.5.1 Continuity and change against the tripod model ǡǲǳǲǳǡǲǳǡ ǲǳ  ǲ      ǳ(Pollitt, et al., 2004, p.42).  Against these 
tenets, there is broad overlap    ǯ (1991, pp.4-5) seven doctrines of NPM Ȃ ǲ      ǳǡ ǲ-  ǳǡ ǲǳǤǤ 
Disaggregation 
Being administrative rather than legal entities, Next Steps agencies were always somewhat 
constrained on this measure of the tripod compared to international agency reforms (Pollitt, et 
al., 2004, p.36).  Nonetheless, as Chapter 4 indicated, the original agencification narrative 
centred upon such notions of decentralisation and the removal of executive activity to the 
governing periphery, and recent academic commentaries continue to reference agencies in 
these terms.  Pyper and Burnham (2011, p.196), for instance, describe agencies as only ǲȏȐ[s]ǳǡ	(2012, p.332), critical of   
ǯ    ǡ   is ǲ   ǤǤǤ
built, to a large extent, on a constitutionally dubious distinction between executive agencies and 




ǯǡ  tents and ǡǳǤ 
The evidence presented in this thesis provides a broad-based challenge to these implicit 
assumptions of continuity in agency disaggregation, although the situation is differentiated 
across macro, meso, and micro strata.  In the contemporary discourse of both the core executive 
(Chapter 4) and the MoJ (Chapter 5), fundamental difference is posited between consolidated, 
politically-proximate and accountable agencies, and the ǯ-length governing periphery.  Still, 
the situation is likely to differ across government, as indicated by the mistaken inclusion of 
agencies in some departmental returns to the central Public Bodies review (NAO, 2012, p.8).  In 
micro justice discourse, the situation is increasingly complex.  Following the ideational and 
sectoral reinterpretations noted above, there were few claims to decentralisation or de-
politicisation across the three justice agencies.  NOMS partakes in joint ministerial briefings 
alongside Justice Policy Group officials, as if together performing ǲMoJ-officials-advising-our-ǯ ǳ (Box 6.8).  Similarly, if it were not for ǯpartnership, its staff would be 
like any other civil servants in ǲwrit[ing] whatever the minister wantsǳ in a white paper (Box 
6.17).  And in OPG, their ǲǳ iǲǳ of the 
agency model (Box 6.36).  Nonetheless, Chapter 6 also compared the horizontal and vertical 
identity profiles of each justice agency against those anticipated by the Next Steps model.  Here 
it was shown that, as Next Steps predicts, all three essay substantial identity differentiation 
against the core MoJ, be that on the basis of risk management, operational pride and internal 
contestability; operational intimacy; or size and policy sector.  This confounds the predominant 
departmentalisation and reaggregation trend, although, significantly, there were few claims to 
independence rationalised as a public management solution Ȃ the core of the Next Steps 
proposition.  Moreover, the synchronic variegation in this micro-level discourse when 
compared with the unity of the meso and macro spheres might be a product of its status as 
organisational fieldwork data.  Therefore, in the much modernised post-Next Steps Whitehall, 
further analysis is needed to explore whether identity construction in newly departmentalised 




agencies differs from that in regular core directorates which are themselves subject to growing 
managerial and corporatising reforms, as seen in Justice Policy Groupǯ  
management, Policy Plan, and project methodology (see Chapter 8). 
Autonomisation 
This dimension of the tripod model refers to the reduced regulation supposedly granted by 
agency status, designed to enable public sector entrepreneurialism.  In Chapter 4, the Next Steps 
argumentation was indeed shown to rest upon enthymematic prescription of management 
freedom to ǯǤIts intersubjectivity, according to the general analytic 
framework, reflects ǯcontemporaneous ideological predominance, described elsewhere by 
Lowndes (1997, p.43) ǲǳǡ(1993, p.6) ǲǳǡ
and Clarke and Newman (1997, p.86) ǲǳǲǳǲ ǳǤ  Conversely, in the contemporary Public Bodies discourse, the idea of 
management autonomy for the sake of improved public services was nowhere to be seen, 
whether explicitly or implicitly.  Moreover, the new Legal Aid Agencyǯ  was 
actually designed tǯ, which, again through enthymeme, was 
diagnosed as the obvious cause of its underperformance (Box 5.6).  This ideological realignment 
illustrates what Talbot and Johnson (2007, p.53) identify as a wider post-1990s dislodging of ǲǳl in ǲǳ. 
More broadly, like the rest of Whitehall, executive agencies are currently subject to the controls 
and embargos established by the Coalition Government in its efforts to control the fiscal deficit 
(see examples in Cabinet Office, 2011).  This is part of a wider strengthening of the core 
executive after 2010, including through the creation of the Efficiency and Reform Group, the 
Government Digital Service, and the Major Projects Authority (NAO, 2012a).  Furthermore, 
while the MoJ agencies already partake in interorganisational shared services, and have 
suffered some de-autonomisation as a result, the prospect of cross-governmental consolidation 
is likely to bring further challenges to the agency model in the coming years (Elston & 




MacCarthaigh, 2013).  Again, research will need to chart these developments and their impact 
on established public management infrastructure.  
Contractualisation 
The contractual basis of agencies is perhaps the area of greatest departure from Next Steps and 
its codifying of the tripod precepts.  MoJǯ austerity programme largely abandoned agency 
sponsorship in favour of collegial delivery.  Even before this, however, the previous argument 
about the intra-Ǯǯ of Ǯǯpolicymaking to agencies 
similarly undermines the principal-agent contractualism advocated in public choice theories of 
provider capture.  More broadly, after the general decline in framework document maintenance 
noted in Chapter 2, diminished salience was confirmed in both NOMS and OPG (Box 6.13, Box 
6.36).  The HMCTS document was frequently cited by officials, but this concerned its enshrining 
of the judicial-executive partnership and, contrary to the tripod model, was explicitly not a 
document that was ǲever there for the departmentǳ (Box 6.26).  Similarly, tǯ
framework document followed the wider macro and meso reform narratives of centralisation 
and consolidation, creating not a public service bargain between ministers and officials, as was 
the case in the 1990s, but rather an agreement between the senior officials of the department 
(see Chapter 5).  Again, agencification represents neither the decentralisation nor de-
politicisation necessary for principal-agent contractualism.   
Despite this interpretive shift, the fact remains that agencies continue to require frameworks, 
and, under the Coalition Government, both NOMS and HMCTS have re-issued documents (Lord 
Chancellor & Secretary of State for Justice, 2011; MoJ, 2011f).  In part, this reflects their 
necessity for sound corporate governance (Box 6.13, Box 6.36), but, in style, they continue in the 
contractual manner developed in the initial Next Steps rollout.  This ostensible continuity 
perhaps accounts for some of the stasis assumed in academic commentary.  
 ǯ 
reading of considerable evolution, however, an alternative account might develop from 
Atkinson and ǯ (2011)   ǲ ǳǤ  Framework documents are 




highly conventionalised, epitomising what Finlayson (2007, p.556) ǲǳȂ 
that is, mode of discourse codified by certain structural, stylistic and oratorical conventions ǲǡemselves from other kinds of ǳǤ  For example, there is the prospective and contractual narrative voice, the pseudo-legal 
referencing of interrelating Ǯǯǡthe paragraph numbering.  Such documentary realities ǲns of organisational routines, decision-making processes, or  ǳǡ however, but the means    ǲ  ǳ (Atkinson & Coffey, 2011, p.79). In short, 
reproduction of the agency framework document genre some twenty-five years after its 
inception is a matter of intrigue from the perspective of organisational identity, but is not in 
itself a sign of stalled public management. 
9.5.2 Paradigmatic continuity and change  
Benchmarked against the tripod model, then, the contemporary agency policy and practice 
narrated in the thesis performs badly against all three managerialist components, although 
greatest departure is from contractualism.  Still, as noted above, affirmative interpretations of Ǯǯǡdeparture from the 
original accountable management philosophy (see Section 9.3.3, above).  As well as 
managerialism, the assurance of accountability and imposition of new forms of bureaucratic 
control are significant NPM themes (Hoggett, 1996), following the desire for reasserted political 
primacy over public institutions (Aucoin, 1990).  In this manner, the use of agencies as an 
accountability instrument suggests a potentially differentiated evolution of NPM, whereby its 
high tide of emancipatory and contractual rhetoric has passed, depositing a watermark of more 
lasting governing infrastructure Ȃ annual reports, business plans, Accounting Officer 
responsibilities, and the framework document Ǯgenreǯ discussed above.  This type of account 
accords with international claims of doctrinal layering and hybridity (Christensen & Lægreid, 
2011).  The extent to which it constitutes a paradigm change, however, is a complex matter for 
another dissertation.  Given the contemporary concern with public accountability across the 




establishment, especially after the recent MPs expenses, cash-for-honours, phone hacking and 
tax evasion scandals, this will need to be couched within a broader consideration of social 
commentary and critique, against which accountability in public governance gathers new 
meaning compared to 25 years ago. 
9.6 Methodological reflections 
Public administration has enjoyed something of a reflexive turn in recent years, with scholars 
paying new attention to the opportunities afforded by post-positivism (Haverland & Yanow, 
2012; Hay, 2011; Jun, 2006; Riccucci, 2010; Wagenaar, 2011; White, 1999).  Interpretive     ǡ ǡ ǡ   ǯ  
anthropology and sociology, the few available studies are confined to high-level (trans)national 
analyses of documented reform ideas (Moynihan, 2006; Smullen, 2004, 2010).  In extending this 
approach from macro ideational discourse to a specific policy sector and three organisations in 
which Ǯǯ    -to-day governance, this thesis has sought to elaborate 
that promising but still confined field.  In so doing, it has departed from the three 
methodological tendencies noted in Chapter 2.  These are reconsidered below, after an initial 
reflection on the overall narrative strategy. 
9.6.1 Interpretive and narrative methods 
Interpretive research advances not a theoretical agenda but an axiomatically-different meta-
theory Ȃ a paradigm of social science that propagates distinct knowledge claims and standards 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012).  In particular, replacing traditional 
positivist concerns with internal and external validity, reliability and objectivity are alternative 
aspirations for credibility, transferability and dependability, compliance with which is sought 
through, for example, transparency of method and interpretation, depth of field engagement, 
and Ǯthick descriptionǯ (Guba & Lincoln, 1982).  Amongst the most significant theoretical and 
methodological challenges facing interpretive social science is the registering of social and ǲǳ(Wagenaar, 2011).  Accordingly, the strategy 




in this thesis has been to attend to narrative as a near-pervasive and deeply social mode of 
communication (Bal, 1985; Pentland, 1999; Riessman, 2008), aided by the general analytic 
framework of argumentation, voice and differentiation.  Together, these components of story 
make for neither an exhaustive toolkit nor one aimed at Ǯǯ ǡ  rather 
represent a mutually-reinforcing aid to registering (some) synchronic and diachronic meaning.  
Nonetheless, intersubjectivity remains a challenge in narratives retold beyond individual 
storytellers.   Thus, although a pragmatic means of understanding something of contemporary 
governing processes, Chapter 8ǯ  
axiom of preserving individually authored structures, and, in so doing, potentially introduces 
greater researcher dominance into the constructed policy stories.  New research must thus give 
greater consideration to the communality of narrative form within grouped situations, and how 
this is to be registered.  
9.6.2 Three methodological tendencies: a case for redirection? 
De-contextualisation 
Regarding the existing, recently burgeoning international agencification canon, the first 
methodological tendency identified in Chapter 2 is towards de-contextualisation.  This is a 
product of the predominance of administrative system analysis, whereby large-N techniques of 
organisational ecology chart longitudinal evolution in agency populations and their aggregative 
demographics of autonomy and control.  Undoubtedly, studies of administrative 
decentralisation have advanced considerably under this research paradigm, which affords 
cross-national comparison and a variety of theoretical models.  However, the method has ǡǮǯ
their day-to-day work and the contingent policy systems in which that work is performed.   
In cross-governmental analysis, organisations are necessarily conceived as generic members of 
a wider collectivity readily defined by the shared (pseudo-ȌǮǯǤ
is both homogenising and determinist, collapsing together otherwise diverse and unconnected 




governing activities simply by virtue of a shared public management label.  It is also insensitive 
to interpretive diversity, leading to the problematic as   ǯ  
subtraction from the overall population carries the same meaning both synchronically and 
diachronically, with population continuity thus representing a proxy measure for policy and 
paradigm continuity.  In other words, contemporary agencification is assumed to still engender 
tripod-style disaggregation, autonomisation and contractualisation.  As this thesis has shown, 
the interpretive malleability of public management artefacts Ȃ across both synchronic and 
temporal contexts Ȃ renders this assumption untenable.  It is only by contextual reading that, for ǡ    ǯ        
testament to NPM-style contractualism, but as a product of its constitutionally-dangerous 
proximity to penal delivery.  Equally, it is only by situating NOMS within its historical 
contingencies and emic understandings of task and politics, or by reading OPG against its 
concerns with de-ǡ     Ǯǯ   function of corporate 
governance can be registered.  These meanings, which accomplish agencification on a day-to-
day basis, are unavailable in abstracting system analysis, and yet are the essence of a public 
governance system in which agency status is only ever one artefact, and a constructed one at 
that. 
Deductive empiricism 
The hypothesis-led testing of etic concepts and theories is an enabler of large-N system analysis 
and the explanatory research which dominates agencification scholarship.  Its appropriateness 
for social research is largely a matter for considered epistemological conviction, and it is not the 
intention here Ǯǯ of yesteryear.  However, following the previous 
critique of administrative system analysis, the possibilities of an alternative, inductive and emic 
approach can be identified in relation to the arguments expounded in this thesis.  In particular, 
existing research in the UK has assumed broad continuity in the post-Next Steps period, so that 
agencies mean departmental detachment (Pyper & Burnham, 2011), contractual performance 
management (James, et al., 2011), an affinity with other quangos (Flinders & Skelcher, 2012) 




and the epitome of NPM (Drewry, 2011).  Though consistent with Next Steps precepts, these 
characterisations are unreflective of the emic perspectives which this thesis has Ȃ however 
approximately and provisionally Ȃ sought to elucidate.  Equally, outside the UK, the 
internationalisation of the agency research agenda over the last decade has engendered both 
theoretical and methodological homogenisation (see Chapter 2), including standardised 
definitions and measures of key concepts such as autonomy and control (Verhoest, et al., 2004).  
Latterly, concern has grown as to the expediency of this approach for capturing the complexities 
and contingencies of policy processes (Bach & Verhoest, 2012), and the social constructivist 
perspective advanced in this thesis bolsters that call for increased qualitative attention to post-
agencification policymaking, again on the basis of the interpretive malleability of work defined 
situationally ǮǯǡǮǯǮǯǤ 
Concept or process research 
The third tendency identified in Chapter 2 is, again, a product of administrative system analysis.            Ǯǯǡ Ǯ ǯ   ǡ    snapshot evaluations which instantiate 
the previous tendencies towards de-contextualisation and etic definition.  There are many 
challenges to conducting alternative, process-based research, not least practical constraints of 
time and access.  Nonetheless, if agencified governance is to be studied with new proximity to 
its day-to-   ǡ  ǲ   ǳ (Gains, 2011) with 
public organisations and policy systems is unavoidable.  The team stories essayed in Chapter 8 
are an early effort in this direction. 
9.7 Conclusion: new directions in agency research 
The arrival and development of executive agencies in Whitehall was received differentially, with 
government, parliament and some commentators claiming a civil service revolution (Drewry, 
2011; James, 2003; TCSC, 1990), but others positing a far less dramatic process of restructuring 
(Hogwood, et al., 2001; Talbot, 2004).  A broad conclusion of this thesis might be that, whatever 




the state of affairs during the early implementation, the long-term evolution has been to 
diminish the impact of agencification through departmentalisation, resource interdependence, 
and new emphasis on corporate and political accountability, rather than autonomy and 
decentralisation.  However, as noted previously, agencification was pursued not as an end in 
itself, but rather as a means of revitalising and modernising the civil service.  The extent to 
which that aspiration was achieved remains an empirical question, and one of considerable 
import if, as this thesis has argued, ǯ  vis-à-vis core departments has 
declined.  Potentially, de-agencification signals not regression, but adaptation.  It is this 
longitudinal perspective that is missing from much existing work in the UK, and yet this is a 
growing concern of the international scholarly community.  As such, there is much to be gained 
from instigating Ǯǯ, including fuller understandings of the extent of 
institutional fracture in contemporary Whitehall, the nature of the post-agencification 
policymaking process, and the capabilities of the modern civil service. 
Beyond the UK, then, there have been considerable advances over the last decade.  ǯ-length 
governance has enjoyed sustained research endeavour, and many empirical and theoretical 
advances have been claimed.  Nonetheless, that research agenda faces its own challenges in 
accounting for the complex, political and ineluctably social ontology of public governance.  In 
particular, ongoing methodological homogenisation must be viewed with some criticality, 
particularly for its tendencies towards de-contextualisation, deduction and snapshot evaluation.  
In so doing, qualitative case studies, ethnographies and other interpretive strategies may be 
found to offer promising avenues for future exploration.  It must never be forgotten that 
agencies strive to deliver public outcomes in often challenging circumstances and amongst a 
mass of historical and cultural contingency.  By appreciating this governing Ǯwholeǯǡ 
rounded explanations of agencification as an important but increasingly indivisible component 
of modern governance may well be forthcoming. 




Appendix I Ȃ Agency Reform Across the UK and Devolved Administrations 
 
Chapter 2 identified divergence in post-Next Steps agency rationalisation between UK central 
government and the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  The 
three commentaries and four tables below elaborate upon this. 
Scotland 
Closely paralleling political events, Scotland saw no major rationalisation until 2008.  In 2001, 
the Executive proposed reducing the number of non-departmental bodies by returning 
functions to either the core government or an executive agency (Scottish Executive, 2001, p.6).  
Agencies were painted favourably since they allow ǲ      ǳ   ǲ   ǳ (Scottish Executive, 2001, pp.18-
19).  Across 2001-2006, the number of Scottish agencies duly rose to 18.  However, with the 
change of administration in 2007 came renewed concern that Scotland had too many disparate  Ǥ   Ǯ ǯ  launched, and agencies were no longer Ǥ ǡǲȏȐǳ(Scottish Government, 2009, p.12).  Six 
agencies were reabsorbed in 2008 and 2009, although two new agencies were also designated.  
By the end of 2010, Scotland had 13 agencies, indicating that the extent of de-agencification 
remained limited. 















































































































Launches 1 2 1 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 20 
Reintegrations - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 3 - 6 
Misc. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 
Net Change +1 +2 +1 +3 +1 +1 0 +1 0 0 0 +2 +1 +1 +1 +2 +1 0 -2 -2 -1  
Total Agencies 1 3 4 7 8 9 9 10 10 10 10 12 13 14 15 17 18 18 16 14 13  
 
 





Wales stood apart during Next Steps, only gaining one agency of its own.   Three further Welsh 
agencies were launched after devolution, though, by 2005, three had also been lost.  Despite the 
rollback in Wales predating that in Scotland, their agency stories display several similarities.  In 
particular, no agency-to-agency mergers have occurred, making de-agencification the dominant 
reaggregation mechanism.  Furthermore, in both countries, the changes occurred against a Ǯǯ(for details of this in Wales, see Thomas, 2004). 










































































































Launches 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Reintegrations - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 - - - - - 3 
Net Change +1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +1 0 0 +1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0  
Total Agencies 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1  
 
Northern Ireland ǯ-historical and political 
particularities, including the existence of a separate civil service (the NICS).  By 1998, 25 
agencies had been established:  
ǯǢ ? ?
as part of the NICS (Minister for the Cabinet Office, 1999, p.252).  Unlike in Scotland and Wales, 
net agency reductions began soon after 1999, though the decline was not dramatic.  Between 
2003 and 2005, the population stabilised at 22, before a second period of reaggregation 
followed the Review of Public Administration (2006).  This came in response to accusations that 
Northern Ireland was vastly over-administered (Knox & Carmichael, 2006), and resulted in a 
major rationalisation through a combination of mergers and reintegrations, leaving 13 agencies 
by the end of 2010.   
 




















































































































Launches 1 2 3 3 0 5 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 28 
Mergers - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 2 - - 6 
Reintegrations - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 2 - - - 2 - 1 1 - 7 
Misc. - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - - - 2 
Net Change +1 +2 +3 +3 0 +5 +10 0 +1 0 -1 0 -3 +1 0 0 -2 -3 -3 -1 0  
Total Agencies 1 3 6 9 9 14 24 24 25 25 24 24 21 22 22 22 20 17 14 13 13  
 
UK central government 
Developments in core UK agencies were discussed in Chapter 2.  The disaggregated data is 
presented below. 

























































































































Launches 3 6 23 18 15 10 11 8 21 11 3 6 4 4 2 6 2 4 4 4 5 2 2 174 
Privatisations - - - - - 1 - 3 8 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15 
Mergers - - - - - - - 4 1 - 2 6 3 4 2 6 2 1 4 4 6 3 - 48 
Reintegrations - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 5 3 - - 3 5 3 8 2 - 2 33 
Misc. - - - - - - 1 - 2 - 1 2 - 2 - 2 - 3 1 1 3 1 2 21 
Net Change +3 +6 +23 +18 +15 +9 +10 +1 +10 +8 -1 -3 -4 -5 0 -2 -3 -5 -4 -9 -6 -2 -2  
Total Agencies 3 9 32 50 65 74 84 85 95 103 102 99 95 90 90 88 85 80 76 67 61 59 57  
 
  




Appendix II Ȃ Research Governance 
As well as establishing this stuǯ (meta-)theoretical origins, Chapter 3 described the design 
and implementation of its empirical components.  This appendix elaborates upon the specific 
methodological issues of ethical clearance and participant access. 
Ethical clearance 
The research was conducted in line with the Framework for Research Ethics developed by the 
UK Economic and Social Research Council and codified in the policies and procedures instituted 
by the School of Sociology and Social Policy ȋǮǯȌand wider University of Nottingham 
Research Ethics Committee.  The overarching aim was to ensure thorough, explicit and ongoing 
consideration of ethical issues during the project, with an emphasis on participant protection.  
Before any approach was made to government, an initial ethical review was conducted using the ǯ Research Ethics Checklist.  This addressed matters ranging from participant 
vulnerability, anonymity and access, to data storage and researcher identity.  The checklist was 
signed by the research supervisor and submitted to the internal examiner and postgraduate 
research convenor at the first-year doctoral progress review.  Thereafter, as access negotiations 
proceeded (see overleaf), the review was updated and a participant information sheet and 
consent form developed.  These were modified from School templates, and provided the basis ǯ.   
In bullet-point format, the information sheet gave details of the researcher, supervisor and 
School research ethics officer; the project aims and the rationale behind participant selection; 
the permission granted by the case study organisations; the ǯ
participation, and their likely time commitment; the Ǯ-attributaǯ
(see below); the request to record and transcribe conversations; and the likely dissemination 
routes for the research, including to employer organisations.  On anonymity specifically, the 
information sheet said: 




ǲEvery effort will made be to ensure the anonymity of participants in the research Ǥ      Ǯ-ǯ Ǣ ǤǤǡ 
and quotations will be cited without precise reference to their source, thus: ǮAn official 
in the policy division commented that...; it emerged from an agency manager that...ǯ.  
Even so, an absolute guarantee of anonymity cannot be made for all participants, given 
the uniqueness of some organisational roles and the potential for colleagues to ǯs contribution.  The identity of the case organisations will be made 
explicit in the research outputs.ǳȋǣȌ 
The interview consent form contained a series of first-person statements summarising the 
terms of engagement outlined in the information sheet ǮǯȀ ǯǯ from 
participants to indicate approval.  Once access negotiations concluded, the updated checklist, 
information sheet and this consent form were approved by the School research ethics officer 
prior to the commencement of the fieldwork. 
Access 
Initially, the MoJ Secretariat was formally approached about the research project.  Towards the 
end of the three-month deliberation that ensued, the chief executives of the three agencies were 
contacted, as were senior management in the Cabinet Office.  Once agreement was reached, 
initial interviews were established on a self-select basis with those involved in the access 
discussions.  Thereafter, Ǯǯmmendation or 
involvement in particular projects or work streams.  In all cases, initial contact was by email.  
This detailed the broad aims of the research, the permission already gained from the MoJ and 
agency chief executives, and the reasoning behind the particular interview request (for instance, 
involvement with an example policy, such as PbR or Working Prisons).  A one-page briefing on 
research aims and policy relevance was attached which elaborated on the research focus and its 
relevance to both the ǯ      
ǯ 
administrative reform agenda.  If officials agreed to contribute, the participant information 
sheet and consent form were then supplied electronically before meetings, and discussed and 
signed at the start of the interview.  For those requesting transcript review rights or unrecorded 
discussions, the declaration was amended accordingly.  




Appendix III Ȃ Interview and Document Codes 
 

































































Document_001-004 Ȃ OPG consultation papers 
Document_005/006 Ȃ OPG Digital Transformation papers 
Document_007/008 Ȃ MoJ Internal Audit papers 
Document_009 Ȃ Cabinet Office Public Bodies Reforms papers 
Document_010 Ȃ MoJ Justice Transformed strategy 
Document_011 Ȃ MoJ Guide for Policymakers 
Document_012 Ȃ NOMS Operational Policy Group papers 
Document_013 Ȃ MoJ Target Operating Model Blueprint 
Document_014 Ȃ Email 
Document_015 Ȃ Email 
Document_016/018/020/029 Ȃ MoJ Staff Insight Magazine 
Document_017 Ȃ MoJ Departmental Governance papers 
Document_019 Ȃ Hand drawn diagram of Payment by Results economic model 
Document_021 Ȃ Restricted 
Document_022 Ȃ Public Guardian Board Stakeholder Meeting papers 
Document_023-025 Ȃ Criminal Justice System Efficiency Programme papers 
Document_026 Ȃ Hand drawn diagram of HMCTS strategy 
Document_027 Ȃ Public Guardian Board Annual Report 
Document_028 Ȃ MoJ/JPG PowerPoint sides for new staff 
Document_030 Ȃ Email 
Document_031 Ȃ HMCTS Enforcement Contracting papers 
Document_032 Ȃ Email 
Document_033/034 Ȃ MoJ/JPG Blueprint Staff Consultation  
Document_035-038 Ȃ ǯ-Length Bodies Governance documentation 
Document_039 Ȃ Criminal Enforcement Legislative Changes Impact Assessment 
  




Appendix IV Ȃ Transcription Conventions 
 
Boxes 
Boxes are used within the thesis to either present formal argumentation, or to delimit 
narratives or narrative-like passages.  For the sake of clarity or conciseness, these Ǯǯ e quotation with paraphrasing, which preserves narrative structure, key 
distinctions and other linguistic features, but reduces length and removes extraneous detail. 
Style sheet        ȋǲ ǳȌǢ   use single quote ȋǮǯȌǤ 
Italicised quotations, whether in boxes or indented within the commentary, indicate text treated 
as data.  Italicisation within the regular commentary is for emphasis.  To avoid confusion, 
data quoted within the commentary is not italicised. 
Unless otherwise stated, single-underlining within quotations indicates words referenced in the 
commentaries above and beneath. 
In formal and rhetorical argumentation, double-underlining indicates an implicit premise within 
an enthymeme (see Chapter 3). 
A hanging dash (-) indicates trailed off speech, a change of direction, or an interruption.   
Ellipses (...) indicate omitted text.  Where, for the sake of clarity or conciseness, longer passages 
are omittedǡǮǯǮǯǤ 
Contextual material is contained in square brackets []. 
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